Offensive on Leningrad 1941. Leningrad strategic defensive operation began

The capture of Leningrad was considered by Hitler as one of the most important military-political goals in the war against the Soviet Union. To implement it, the Wehrmacht High Command on July 8, 1941 set Army Group North (Field Marshal V. Leeb) the task of continuing a rapid offensive in the Leningrad direction, defeating the troops of the North-Western and Northern Fronts, cutting off Leningrad from the main territory of the USSR and in cooperation with Finnish troops, capture it on the move. The main blow was to be delivered by the 4th Panzer Group (General E. Hoepner), which was ordered by the forces of the 56th Motorized Corps to cut the Leningrad-Moscow highway at Chudov, and the 41st Motorized Corps was ordered to break through to Leningrad from the south through Luga. The Wehrmacht's 18th Army was to advance behind the left flank of the 4th Panzer Group. There it was supposed to cut off and destroy the Soviet troops operating in Estonia from the rest of the forces of the North-Western Front, while simultaneously capturing Tallinn and the Moosund Islands. At the same time, Finnish troops attacked Leningrad from the north on the Karelian Isthmus. The offensive of Army Group North was supported by the 1st Air Fleet, and the actions of the enemy concentrated in Finland were supported by part of the forces of the 5th Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force. In total, the group of German-Finnish troops aimed at Leningrad numbered 810 thousand people, 5.3 thousand guns and mortars, 440 tanks and 1.3 thousand combat aircraft.

The defense of Leningrad involved troops of the Northern (from August 23 of the Leningrad), Northwestern Fronts, the forces of the Baltic Fleet (Vice Admiral V.F. Tributs) and the Peipus Military Flotilla (Captain 1st Rank N.Yu. Avraamov). By the beginning of the Leningrad operation, they numbered 517 thousand people, 5 thousand guns and mortars, 700 tanks (of which 646 light), 235 combat aircraft and 19 ships of the main classes. General management of the actions of the Northern, Northwestern Fronts and the Baltic Fleet from July 10 to August 29 was carried out by the Main Command of the Northwestern Direction (Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov). To centralize aviation combat operations in the Leningrad direction of the Air Force of the Northern and Northwestern Fronts. The Baltic Fleet and the 7th Air Defense Aviation Corps are subordinate to a single command headed by Major General AA Aviation. Novikov. To strengthen the defense of Leningrad from the sea and control all naval forces stationed in the city, the naval defense of Leningrad and the Ozerny region was created. The air defense of Leningrad was assigned to the 2nd Air Defense Corps (Major General of Artillery M.M. Protsvetkin).

On the approaches to the city, defensive lines were created, in the construction of which hundreds of thousands of residents took part. The defensive line created around the city had several belts. Its distant positions were located in the area of ​​​​the cities of Luga, Novgorod, Staraya Russa and on the Karelian Isthmus. In addition, defensive structures with resistance walls were created along the line Peterhof (Petrodvorets), Pulkovo. The total duration of all defensive lines in the Leningrad direction was about 900 km. Leningrad itself was preparing for defense. Many of its residents submitted applications asking to be sent to the front. In the first week of the war alone, military registration and enlistment offices received 212 thousand such applications. At the end of June, the creation of the Leningrad People's Militia Army began. The first three divisions of the people's militia (31 thousand people) were transferred to the Luga operational group by July 14.

On the closest approaches to the city from the south and southwest, the Krasnogvardeysky and Slutsk-Kolpinsky fortified areas were built.

By the beginning of the Leningrad defensive operation at the line of Pärnu, Tartu, east of Pskov, Ostrov, the fascist German troops were opposed by the 8th (Lieutenant General F.S. Ivanov), 11th (Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov) and 27th I (Major General N.E. Berzarin) of the Army of the North-Western Front. As a result of heavy losses incurred during defensive battles in the Baltic states, Soviet troops experienced an acute shortage of weapons and manpower. Thus, of the 23 rifle divisions that were part of the front, only seven were fully equipped.

On July 10, German troops launched an offensive against Leningrad. Heavy fighting broke out on the distant approaches to the city along the entire front. In a number of areas the enemy managed to break through the defenses. The successes of the first three weeks of the war so convinced the German command of the weakness of the Soviet defense that the headquarters of Army Group North had no doubt about the rapid advance towards Leningrad. But soon the Wehrmacht's plans were disrupted. Having broken through to the Luga area. The 41st German Motorized Corps unexpectedly encountered stubborn resistance.

