La Rochefoucauld's maxims analysis. Francois La Rochefoucauld - maxims
Ivan Nikiforovich Khudenko was a typical character of that era - a “sixties worker” from agriculture. The son of a peasant, he was born in 1918, graduated from a financial and credit technical school in 1934 and was sent to work as an assistant accountant at a state farm. He went through the Finnish and Great Patriotic Wars, serving “in the economic sector.” In 1957, he was demobilized with the rank of captain, settled in Alma Ata, and became head of the state farm financing department in the Ministry of Agriculture of the Kazakh SSR. However, he could not calmly shift the papers. Khudenko’s widow, Tatyana Gavrilovna, recalled: “We used to sit and watch TV, and suddenly someone would speak on economic issues. Ivan Nikiforovich immediately grabs a pencil, writes down all the numbers, recalculates and then sends his opinion: this, they say, is true, but this is not true, a lie! He loved numbers, as long as they were honest. And if they were dishonest, then he simply suffered! He did not tolerate disorder... He said that good is lying under our feet, and we are trampling on it... Give a man freedom, he said, so he will move mountains!”
In the early 1960s, a restless economist was given control of the diversified state farm “Iliysky” in Alma-Ata region. Here Khudenko set up an experiment to introduce a “no-order system of organization and remuneration of labor.” To put it simply, Khudenko transferred his state farm to full self-financing, supported by direct material incentives for workers. The results achieved were paid, not the efforts expended.
Instead of a cumbersome system of three complex departments and nine field crews with a huge number of workers and common, that is, “draw”, equipment, 17 units of 4–5 people were created with equipment assigned to them (combines, tractors, etc.) . Each link had strictly defined functions and a fund of costs for their implementation. Previously, up to 500–600 people worked at nine leks, depending on the amount of grain. After the reorganization according to the Khudenko system, three mechanized currents were created, and they were serviced by only 12 people. The number of managers at the state farm was reduced from 132 to two people - the manager (also the chief agronomist) and the economist/accountant of the grain department remained.
The economic results of the experiment were stunning. Work on the new system started on March 1, 1963. During the first season, grain production on the state farm increased 2.9 times, profit per worker increased seven times, and the cost of a hundredweight of grain fell from 5–7 rubles to 63 kopecks. Employee productivity in mechanized units increased almost 20 times over the year. Revenues increased accordingly. The head of the unit received 350 rubles a month, his machine operators received 330 rubles. In other state farms of the USSR, 100 rubles were considered a good monthly income.
The central press burst out with laudatory publications, Kazakh documentarians made a film about Khudenko, “Man on Earth,” and the fathers of the republic closed the experiment at the end of the farming season. Moscow economists who came to defend the innovator were told honestly: Khudenko “disturbs social peace.” The fact is that the number of workers employed at Ilisky under Ivan Khudenko’s system decreased from 863 to 85 people. The author of the experiment proposed a solution to the problem: to build a fruit and vegetable plant in Ilisky, which would supply the Kazakh capital with fresh and canned vegetables and fruits all year round. But this required additional funds... In addition, Khudenko proposed to extend his experience to the entire agricultural sector of the country. In this case, 33 million of the 40 million peasants then employed in production would have to be re-employed. At the end of 1964, the new First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, watched the film “Man on Earth” and concluded the discussion: “This matter is premature.”
When the USSR restored industry destroyed by the war and gained the opportunity for peaceful development, industrial experimentation was the norm in the late 50s and early 60s of the USSR. Experiments were also carried out in agriculture, already planned, partly industrial, which did not let the country down in the war, but essentially ineffective: with low labor productivity, with a high percentage of manual labor, with patriarchal remnants (natural homestead). They experimented not only with corn and did not just plow up virgin soil. They relied on state farms and looked for the best options. State farms were created in the Moscow region, which were unique research institutes; near Kiev, on the contrary, research institutes were created, with state farms as an experimental base. Experimental stations on the basis of state farms were established throughout the Union. In order not to wait for mercy from nature, laboratories for growing humus were also organized in areas of risky farming. They experimented not only in the field of agriculture, but also in the field of economics. In Belarus under Masherov, the experience that was discussed in the 20s and which was used in industry during the Great Patriotic War will continue. In order to remove the price scissors between raw materials and manufactured products, taking into account that planning is the distribution of labor time (Marx), the total volume of socially necessary labor was calculated in both direct and indirect costs necessary for the production of the product. Based on this, settlements between enterprises that produce, process, store and sell agricultural products were carried out not in cash, but as an offset of “labor costs” per unit of production. Self-financing was also developed, and collective brigade contracting was introduced. But the most resonant experiment turned out to be in Kazakhstan on the introduction of a “unemployed-link system of organization and remuneration of labor,” developed by economist Ivan Khudenko, whose preparation began in 1960 at the Iliysky state farm, near Alma-Ata. The experiment itself began on March 1, 1963.
At that time, the State Planning Committee, when planning cost funds per unit of output in heavy industry, used the method of linear programming developed back in the 30s by Nobel Prize winner Academician L.V. Kantorovich. It is summarized in the book, “Mathematical methods of organizing and planning production.” Leningrad: Leningrad State University Publishing House, 1959. Already this method of mathematical modeling made it possible to make both long-term and short-term (correlated) economic calculations of the resources and funds necessary for the production of almost any type of product in large-scale industry. With the invention of electronic computing technology and the creation of a network of computer centers, the possibilities of introducing mathematical methods into planning increased sharply, but this also required corresponding economic ideas.
Khudenko worked as head of the state farm financing department in the Ministry of Agriculture of the Kazakh SSR. To carry out similar calculations in agriculture, a certain intellectual courage was required, because 40 million people employed in the countryside did not fit into any economic calculations. “According to the USSR Central Statistical Office, agriculture has 60 billion rubles worth of fixed production assets, and employs 40 million people. With a new one, economically justified no, organizing production will require 7 million people, and fixed assets - 32 billion rubles. Currently the state is forced build housing and cultural facilities for 40 million people instead of 7 million. But since all this cannot be done in a short time, almost all 40 million agricultural workers still live in primitive conditions. If the funds allocated annually for these purposes use for 7 million people, then they, being interested in production, they would produce 197 billion rubles (currently 47 billion rubles are produced), or four times more. People would live in cultural conditions, and the state would annually receive a net profit of 170 billion rubles, instead of the 38 billion rubles currently received,” wrote Ivan Khudenko.