Standing in his way was the Luga operational group (Lieutenant General K.P. Pyadyshev, deputy commander of the Northern Front), which included four rifle divisions, three divisions of the people's militia, a mountain rifle brigade, Leningrad infantry and rifle and machine gun schools. Despite the fact that the Luga direction was the shortest to Leningrad, the commander of the 4th German tank group came to the conclusion that it would not be possible to break through here without significant losses and in a short time. As a result, the main forces of the 41st Motorized Corps were turned to the northwest to try their luck in the lower reaches of the Luga. Taking advantage of the fact that there was no continuous line of defense on the 250-kilometer Luga line, enemy tank units captured small bridgeheads southeast of Kingisepp on July 14-15. The enemy was unable to advance further, getting bogged down in the defense by the cadets of the Leningrad Infantry School and the soldiers of the 2nd People's Militia Division (Colonel N.S. Ugryumov).

The 56th motorized corps of E. Manstein also had a hard time, which tried to attack the Luga operational group on the left flank. On July 14, as a result of the successful actions of the 11th Army, the 8th Tank and part of the forces of the 3rd Motorized Division of the enemy were surrounded. For five days west of Soltsa they had to fight heavy defensive battles. After the war, E. Manstein left the following note about this episode: “It could not be said that the position of the corps at that moment was very enviable... The next few days were critical...”. Divisions of the 1st Army Corps were sent to the rescue of the encircled.

In mid-July, the command of Army Group North came to the conclusion that enemy resistance and the lack of its own forces would not allow them to capture the city on the move. This task can be solved only through the consistent defeat of Soviet troops. Therefore, on July 19, the attack on Leningrad from the southwest was suspended. Both opposing sides made maximum use of the short-term pause that was created. While the headquarters of Army Group North was working on a plan for resuming the offensive on Leningrad, the Soviet leadership was strengthening the city’s defenses. The German command was fully aware that the sooner it resumed hostilities, the less time the Russians would have to strengthen their defenses. However, the start of the offensive was delayed six times, mainly due to difficulties in supplies and regroupings, as well as disagreements over further actions.

Meanwhile, the situation for Soviet troops in Estonia deteriorated significantly, where, under attacks from superior enemy forces, the 8th Army began to withdraw along the entire front. This allowed German troops to reach the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the Kunda area at the beginning of August. By August 7, the 8th Army was cut into two parts. Its main forces were thrown back by the enemy to the Tallinn area, and a smaller part retreated to the area west of Narva. Despite the losses suffered, the troops of the 8th Army for more than three weeks (August 5-28) continued to staunchly defend Tallinn, the main base of the Baltic Fleet, which was not prepared in advance for defense from land. Up to 25 thousand residents of the capital of Estonia were involved in defensive work, and a combat workers' regiment was formed. The 10th Rifle Corps (Major General I.F. Nikolaev) of the 8th Army, subordinate to the command of the Baltic Fleet, marine detachments, a workers' regiment, supported by naval artillery and fleet aviation, stubbornly repelled the enemy's attacks one after another. But the forces were unequal. On August 28, the defenders were forced to leave the city. The ships of the Baltic Fleet, subjected to artillery fire and continuous strikes from enemy aircraft, with troops on board, made an exceptionally difficult breakthrough through the mined Gulf of Finland from Tallinn to Kronstadt on August 28-30. The fleet managed to retain the main combat core of its forces. Losses in transport and auxiliary vessels, as well as in personnel, turned out to be quite serious. The troops that arrived in Kronstadt joined the ranks of the defenders of Leningrad.

North of Leningrad on the Karelian Isthmus, the Finnish South-Eastern Army posed a serious threat to our defense. The 23rd Army defending on the Karelian Isthmus (Lieutenant General P.S. Pshennikov, from August 6, Lieutenant General M.N. Gerasimov), after heavy and stubborn battles with superior enemy forces, by the beginning of September was forced to retreat to the state border line 1939 of the year.

Having assessed the current situation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters and the command of the North-Western direction came to the conclusion that the most dangerous was the Novgorod direction, where the enemy had created a powerful group of troops. To defeat it, it was decided to launch two converging strikes (from the north and east) with the forces of the 11th and 34th (formed) armies, as well as a specially created operational group (4-5 rifle and 1 tank divisions). The offensive was planned for August 3-4. But due to the slow concentration of troops, it began only on August 12.

On August 8, the 41st Motorized Corps resumed the offensive, and on August 10, units of the 56th Motorized Corps began active operations. The enemy simultaneously advanced in three directions: the Red Guard (Gatchina), Luga and Novgorod. The most powerful blows were delivered from bridgeheads on the river. Meadows on Krasnogvardeisk (Gatchina) and Novgorod. The enemy's attempt to immediately overcome the Red Guard fortified area and the defense of our troops near Luga was repulsed. However, on the left flank of the Luga defense line he managed to achieve great success. Having broken the resistance of the Soviet troops here, he broke through the defenses and began to develop his success in depth. On August 15, German troops captured Novgorod, on August 20 - Chudovo and cut the Moscow-Leningrad highway and railway. It seemed that the Soviet defense was broken, and the desired goal - Leningrad - was very close. On August 15, Leeb arrived at Hoepner's headquarters to discuss the details of further actions, and here he was caught by a message that upset all their joint plans.

On August 12, troops of the North-Western Front with the forces of the 11th and 34th armies near Staraya Russa launched a counterattack on the right flank of Army Group North. Having advanced over three days of the offensive to a depth of 40-60 kilometers, they created a threat to the rear of the entire Novgorod enemy group. The task of capturing Leningrad was in jeopardy. This development of the event caused great concern among the German command. Large reinforcements urgently began to be transferred to the 16th Army, including the 39th Motorized Corps, which arrived from the Army Group Center advancing on Moscow. As a result, the advance of the Soviet troops was stopped.

One of the reasons for the failure was the setting of impossible tasks for the troops: by the time the 11th Army went on the offensive, it was greatly weakened by previous battles, and the 34th Army was poorly equipped and coordinated. Often, newly formed formations and units were led by insufficiently trained commanders.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Leningrad region continued to deteriorate. On August 17, the military council of the North-Western direction received instructions: in view of the real threat of encircling the city, special attention should be paid to strengthening its defenses on the southern and south-eastern approaches. At the same time, the Supreme Command Headquarters took measures to improve the leadership of the troops defending Leningrad by reorganizing the command and control bodies. On August 27, the Leningrad Front was created consisting of: the 8th, 23rd and 48th armies, the Koporye, Southern and Slutsk-Klin operational groups, as well as the front air force. The Baltic Fleet came under operational control of the front. The remaining troops of the former Northern Front (7th and 14th armies and several separate formations) became part of the also newly created Karelian Front (Lieutenant General V.A. Frolov). The Northern Fleet was operationally subordinate to him. On the eastern bank of the river. Volkhov, two new armies were additionally deployed - the 52nd (Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov) and the 54th (Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik, from September 26, Lieutenant General M.S. Khozin). The Sluiko-Kolpino operational group was transformed into the 55th Army (Major General I.G. Lazarev), and the remaining formations of the Krasnogvardeisky fortified region - into the 42nd Army (Major General V.I. Shcherbakov). However, the measures taken did not lead to a noticeable improvement in troop control near Leningrad. Therefore, a new reorganization soon followed. On August 30, the Main Command of the North-Western Direction was abolished. Commander-in-Chief K.E. On September 5, Voroshilov was appointed to the post of commander of the Lenipgral Front.

At the end of summer, heavy fighting broke out south of Lake Ilmen. Under the pressure of superior enemy forces, Soviet troops were forced to begin a retreat and retreat beyond the river. Lovat. On August 25, the 39th German motorized corps, advancing from the Chudov area, managed to capture Lyuban. The 48th Army defending here was unable to withstand the onslaught of five German divisions and retreated to Kirishi and Pushkin. Three days later the enemy occupied Tosno. There were just under 50 km left to Leningrad. Since August 30, the most fierce fighting took place in the Krasnogvardeysk area, where the enemy was stopped. However, having broken through the Mga station and captured the city of Shlisselburg (Petrokrepost) on September 8, the enemy reached Lake Ladoga and blocked Leningrad from land. Only the island on which the Shlisselburg fortress rises (ancient Oreshek) remained in the hands of Soviet troops. For almost another 500 days, the small garrison of the fortress not only defended itself, but also inflicted considerable damage on the enemy. The Germans' attempts to cross the Neva encountered staunch defense of Soviet troops and were unsuccessful.