The conclusion that Khudenko comes to, using the example of “his” state farms, is the following: to implement economic calculations in practice in agriculture, both a new system of organizing production and distribution by labor are needed. Mathematically this can be expressed as follows. There are mandatory labor costs. Problem: how force a private person, a professional cretin, essentially an irresponsible person, do his best so that his work is not simply equal to the obligatory labor costs, but goes beyond the limits of this equality, is individual, creative, depending on his personal abilities? Ethically, this task stands like this. How can we, with those people who exist (there are no others), move from Franklin’s formula “time is money” to Marx’s formula “Free time as a measure of the wealth of human culture...” After all, the disinterest of workers in the results of their labor is a question that is relevant here for hundreds of years. He also stood before socialism. Through “indifference” to labor, wrote Weber, the “negative participation of workers in the management” of production is manifested. Capital offers one method for this sabotage (Taylor) - regulation of each production operation, constant and vigilant control over the execution of work, involving a huge number of different kinds of supervisors, a system of punishments for violations.
At the same time, the labor organization system worked out by Khudenko was simple and ingenious: in addition to reducing the number of production workers by 10 times (the state farm where Khudenko undertook to implement his system previously employed 853 people), it was simplified and reduced to a minimum ( starting and ending point) resource accounting, and with it 132 people accountants and managers. 17 units of 5-7 people were created with equipment assigned to them (harvesters, tractors, etc.) and funds that they manage and are responsible for. For Khudenko, overcoming sabotage, “negative participation in management,” is achieved through the positive inclusion of workers in management. In the place of the overseer is a self-governing production team, but the money formally remains in the form of natural cost funds, which are managed by each link and, in fact, in the form of wages, which each manages individually. If you squander it, you will be left with nothing; if you save, use it for development. By being included in the management and disposal of funds, a person became responsible for the overall result and personally interested in the results of his work. In just one year, the savings in the use of material resources: diesel fuel, spare parts, etc., were threefold. An interesting point is that the repair crew was paid according to the principle - the less equipment is repaired, the higher the wages of the repairmen. This is exactly the decision that was made at the leadership council.
As already mentioned, out of 132 accountants and managers, Khudenko left only the director (also the chief agronomist), who was subordinate to the advice of the foremen and the economist-accountant (coordinator of the experiment). At nine currents, previously up to 500-600 people worked per season, three mechanized currents were created, and they were serviced by as many as 12 people. In the first year, the economic results were stunning. Indicators of grain production by mechanized units in 1963 compared to 1962 are presented as follows:
Gross grain harvest in tons- 9204, compared to - 3150 in 1962 Number of average annual employees- 29 people, compared to 202 in 1962. Grain produced per worker- 317.3 tons, compared to 15.6 in 1962 Payroll fund (thousand rubles)- 59, in comparison - this is 181 in 1962.
As can be seen, in 1963 compared to 1962, grain production increased 2.9 times, mechanized units increased labor productivity 20 times. In 1964, the state farm handed over to the state more than 1 million poods of grain - more than two times more than in previous years. The salary fund was saved 3 times, and the use of natural funds decreased by the same amount. At the same time, the cost of a hundredweight of grain fell from 5-7 rubles to 63 kopecks. Accordingly, the salary increased to 300-350 rubles. Houses were built according to an individual project, water supply was installed, electric stoves were installed, they abandoned the homestead, laid out a winter garden, their own theater...
However, the experiment was interrupted, despite all the successes. But rather, precisely because of these successes. Khudenko, with his experiments, found himself at the forefront of the struggle that took place in the 60s between market people and “non-commodity people” in the USSR. His “cost accounting,” the worker’s interest in the results of his labor, fit into the system of economic planning, but undermined the monopoly of departmental cost accounting. The fight went on with varying degrees of success. Five years later, having received the support of the Deputy Minister of Agriculture of Kazakhstan A. Elemanov, Khudenko will again continue his experience at another state farm, Akchi, officially called an “experimental farm for the production of vitamin herbal flour.” The addition of such flour, which contains a lot of protein and vitamins, to the diet of cows increases milk yield by 30-40%. The principle of labor organization is the same as in Iliysky. All units were in full control of the funds; management was carried out through the council of the units. Director Mikhail Li reported to the council, Khudenko coordinated the experiment. Over time, the need for these positions will disappear. The experiment was again closed in a barbaric manner. Khudenko will continue to fight, hold round tables, sue, find support in Moscow, but the opponents will be stronger, they will find a formal pretext and Khudenko will be sent to prison, where he died in 1974. Base? Khudenko undermined social peace and created unemployment. This decision will be made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, when the experiment was closed, the Jesuit communists who believed in communism, but ignored (did not understand) the theory of Marx and did not believe in the communist revolution, won.
In fact, if Khudenko's experiment undermined anything, it was the foundations of the division of labor on which the modern production system is based - the basis for dividing people into classes. Khudenko's production units were united into a self-governing labor collective. It is governed by a council of foremen (leaders). Annual, or even seasonal, mandatory rotation of the council, everyone learns to manage and manage the results of their work. Khudenko has management of man by man, i.e. forced labor by another person ceases to be a profession. The principle of self-government works. This is the first step towards the transition “from managing people to managing things and processes.”
This put on the agenda a number of issues that could not be resolved within the framework of the experiment. Firstly, with such high labor productivity, it was completely logical to raise the issue of reducing the working day (and the transition to a five-hour working day was discussed in the USSR in the 60s). Secondly, the experiment showed that a person who is fluent in various professional methods of activity - from agriculture and mechanization to production process management - is the norm: this means narrow specialization is a deviation. Third, which is completely logical, such a level of production culture required a transition to universal higher education, but not any higher education, namely universal laboratory polytechnic education, which was abandoned in the USSR in the 30s. I generally adhere to the point of view that the refusal of the communists in the USSR to introduce universal higher education laboratory education - This is a strategic mistake of the party, which led to the defeat of socialism.
The experience of creating self-governing labor collectives, which was reproduced by Khudenko, i.e. the experience of including every person involved in production in managing the process of this production and managing planned funds is just part of the solution to the general task of eliminating the division of labor, i.e. the destruction of all forms of servility, domination and forced labor. The content of socialism is destruction, i.e. Sprengung - explosion (Engels) of the entire old bourgeois state machine, the apparatus of violence and the system of forcing hired workers to work, the destruction of all forms of coercion of man by man, which is possible only through training and the involvement of “cook’s children” in management. Every person, without exception, must be trained and included in the management process. This is exactly what Khudenko shows us using the example of labor organization in the form of a self-governing labor collective. By the way, Khudenko’s experience directly resonates with the system labor organization, which was cultivated by A.S. Makarenko. Elements of self-government could be found in large numbers at all levels of the organization of Soviet society - from the pioneer and Komsomol organizations - to the workforce of a factory or research institute. But the problem is that you cannot build an integral system of public self-government from individual elements. In addition to individual elements and experiments, each of which needs to be carefully studied and popularized, we also need a general integrating idea - the idea of destroying the prevailing system of exploitation of man by man and creating conditions for the transition to a society without classes, without forced labor - a society of self-governing collectives.
"This work represents an attempt analysis of the lessons from experiments conducted by I. N. Khudenko in Kazakhstan - in 1963 at the Ilisky state farm and in 1967-1969 at the Experimental Farm for the Production of Vitamin-Herbal Flour in the village of Akshiy (Alma-Ata Region).The author repeatedly had the opportunity to talk with I. N. Khudenko about the problems of the experiments he was conducting, their socio-economic essence, get acquainted with the documentation on the experiments, talk with farm workers in Akshiy, meet and discuss the problems of the experiment with Academician T. I. Zaslavskaya (then Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences), employees of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Economic Sciences V.D. Belkin, Candidate of Economic Sciences V.I. Perevedentsev, who studied the results of the experiment, took part in the round table organized by Literaturnaya Gazeta and in a trial as a witness.
The core question socio-economic experiments of I. N. Khudenko, the idea of which he substantiated and sent to the USSR Government in 1960, was the introduction of full self-financing in industries in which the results of labor are not adequate to the labor processes (agriculture, construction, geology, fisheries, etc. ) using the “closed box” method. The essence of the method is as follows: labor efficiency is assessed by comparing the standard costs of living and embodied labor (determined at the input to the “box”) and the actual costs (determined at the output) with the result. Theoretically, this part of the method is not new. The merit of the author is that he substantiated the expediency of its use, since in real economic management the method was not used, being replaced, based on the dogmatically understood and interpreted position of V.I. Lenin - “socialism is accounting,” taking into account labor processes.
From the book "MEMORIES OF THE FUTURE", Ruslan Azimov. In agriculture, for example, labor assessment was carried out operationally (plowing, harrowing, sowing, weeding, harvesting, etc.) according to labor processes. This order, not only forced a lot of accountants, but also gave rise to economic and moral imbalances. The machine operator could plow perfectly, but it turned out that plowing was unnecessary or even harmful for the final result. Sowing could be carried out quickly and technically flawlessly, but not in optimal agrotechnical terms, etc. Thus, many intermediate operations could be carried out well, even perfectly, but the final result could be zero either due to one unfulfilled or not performed duration of the technological operation.
It should be noted Another feature is the advantage provided by using the “black box” method - this is the ability to have only one account in the bank, reflecting the income and expenses of the account owner. This also increases the efficiency of the economic management mechanism.
New in the author's proposal was a method of overcoming the difficulties of calculating socially necessary labor costs per unit of production. In capitalist production, socially necessary costs are determined by the market. In our country, it was understood that this could be done through scientifically based standards. However, the regulatory framework was the “Achilles heel” of the economy, and remains so today. I. N. Khudenko proposes to take the best world achievements (not the industry average, not the world average, but the best) as the basis for rationing the costs of living labor. But with the condition that if the producer does a better job, then all the savings in living and embodied labor remain with him. This proposal solves a lot of problems: no one needs to be persuaded not to drive the K-700 to their mother-in-law for pancakes, no one needs to be rewarded for saving fuel, spare parts, tires, etc. There was no need for masses of accountants and accounting documents; everything was decided by the standards and the fence map. This ensured the coincidence of interests of the individual, the collective and society. In case the producer's income increased immoderately, I. N. Khudenko proposed introducing a truly progressive income tax. That’s right, not a “pay ceiling,” but a progressive income tax, in which up to 90 percent of wages could be taxed if they were excessively high.
Another fundamental point the author had a wage standard. Since the subsistence minimum was not calculated in our country (the resolution on its calculation was adopted only in 1987 - Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 825), the voluntaristic approach prevailed and continues to prevail in tariff payments. The necessary labor is not consistent with prices and needs. The author, based on the position of K. Marx that if the producer’s wages differ significantly from the average, he will find a way to compensate (in other words, he will steal, if not the product, then time), he proposed paying for living labor in advance, taking into account the norm (share) of living labor per unit of production. Due to the complexity of this procedure, the amount of the advance was determined at 1.5 rubles per man-hour or 250 rubles per month (with a minimum payment at that time of 30 rubles). Moreover, based on the fact that work is a socially useful activity, none of the types of work in itself can be either good or bad (“all work is good, choose to your taste”), the standard advance payment was equal for everyone (director, machine operator, accountant, etc.) the final payment was made based on the results of the work. Better, greater qualifications, skill, and diligence manifested themselves as a result.