K.E. Voroshilov, hoping to improve the situation on his own, did not inform Headquarters about the blockade of Leningrad in time. There was an immediate reaction from I.V. Stalin - to remove Voroshilov from command of the troops in the Leningrad region. In his place on September 10, Army General G.K. Zhukov was appointed commander of the Reserve Front, who carried out the successful Elninsky offensive operation in early September and caused a lot of trouble for the troops of Army Group Center.

South of Leningrad events developed more dramatically. There, in a narrow sector from Kolpino to Ropsha, the enemy struck the formations of the newly created 42nd and 55th armies. The lack of much-needed combat experience and poor coordination of the formation forced the Soviet command to withdraw troops almost to the far outskirts of Leningrad. On September 12, the Germans entered Krasnoe Selo, from the heights of which the city lies before them in full view. It seemed that it would not be possible to hold him. In Leningrad, active preparations were already underway for the explosion of plants and factories, as well as for the sinking of ships of the Baltic Fleet.

The new front commander, G.K. Zhukov, who had just arrived in Leningrad, took decisive measures to restore the situation. To strengthen anti-tank defense in the most threatened areas, anti-aircraft guns were deployed, the power of all the artillery of the Baltic Fleet was concentrated in the zone of the 42nd Army (the new commander is Major General I.I. Fedyuninsky), from the city of Uritsk to the Pulkovo Heights. Part of the forces of the 23rd Army from the Karelian Isthmus was urgently transferred there, new rifle brigades of sailors, border guards, cadets and students of military educational institutions were formed and sent to the front. In addition, three divisions of NKVD troops were sent to the front.

The intensity of the fighting was increasing. The enemy, regardless of losses, rushed forward. On September 16, the Germans reached the Gulf of Finland, between the cities of Strelnya and Uritsk. Units of the 8th Army found themselves cut off from the main forces of the front. To the west of the city, the Oranienbaum bridgehead was formed, which had the most important operational significance. Lacking a sufficient amount of not only heavy, but also light weapons, as well as ammunition, the defenders of the bridgehead fought courageously on the last lines before Oranienbaum. The enemy failed to liquidate the bridgehead during the entire siege of Leningrad. On September 19, on the orders of Zhukov, the 8th Army launched an attack from him on Krasnoe Selo, in the rear of the enemy advancing from Uritsk to Leningrad. Although this counterattack did not lead to the restoration of defense here, it forced the Germans to regroup part of their forces from the Leningrad direction to the Peterhof direction.

The capture of Pushkin and Pavlovsk on September 17 turned out to be the last significant success of the enemy. On that day, General E. Hoepner received an order to withdraw the tank group from the battle and transfer it to the Moscow direction. All troops. operating near Leningrad, from now on came under the command of the 18th Army. Further attempts by the enemy to develop an offensive and break into the city, as well as break through the Neva to meet the Finnish troops, were met with the unshakable courage of the Soviet soldiers. In these battles, the enemy troops suffered heavy losses, but did not achieve any noticeable success.

On September 25, the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Leeb, was forced to report to Berlin that he could not continue the attack on Leningrad with his remaining forces. A day later, he signed an order in which he instructed his subordinate troops to go over to active defense, creating conditions for a further offensive with the aim of a closer blockade of Leningrad, as well as connections with Finnish troops to the west and east of Lake Ladoga.

An important role in thwarting the enemy's plans to capture Leningrad on the move was played by counterattacks by Soviet troops and their active offensive actions on the external front of the encirclement with the goal of releasing the blockade of Leningrad. To repel them, the command of Army Group North was forced to deploy large forces, which led to a significant weakening of the group attacking directly on Leningrad. At the end of September, the front near Leningrad stabilized. The city on the Neva survived, repelling a blow that none of the European capitals conquered by the Wehrmacht could resist. The siege of Leningrad, unprecedented in history, began, lasting almost 900 days.