The proposal proposed by I. N. Khudenko was also novel. organization and formation of labor collectives and their management. Taking into account the seasonal nature of work in agriculture (and a number of other industries), the author substantiated the need for an average annual seven-hour working day, and not a 41-hour week or a seven-hour working day (eight-hour in a five-day week).
Recruitment of the workforce carried out by the collective itself (after, of course, the formation of the protonucleus). The main, initial cell is the self-supporting link, which is part of the team of the self-supporting enterprise. The management and management of the farm are elected and report to the team. The management of the enterprise is carried out by a council of managers, current management is carried out by a self-supporting management unit that exists on a statutory (contractual) percentage of income. There is no labor plan or headcount limit.
Using a similar method The experiment at the Ilisky state farm was carried out from March 1963 until the end of the year. Main results. The work in field cultivation, which 800 people could not cope with before the experiment (500 people were involved in the harvesting from Alma-Ata), was completed by 80 people. The growth in labor productivity is impressive. However, financially, the affairs of the experimental farm turned out to be not so brilliant - they practically did not improve. Analysis of the causes is important not only from the point of view of evaluating the experiment and its immediate results, but also from the point of view of the problems generated by the new economic system. The first problem arose as a consequence between economic accounting and the lack of wholesale trade in fixed assets.
On an experimental farm There were agricultural equipment for 800 people, in particular 225 tractors. The experimental farm kept the equipment for 67 people (80 tractors), and having repaired the rest, it decided to sell it, so as not to pay very significant depreciation charges and not to waste the equipment. The farm was denied assistance in resolving this issue and had to pay depreciation.
Second problem turned out to be even more difficult: the one-time release of more than 700 people created an employment problem. Employing 700 people is not easy in a large city, but where to find work in the countryside? No assistance was provided to the experimental farm. The farm was forced to pay the minimum wage that existed at that time - 30 rubles, as unemployment benefits. This gave rise to a social conflict: many, the majority, demanded work, not benefits. But still benefits placed a heavy burden on the economy of the experimental farm. The financial situation of the experimental farm was complicated by the fact that The winter crops sown by his predecessors froze, and the losses were “blamed” on the new farm.
And another lesson was given by the experiment- raised the problem of radical improvement of management. Since the basis for assessing farm activity was the comparison of standard costs and actual costs, there was no need for a mass of intermediate accounting and reporting operations both at the level of statistics and agricultural authorities, planning, and Soviet ones. Managerial workers at these levels felt out of place - the old management methods were no longer suitable, and they were not ready for the new ones, especially since in the new conditions many of them objectively became unnecessary.”
The experiment at Iliysky was interrupted, but I.N. Khudenko did not lose hope of resuming it. After a year and a half of working at the state farm, he became convinced of the economic efficiency of his system. But, at the same time, I realized that it was impossible to impose a new business model on the old, established structure of the state economy with a bureaucratic management apparatus and a semi-descendant mentality of workers. It was necessary to create a new economy, where initially there could be no extra people or extra equipment.
At the Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakhstan at that time A.E. Elemanov worked as deputy minister. According to those who knew him, he was an erudite, an enthusiast, a man of crystal honesty. For several years, until his death, he supported I.N. Khudenko and personally controlled, in defiance of the party authorities, the creation and operation of experimental farms.
With the assistance of A.E. Elemanov, After some time, Khudenko managed to continue the experiment. The Iliysky state farm still houses people who worked at the Experimental Farm for the Production of Vitamin-Herbal Flour, organized on the initiative of I.N. Khudenko. For them, the years of work on the experimental state farm remained the most memorable, the most significant against the backdrop of decades of peasant labor. And there was a reason. In Khudenko’s new household, the “office” fit into the room in which he himself lived. But houses for workers in the village of Akshiy under Ivan Nikiforovich were built with five rooms, an area of over 90 square meters, with hot water and electric heating. Isn't it true that today only the wealthiest farmers can afford such urban amenities? And in the Experimental Farm, such houses were built for ordinary workers, since in its system the visible material foundation of democracy was combined with free labor and prosperity.
Those understood this well, who followed their former director to Akshiy, where a new, literally and figuratively, economy was to be created in the semi-desert. Their enthusiasm cannot be explained by high earnings alone. And there could not be a “long ruble” until the economy reached its designed capacity. Like-minded people gathered in Akshiy and decided not just to work well and earn money: these people wanted to build themselves a truly free life.
At the head of the Experimental Farm there was a coordination unit of two people. The director was Mikhail Vasilyevich Li, and the economist-accountant was Ivan Nikiforovich Khudenko. All decisions were made collectively, at the farm council, and therefore the management level was the executive body. In order to restore a complete picture of work and life at the Experimental Farm, let us turn to the memories of those who worked there in 1968-1970.
“When we arrived in Akshiy“,” says G. A. Ilyan, “we did not have to abolish the functions of accountants and controllers, as in Iliysky.” We abandoned them immediately so as not to overinflate our staff. Everyone had to receive a salary depending on the quantity and quality of the final product. And no one was paid on the farm for intermediate products or services, such as repairs, etc. Then you will understand why.
Zvenev in crop production They chose me, although the team included many people with higher education, for example, Vladimir Antonovich Khvan, who previously worked as the chief engineer of the T. Bokin state farm, and other specialists from different farms. Yes, no one was chasing positions, since decisions were made at the council, and then everyone did their job. For example, I also transported flour to a feed mill, since I was, in fact, a team driver. Paperwork took almost no time: we only took into account costs and products. The work was organized in such a way that no one could “rest” at the expense of their comrades. After all, we didn’t have extra people, and if someone suddenly wanted to take a nap in the far field, then the output of the final product would drop by tons per day. And we would quickly find the quitter along the chain. But we didn’t have this and couldn’t have it. Reliable people were selected, everyone was vouched for by the team.
All improvement proposals We implemented it in our own unit without any approval from the director or Khudenko. He taught us this himself. And then they didn’t go and beg for a bonus from their native state, as was customary at that time. We knew that any innovation, if effective, would affect the final result, and therefore our earnings.