The defense of Leningrad was intended not only to hold the city - the largest political and economic center of the country, but also to inflict the maximum possible damage on the enemy, to bleed, distract and pin down one of his three strategic groups operating on the Soviet-German front. This goal was fully achieved. However, it came at a high price. The losses of the Soviet troops were: irrevocable - over 214 thousand people, sanitary - about 131 thousand people.

The Leningrad defensive operation of 1941 was an important contribution to the disruption of Hitler's plan for a lightning war. The Soviet troops showed high activity, combining stubborn defense with counterattacks, which kept the enemy in constant tension, exhausted him, and forced him to exercise caution.

In September 1941, the Germans withdrew the 4th Tank Group from Army Group North and transferred it to Army Group Center to participate in the attack on Moscow. In our time, it has almost become a dogma that immediately after this the German command abandoned any active offensive actions directly against Leningrad. However, a detailed study of Wehrmacht documents indicates something completely different. How were things really?

To Leningrad!

Until recently, there were few even simple mentions of exactly what plans for further action the German command was preparing after stabilizing the front near Leningrad in the fall of 1941. Yes, and they were mostly known from secondary sources.

The only exception was the translated diary of the commander of Army Group North, Wilhelm von Leeb. However, those of his notes that were published and subsequently translated into Russian by Yuri Lebedev represent only a small part of the numerous evidence that has survived to our time.

Scheme of the Oranienbaum bridgehead

One gets the impression that many researchers remain fascinated by the question of the future fate of the population of Leningrad and Hitler’s directive of September 6, which determined Moscow as the main direction of the Wehrmacht’s offensive actions on the Eastern Front. But even if you just carefully study the literature available to the general reader, the picture turns out to be somewhat more complex.

German scientists in the fourth volume of the collective work “Germany in World War II” mention that the German 18th Army was supposed to conduct at least one more offensive operation in the Leningrad direction. However, they touch on this issue rather superficially, saying only that Leeb’s proposal to attack the Oranienbaum bridgehead was canceled by Hitler, who feared large losses. True, then researchers claim that the Germans nevertheless returned to this idea, but already in November.

If you carefully delve into the divisional historiography, it turns out that an operation to capture the Pulkovo Heights was also planned. This is known from the history of the German 269th Infantry Division. And in the history of another Wehrmacht division, the 121st Infantry, extracts are given from the order to the 28th Army Corps, which states that the corps should capture Kolpino. The division itself had the task of taking Moscow Slavyanka.

Thus, we can conclude that during the offensive of German troops on Leningrad in September 1941, Army Group North was unable to complete some of the tasks that were outlined in the order to encircle Leningrad on August 29. In particular, the 18th Army was faced with the task of compressing the encirclement ring around Leningrad even more tightly in order to be able to destroy it with artillery fire. At the same time, the commander of the 18th Army, Georg von Küchler, had clear instructions from Wilhelm von Leeb, commander of Army Group North, not to attack the city itself and to stop preparing for its occupation.

Title page of the order for Army Group North on the encirclement of Leningrad dated August 29, 1941

Another clear indication that the German commanders did not intend to remain static observers of the further fate of Leningrad is in the entries of the combat log of the 18th Army for September 23. There, the issue of further offensive is discussed with the division commanders of the 28th Corps. The commander of the 121st Infantry Division in this discussion directly says that the ring around Leningrad should be compressed so that the divisional artillery could “work” in the city.

Fortunately, these plans were destined to remain on paper for some time. On September 24, the sharply deteriorating situation in the 16th Army sector south of Ladoga forced the German command to suspend active operations near Leningrad. However, this issue will soon be returned to at the highest level.

Could these proposals and intentions of the command of the German 18th Army have had a decisive influence on the fate of the surrounded city? At that time, the situation was such that the fate of Leningrad was not decided at the site of this formation. The future of the city depended on whether the Red Army troops could quickly break through the blockade, and if they could not, how realistic it would be to supply the city through Lake Ladoga. At the same time, the capture of the Pulkovo Heights and Kolpino by the 18th Army could undoubtedly seriously complicate the situation.