We sold the products directly to the state, at a fixed price, in which, by the way, profit was excluded. That is, we received a high salary for those times, and we took out equipment on credit and paid for it with products. And they built and expanded production. And all the profits went to the state. At the same time, in Akshiy we built houses for workers, in which later, when the experiment was closed, the district authorities moved in. And the bosses, they won’t move into a bad house...
I can’t remember without pain how the Ministry of Agriculture literally destroyed our experiment. Managers at all levels of the administrative pyramid felt their existence threatened. They were simply not needed in such quantities. Imagine that, following the model and likeness of the Experimental Farm, hundreds and thousands of farms would be created in the republic. We, peasants, would pay interest to managers from our personal income, just as farmers in the West pay various kinds of consultants and entrepreneurs from the service sector...
In the Experimental Farm, as I already said, there were two managers. They subsisted on 10 percent of our total salary. All overhead expenses of managers, as well as their salaries, were included in this amount. Lee and Khudenko were forced to cut non-productive expenses in order to earn more on payday. If the entire agricultural management system worked according to this scheme, then the administrative staff would not swell from year to year and the savings across the country would be astronomical... The standard of socially necessary costs in Akshiy included the highest level of labor productivity in the world. And we, 48 people, once delivered 1,150 tons of products of the highest quality in a month. In just one year, our farm produced a third of the total volume of vitamin-herbal flour prepared in Kazakhstan!
I can talk for a long time about life and work at the Experimental Farm.. But I want to highlight the main thing. Those who went through Khudenko’s school could no longer work poorly, no matter where they ended up after the experiment was closed. We understood not only the principles of scientific organization of labor, the payment system and much more. The main thing was that Ivan Nikiforovich, through work, through everyday communication, conveyed to us his attitude to life, one might say, in a philosophical sense. We saw firsthand that people themselves can build a beautiful life for themselves. The work was to their liking; they were going to provide everyone with apartments for two years. Those who were among the first to become “homeowners” acquired a special dignity (I’m not talking about the joy that is natural for any new settler): quality housing, a high standard of living, coupled with free labor, happily transformed yesterday’s state farm farmhand.
Let me give you a case to prove it.. Once Khudenko and Lee went to Alma-Ata on business, and the Minister of Procurement came to visit us, I don’t think I remember now. On an ordinary state farm, the visit of such high authorities would have been arranged properly. A mandatory meeting, a red cloth on the presidium table, a decanter of water, the obsequious smiles of a dozen senior specialists... It so happened that we had no one to greet the guest. Khudenko and Lee were away, and the worker standing at the AVM (an automatic machine for processing vitamin flour) could not tear himself away from work: it was unthinkable to stop a unit that produced three tons of product per hour. In addition, the entire technological chain, from mowing in the field to packing the finished flour into bags, would have come to a standstill in the midst of the harvest. The minister (!) had to wait until the end of his shift to talk to the workers...»
Innokenty Antonovich Lee In the Experimental Farm for the Production of Herbal Flour, he headed the logistics department. A certified technologist for cold metal processing, “part-time” he was also a driver and a general-purpose turner. In a word, like a farmer in the West, he is both a Swede and a reaper. In addition to him, Alexey Timofeevich Kobylyatsky, Ivan Saponenko, Philip Andreevich Chitalov and Nikolai Maksimovich Evsyukov worked in the unit. They were responsible for the repair and maintenance of tractors, delivery of fuels and lubricants, refueling equipment in the field and installation of equipment. They also installed the Polish AVM unit, one of the most productive at that time. Each member of the unit had at least two specialties.
I. A. Lee told: “I read somewhere, there is such a formulation of happiness: it is when you happily go from home to work, and from work to home. Those who worked with Khudenko will not be able to forget the atmosphere of creativity, initiative, and freedom. He explained our functions this way: repairmen are needed not to repair the tractor, but to ensure that the equipment works without breakdowns, without stopping. Typically, workers in machine and tractor workshops or, say, plumbers in city building administrations work on piecework basis. It turns out that they are almost interested in the tractor breaking down as often as possible and the taps leaking everywhere. That is, everything is turned upside down. And if the plumber was paid to ensure that there were no complaints from residents, the fewer complaints, the more money. Then he would go around the apartments himself and do preventive measures... The same thing happened with us. As a salary, we received a percentage of the earnings of machine operators and machinists who directly grew alfalfa and processed it into flour. So we made sure that the tractors were not idle, so that the machine operators earned as much as possible.
In terms of productivity, the imported AVM unit was a real factory. He worked for us in three shifts and consumed 7.5 tons of diesel fuel per day. And our fuel tankers were small, two tons, one and a half tons. I had to redo it. In a normal Soviet economy, such “willfulness” was unthinkable. And if every question like how to re-equip fuel tankers had to be resolved at the authorities, we would have lost weeks.
When was the plant launched?, we began to need carts for transporting alfalfa grass. So we brought them from Tashkent in five days, 10 carts. But only two cars went. We were our own masters not only in production. Who can now announce to the director that the unit has done its job and our presence at the farm is not necessary for three days? And then the whole team, with their families, go to Issyk-Kul? Khudenko taught us that if there is no work, there is no point in pretending to work, we need to rest. This also increases overall labor productivity. And if we had free days, we took the bus and went swimming, sunbathing, frolicking with the children...
Well, they worked like a good owner in their garden - for themselves. It is no coincidence that we, in fact, as a small team, produced a third of all vitamin products in the republic. So I gave examples with rest specifically to show: Khudenko’s system did not focus on the intensity of work, it aimed at a high final result, which in the end is always and in everything achieved due to brain tension, excluding, of course, the work of professional weightlifters...If we could automate production in Akshiy, so as not to work physically at all, but at the same time produce more flour, we would think that productivity would increase. But things were heading towards this: the workers voraciously read “Technology for the Youth” and similar magazines, books, and brochures in order to give a boost to their brains. And Khudenko planned to automate irrigation on our lands. Of course, completely eliminating physical labor in the countryside is a fantasy. But, in essence, true progress is somewhere in this direction...”
...The Akshiy experiment was not just interrupted. He was literally destroyed. Much time later, Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Belkin and Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Perevedentsev published articles “The Akchi Drama” (April 1, 1987) and “Readers and Officials” (September 9, 1987) in the Literary Gazette, in which they named those who did not allow the sprouts of genuine self-financing to sprout. The administrative apparatus opposed the management system proposed by I. N. Khudenko. And this is understandable. For senior managers, supporting and disseminating Akshiy's experience would be tantamount to attending their own funeral. It turned out that agricultural leaders received all the awards, honors and material rewards for unknown reasons. Because Khudenko’s experiment was not only good in itself, it clearly demonstrated how bad things were in the entire republic, in the country.
If Khudenko's ideas found support and widespread adoption, this would be a genuine revolution in the economy. The country would provide itself with sufficient food and raw materials. The standard of living of the working people would actually increase. The system of recording labor processes, which gave nothing to anyone, neither the state nor the people, would collapse, except for the salaries of the army of accountants, accountants and economists. The then Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Kazakh SSR, A.E. Elemanov, was convinced of this, whose opinion was preserved in official correspondence. He had to fight for the continuation of the experiment in the village of Akshiy almost from the first days of organizing the Experimental Farm. Moreover, with his immediate superior - the Minister of Agriculture of the Kazakh SSR.
“Before recovering from the disease, I was deprived of the opportunity to personally inform you that the experiment at the Experimental Farm for the Production of Herbal Meal yielded positive results: labor productivity outpaces wage growth, profitability is also higher than that of our neighbors and in the republic as a whole,” he wrote on March 24, 1970, to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan G. A. Melnik. - Since some of our leading (Ministry of Agriculture) comrades force subordinate people, contrary to common sense, to turn normal figures into materials discrediting the experiment, I ask you, comrades A. N. Baranov, D. Mukashev, with the participation of I. N. Khudenko, to draw up an objective report on the economy economy and the labor productivity of its workers in 1969 and all materials should be considered in the agricultural department of the Central Committee of the CPC or the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR.”
Having not met with support from the leaders of our republic A.E. Elemanov repeatedly contacted Moscow. Here is one of his reports: “To the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade F.D. Kulakov. On the legalization of experiments that reveal the secret of the farmer’s soul
...In the state farms of Kazakhstan it is extremely the administrative and economic apparatus is inflated. On average, there are 110 employees of this apparatus per state farm. Within one month, the state farm needs to draw up 15 thousand different invoices, accounting sheets and other settlement documents containing 1,800 indicators just for accounting and payment of labor.
This huge documentation It is impossible to verify and practically the calculation of wages occurs uncontrollably with large violations and additions. Apparently the current system of payment and labor accounting is very complex. It is confusing and outdated, and does not provide the ability to provide truly correct accounting and control. Correctly organizing planning, rationing, accounting for work performed and the procedure for paying labor on state farms is the task of the Ministry of Agriculture. Over the past ten years, the state farm economy has not improved at all; on the contrary, it has worsened. Let us present specific figures from the consolidated annual reports on state farms.
The cost of 1 centner of grain from 1959 to 1968 increased from 4.07 rubles to 6.55 kopecks. Losses - from 10 million rubles to 130 million, overhead costs per 1 ruble of gross output from 0.1 ruble to 0.17. Gross output began to be produced in half.
Maybe the losses of 1968 in the amount of 130 million rubles were accidental? No. The losses of the next year, 1969, reach half a billion rubles. Meanwhile, as we are convinced by the experience of the unpaid-link system of organization and payment of labor, where state farms are now suffering losses, it is possible to make a profit.
This new system greatly reduces waste and automatically activates all production reserves. For comparison: all documents compiled on an experimental farm per year contain 34 thousand indicators, costing 1020 rubles, and on a regular state farm, the documentation contains about 20 million indicators worth 600 thousand rubles. The reduction in paperwork alone conceals a reserve of 800-900 million rubles per year for the state farms of the republic.
The fact is that the cost of one indicator with the costs of developing and publishing a tariff system with its ocean of norms and prices costs at least 3 kopecks, like one word on a telegraph. However, at the telegraph office, every sane person tries to send a telegram as cheaply as possible, avoiding duplication of words. In state farm plans, accounting and operational reports, there is a complete duplication of indicators. For example, land use of a state farm, herd turnover, product movement, number of employees, wages fund, capital construction, maintenance, field work are duplicated millions of times. Therefore, repeated attempts to reduce the cost of the apparatus led to the opposite phenomenon - over the past ten years, overhead costs on state farms increased from 10 to 17 kopecks per 1 ruble of gross output. These figures clearly convince us that it is necessary to establish a standard of indicators and a limit of money to pay for them. Similar to how it is done with telegraph and publishing expenses. There, money is spent per word, per printed sheet, etc. We, too, could set reporting at 34 thousand indicators for each state farm, and all correspondence at 100 pages.
Since things are not going well, we need to look for a way out. There are two ways:
1. Strengthen monitoring of the status of all indicators in order to increase their effectiveness, since they are recognized as necessary;
2. Dramatically reduce the number of indicators by using a completely new system of planning, accounting and reporting.
In the first case, the costs of unproductive labor will increase even more, which contradicts the latest regulations on reducing the cost and simplifying the economic apparatus.
In the second case, costs are reduced, but the question arises: how to do this?
To identify this opportunity, an experimental farm was created for the production of grass flour under the Ministry of Agriculture of the Kazakh SSR. In the experimental farm there are no orders, orders, accounting sheets, cash orders, etc. bureaucratic papers. All accounting, planning and financial documentation contains 34 thousand indicators per year. Translated into the language of economics, this means that with the new system of accounting and financing, the paper whirlwind would have carried away not 900 million state farm rubles per year over the past decade, but only two million, and the remaining 888 million would have more than covered the state farm losses reported mentioned above.
In the Experimental Farm, the five-year plan for production and delivery to the state, the number of employees and the wage fund, with the volume of capital investments and credit investments is placed on two pages, and the annual accounting report on its implementation is on one page.