Now it’s time to talk about how the 18th Army’s plans for an offensive in the Leningrad direction changed over time and why they never came to fruition.

When desires do not match possibilities

What did the German 18th Army have at its disposal near Leningrad?

The area from the shore of the Gulf of Finland to the Neva at the Ivanovo Rapids was occupied by five infantry divisions of the 50th and 28th Army Corps. Part of the coast of the Gulf of Finland from Uritsk to Peterhof and part of the western front of the Oranienbaum bridgehead was occupied by the 38th Army Corps. It consisted of two infantry divisions and a battle group created on the basis of Hitler's escort battalion. To the west of it there were two more divisions of the 26th Army Corps.

Title page of the Order for Army Group North on the continuation of operations dated September 28, 1941

The continuation of offensive actions against Leningrad in October 1941 was clearly outlined in the order for Army Group North dated September 28, 1941. The tasks included:

• dense surroundings of Leningrad;
• destruction of the 8th Army west of Peterhof;
• crossing the Neva and joining the Finns west of Lake Ladoga;
• destruction of the Red Army troops south of Lake Ladoga.

Within the framework of this material, the first two points are of interest. The order acknowledged that German artillery was experiencing serious difficulties when shelling the city. Therefore, the 18th Army had to take advantage of every opportunity to advance north. This would make it possible to significantly intensify artillery shelling of Leningrad.

The situation with this order in Leeb's diary is very indicative. The fact is that it contains this order in footnotes, an extract from which also ended up in the combat log of the operational department of Army Group North. And the editor of the German edition made a comment in this place on the assessment of the situation presented in the diary. As a result, the most interesting evidence, now available to any interested reader, remained virtually unnoticed by Russian researchers.

What did this order look like from the point of view of the headquarters of the 18th Army? The order for the 18th Army dated October 4, 1941 set the following tasks for its troops.

“The army, together with its eastern group, is preparing to continue the attack on St. Petersburg, and with the central group, to continue the offensive against the enemy on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland.”

The eastern group of the 18th Army in the order meant the 50th and 28th Army Corps. Their tasks were interconnected. G. Lindemann's 50th Army Corps was supposed to capture the Pulkovo Heights. His divisions awaited further orders to try again to take this key position south of Leningrad. Only after this was the 28th Army Corps supposed to capture Kolpino.

One of the options for the attack of the 50th Army Corps of the German 18th Army on the Pulkovo Heights

The two remaining corps of the 18th Army also should not have sat idle. The 26th and 38th corps were supposed to prepare for another offensive. Its goal was to destroy the 8th Army and eliminate the Soviet bridgehead that had formed on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland.

Thus, it is clear that the Germans had plans to continue the offensive in the Leningrad direction. But why didn't they come true?

Already by October 5, 1941, it became clear that the situation with ammunition in the 18th Army was not at all brilliant. On this day, the operational department of the association sent out a rather interesting order to the army corps commanders, which emphasized the need to reduce ammunition consumption when repelling attacks. Although the order stated that this was not dictated by a lack of ammunition, but by tactical considerations, this signal itself looks very alarming to the Germans.

The fact that ammunition was beginning to run out was known already in September, when the prospect of an imminent siege of Leningrad loomed before Küchler and his headquarters. By October 1, none of the corps of the 18th Army that was besieging the city had a 100% supply of artillery ammunition. For example, for the 28th Army Corps, this figure dropped to 47% of the shells for the main field 105 mm howitzers. The 38th Army Corps, which finished the offensive later than anyone else, on September 24, 1941, found itself in a similar situation. The situation was improving, but it was a rather long process.

The situation was no better with ammunition for army artillery and RGK artillery. Based on their previous experience, the Germans understood perfectly well that not only ordinary field fortifications awaited them at Leningrad. The hastily built Soviet fortified areas around the city played their role. Therefore, when planning possible offensive operations in this direction, the Germans initially planned for a large consumption of ammunition.

Large losses of German infantry led to the fact that in the 18th Army the shortage of personnel reached 28 thousand people - even taking into account the reinforcements received. The total number of infantry divisions in the army was 160 thousand people (those who received rations are taken into account here).