Based on 34 thousand indicators, one economist-accountant compiled an annual report in three days and presented it to the Ministry of Agriculture on January 7. The main indicator is the gross income (newly created product), and in an ordinary economy - tens, even a hundred people, having written 20 million indicators in a year, cannot see in their swollen annual report such an important indicator as gross income (newly created product). Simply put, state farms and the Ministry are working with their eyes closed. They were covered with a sea of papers mentioned above.
It would seem that a “green street” should be open to a “small” accounting report, since it takes as a basis the only important indicator - gross income. By focusing on this indicator, you can boost the country’s economy in the shortest possible time. Without solving the general problem - revising the theoretical foundations of the rural economy - it is impossible to take on the solution of specific problems of increasing the efficiency of production in rural areas.
We deeply believe, that if the status of our experiment, which is now practically conducted by I. N. Khudenko, were published in the press and at the same time a competition was announced, then there would be a huge number of people willing to work on the new system. It would be possible to increase labor productivity and significantly raise the living standards of our people. After all, the logic of economics is that labor productivity is determined by one indicator - the amount of gross income (newly created product per average annual worker). And in rural areas they would be needed tens of times less than under the current system. The freed people would gradually move to other sectors of the national economy and the service sector. One villager would replace ten norms and prices entangled in the ocean. The control of many people over the activities of one specific commodity producer would become unnecessary.
About what is happening in other farms in Kazakhstan can be judged from the table below. The work of state and collective farms is usually judged by many indicators. But as soon as their activities were assessed by the size of the newly created product, that is, economic efficiency, a picture of a true catastrophe emerged.
These are the indicators:
Name of the indicator For state farms in 1969 (in rubles) In the village. Akshiy 1969 (in rubles)
The size of the newly created product per employee is 840 || 5140
Annual salary of one employee 1268 || 3,000
The numbers speak for themselves, however, it must be said that in the Experimental Farm, which has not yet reached its design capacity, labor productivity is ahead of wages, and in state farms, wages are one and a half times higher than the size of the newly created product. Simply put, materialized labor is being consumed. This is nothing more than the collapse of the current system of accounting, reporting, planning, financing, organization and remuneration, veiled by contradictory indicators. It was they who stifled the bright mind of the farmer, gave rise to indifference and indifference in him...
We kindly ask you to authorize an experiment on an unemployed-link system of organizing and remunerating labor at the Experimental Farm for the Production of Vitamin-Herbal Flour in accordance with the methodology approved by me, which was developed by economist I. N. Khudenko. By placing on me, of course, responsibility for the results. I have full confidence that the methodology we have presented will yield good results.
Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Kazakh SSR
A. Elemanov"
Mid 1970, before the harvest, the experiment was interrupted, and the Experimental Farm for the Production of Vitamin-Herbal Flour was liquidated. Ivan Nikiforovich Khudenko immediately began to seek its continuation. He again and again turned to scientists and party bodies with a request to help, to understand, and tried to reach the highest authorities. But by that time, he and his comrades had lost their main support: the Deputy Minister of Agriculture of Kazakhstan, A.E. Elemanov, had died.
Open persecution of I. N. Khudenko began. At first they tried to charge him with attempting to commit theft on an especially large scale. However, prosecutor E. Onegin from the USSR Prosecutor's Office proved that there was no embezzlement or embezzlement. Indeed, when organizing the Experimental Farm in Akshiy, the state allocated 1.6 million rubles. And at closing, its material assets and monetary amounts amounted to 2.1 million rubles. The case was dismissed “for lack of a crime.”
We recently quoted a case in which the historical doom of the Soviet system was reflected like a drop of water:
A major financial official of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the rank of deputy minister, Khudenko in 1960 voluntarily undertook to conduct an economic experiment on state farms in Kazakhstan. Khudenko's proposals were very simple: he proposed a system of complete self-financing and economic independence, and most importantly, a real system of material incentives. The results achieved were paid, not the efforts expended. The experiment was a fantastic success. The employment of people and machines on state farms was reduced by 10-12 times, the cost of grain by 4 times. Profit per worker increased 7 times, and wages increased 4 times. With figures in hand, Khudenko proved that the widespread introduction of his system in the country's agriculture would allow a fourfold increase in production volume - despite the fact that five million people would be employed in agriculture instead of the current thirty million.Newspapers wrote enthusiastically about Khudenko’s experiment and films were made, but no one was in a hurry to apply his system on a national scale. Moreover, in 1970 his Akchi state farm was closed by order from above. The state farm was closed at the height of the season, without paying the workers any money or returning the investments they had made. Khudenko and his workers continued to fight through legal means, turning to the courts. The vicissitudes of this struggle reflected the struggle within the Soviet leadership. Court decisions were overturned several times and new ones were adopted. Some press organs continued to write about the value of the experiment. And finally, in August 1973, Khudenko and his deputy were sentenced to six and four years for “theft of state property.” Even after the verdict, protests by major economic workers in the country continued over this case. November 12, 1974 Khudenko died in the prison hospital.
A detailed article about Khudenko was published in the January (2007) issue of Forbes magazine.
Author - I. Karatsuba, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor at Moscow State University.
On November 12, 1974, an unusual prisoner was dying in one of the prison hospitals of the Kazakh SSR. “The crisis came suddenly. Ivan Nikiforovich stood up on his hard metal bed, barely audibly said: “That’s all...”, took a frantic breath of air and fell onto the pillow. The doctor stated cardiopulmonary failure,” recalled the prisoner’s accomplice and ally Vladislav Filatov (published in the newspaper “Rural Life” in 1988). The name of the hero of the memoirs is Ivan Khudenko. In the 1960s, he tried to introduce capitalist methods of doing business in Soviet agriculture, achieved a 20-fold increase in labor productivity, but ended his days behind bars as a plunderer of socialist property.
The economic results of the experiment were stunning. Work on the new system started on March 1, 1963. During the first season, grain production on the state farm increased by 2.9 times, profit per worker by seven times, and the cost of a hundredweight of grain fell from 5-7 rubles to 63 kopecks. Employee productivity in mechanized units increased almost 20 times over the year. Revenues increased accordingly. The head of the unit received 350 rubles a month, his machine operators received 330 rubles. In other state farms of the USSR, 100 rubles were considered a good monthly income.
The central press burst out with laudatory publications, Kazakh documentarians made a film about Khudenko, “Man on Earth,” and the fathers of the republic closed the experiment at the end of the farming season. Moscow economists who came to defend the innovator were told honestly: Khudenko “disturbs social peace.” The fact is that the number of workers employed at Ilisky under Ivan Khudenko’s system decreased from 863 to 85 people. The author of the experiment proposed a solution to the problem: to build a fruit and vegetable plant in Ilisky, which would supply the Kazakh capital with fresh and canned vegetables and fruits all year round. But this required additional funds... In addition, Khudenko proposed to extend his experience to the entire agricultural sector of the country. In this case, 33 million of the 40 million peasants then employed in production would have to be re-employed. At the end of 1964, the new First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, watched the film “Man on Earth” and concluded the discussion: “This matter is premature.”
Already in the last Khrushchev years, the relative independence of the peasants came to an end. Material incentives, progressive methods of work - all this is nonsense, you just need to work better and follow the party line. It is all the more surprising that Ivan Khudenko in 1969 achieved a new experiment. Literally out of nowhere, in the Kazakh semi-desert, a small state farm “Akchi” was created, officially called an “experimental farm for the production of vitamin herbal flour.” The addition of such flour, which contains a lot of protein and vitamins, to the diet of cows increases milk yield by 30-40%. “Akchi” was again built from units (working groups, as they would say now) - mechanical, construction, and management. All levels worked on full self-support, and issues were resolved openly and quite democratically at the economic council, to which its director was subordinate. There were only two people at the management level - director Mikhail Li and economist-accountant Ivan Khudenko.
The experiment was carried out according to a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, and its terms were agreed upon with the union departments - the Labor Committee, the Central Statistical Office of the USSR, the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of the USSR. How Khudenko managed this is still a mystery. Labor productivity at Akchi was six times higher than the republican average, and wages were two to three times higher. The quality of the state farm's products, grass flour, was also unusually high. As Khudenko’s partner Vladislav Filatov recalled: “For the highest grade, the carotene content in grass flour was set at 180 units, but we had 280. The equipment went off scale, the inspectors could not believe their eyes. And we read that its content depends on the time of day. And they mowed at night, when carotene is at its maximum.”
Attracted by the spirit of free and creative work, Almaty architect Vladislav Filatov (already mentioned above), who with his team built comfortable houses for state farmers, and the director of the neighboring farm, Vladimir Khvan, moved to Akchi. The local and central press wrote about Akchi, and an article from Literaturnaya Gazeta was even reprinted by the Yugoslav communist organ Borba under the title “The secret of the economic miracle in the Kazakh state farm.”
In 1970, the experiment was closed, and in the most barbaric way. This is how Filatov remembered it: “It all looked like a robbery. In the middle of the day, a detachment of mounted police surrounded our plant for the production of herbal flour. People were literally pulled off tractors and driven away from the units working at the plant. From the outside it might seem that there is a manhunt for major criminals.” The state farm was closed at the height of the season, without paying the workers any money or returning the investments they had made.
Khudenko and his team fought for their cause for three years, visiting offices and newspaper editorial offices. Innovators were caught doing something stupid. Tired of fighting for the idea, Khudenko tried to return at least the money he earned at the state farm. Having filed a lawsuit, the economist sealed the document with the seal of the now non-existent Akchi. This became the formal reason to accuse Khudenko and his partners of attempting to steal state property. You know the end of this story.
A typical story for those years. One can recall the high-profile case of the chairman of the Kirov collective farm near Moscow (Chernaya village, Balashikha district) Ivan Snimshchikov. In 1952, he was elected the sixteenth chairman in five years of a collapsed farm with eighty employees, which ranked last in the region in all respects. Over the next seventeen years, Snimshchikov managed to bring the collective farm to the forefront. His collective farmers took on any business that could bring money. They unraveled old ropes lying on the ground in the ports of Riga, Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok, and made cables out of them for the needs of builders and electricians, sewed mattresses, made juices and jams from fruits and vegetables ruined by vegetable warehouses, and stamped plastic containers for perfume factories. All this was sold at “negotiated prices”, which provided funds for the development of the main business (livestock and crop production), construction and improvement. People returned to the collective farm; by 1969, Snimshchikov employed one and a half thousand people, and the total volume of products sold was 12 million rubles.
And everything would be fine, but Snimshchikov’s people lived shockingly well - the chairman paid his double salaries and took milkmaids around the Black Sea on ships. As a result, Snimshchikov was accused of “NEPmanism” and private property sentiments and was put on trial. The collective farm began to seethe, the tractor drivers shouted: “Now let’s start the tractors and go to Red Square with a demonstration.” Ivan Snimshchikov received six years with confiscation of property (900 rubles, according to the court list), was amnestied after five years, went blind and died in a tiny “Khrushchev” apartment.
The fate of the imprisoned Ukrainian Viktor Belokon, a one-legged war hero, whose collective farm “Serbs” flourished on the supply of apples and pears from near Odessa to Transbaikalia, was also tragic. Among those repressed for good work are Vladimir chairman Akim Gorshkov, Kuban combine operator Vladimir Pervitsky and many others. Meanwhile, under Brezhnev, agriculture plunged into depression. Since 1963, the USSR purchased food abroad. State investment in agriculture in 1966-1980 was estimated at 383 billion rubles - with almost zero return. Any person over 25 years old remembers that a couple of kilograms of meat could be obtained in one hand only by standing in line for three hours. You already know how this story ends.
And, by the way, a small detail of Akcha history: after the destruction of the Khudenkovo farm, the district committee authorities moved into the vacated houses of the evicted state farmers.
That's it.
The Soviet Union was not a tenant, not a tenant.