In light of this, the refusal to re-assault the Pulkovo Heights in early October 1941 does not look like an accidental decision of the German command. This offensive would have required a significant amount of ammunition from the 50th Army Corps, which simply did not exist. Suffice it to say that if the offensive plans were implemented by October 12, the consumption of shells from the German heavy artillery of the RGK as part of the 18th Army should have been:

• 15 cm guns have 200 shells per battery;
• 21 cm cannons have 150 shells;
• 24 cm cannons have 60 shells.

As a result, part of the plan for a closer encirclement of Leningrad was postponed indefinitely.

Minimum program

But there remained one more pressing point of the plan outlined in the order of September 28. In the new order for Army Group North dated October 9, 1941, the 18th Army still had the task defined in the previous document to destroy the Soviet 8th Army. This would allow the Germans to firmly lock the Soviet fleet in Kronstadt.

It follows from the documents that the operation to defeat the 8th Army was planned for the end of October. Formations of two army corps were to participate in it: the 26th and 38th. According to the order for the 18th Army, issued probably on October 14, the two corps were first supposed to reach the line eastern edge of the forest 1 km east of Martyshkino - northern edge of Lisitsyno - mark 23.8 - mark 67.7 at Venka - mark 63 .8 for Bol. Blacksmiths. This was to be followed by an offensive to capture the port of Oranienbaum and Soviet batteries in Bolshaya and Malaya Izhora. Operations against Pulkovo and Kolpino were postponed. The headquarters of the 38th Corps reported that it could go on the offensive as early as the 29th.

A map showing the locations of German air strikes during the offensive of the divisions of the 38th Army Corps south of Peterhof. The map shows the bombing points and the time the last bomb was dropped.

At this stage, as often happens, many “buts” immediately appeared. And the main problem turned out to be a lack of strength. The Germans were waiting for the arrival of the fresh 212th Infantry Division near Peterhof.

On October 22, the headquarters of the 18th Army presented its comments on the course of the planned operations. This document recognized that in the current situation the army would not be able to complete the task and reach the Korovino-Peterhof line. Now the problem was not only that the Germans lacked strength. The intentions of the Soviet command remained unclear to the enemy. The Germans were afraid of a possible strong blow to break the blockade and wanted to save their forces to repel it.

But Küchler and his staff had no intention of abandoning the operation itself. They especially noted that the Soviet 8th Army was unlikely to be able to provide strong resistance. The German commanders were seriously afraid that Soviet coastal artillery might interfere with them. To combat Soviet coastal batteries (and this is, first of all, the Krasnaya Gorka fort), it was proposed to use various types of railway artillery. In particular, they talked about the “Short Bruno” and the 520-mm French howitzer.

Apparently, this document came to Leeb’s desk just before his conversation with Hitler, which took place on October 28. It was on this day that the German leader nevertheless decided to abandon the offensive, citing the capabilities of Soviet coastal artillery.

Indeed, the means at the Germans’ disposal to combat Soviet coastal batteries were clearly not enough. However, in the future, Hitler's decision turned out to be a rather serious mistake.

However, it is impossible to assume that the “possessed” Fuhrer once again prevented the Wehrmacht generals from winning the war. Everything is somewhat more complicated. The possible success of the German offensive on Tikhvin and Volkhov could lead to a starvation disaster in Leningrad even without any additional movements on the part of the 18th Army.

Sources and literature:

1. Dr. Friedrich Christian Stahl/Henning Eppendorff/Rudolf von Tycowicz/Werner Ranck/Hans Geraets/Walter Schielke/Werner Preuss/Werner Cordier: Geschichte der 121; ostpreußischen Infanterie-Division 1940–1945, Selbstverlag, Münster/Berlin/Frankfurt, 1970.
2. Germany and Second World War. Volume IV: Attack On Soviet Union. Oxford, 1998;
3. Helmut Römhild. Geschichte der 269. Infanterie-Division -, Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Dorheim, 1967.
4. Documents of the 16th and 18th armies of Army Group North from the NARA collection;
5. Leningrad "blitzkrieg". Based on the military diaries of senior Wehrmacht officers Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb and Colonel General Franz Halder // Translation and notes by Yu. M. Lebedev. - M., 2011.

"And the one who today says goodbye to her beloved, -
Let her transform her pain into strength.
We swear to the children, we swear to the graves,
That no one will force us to submit!”

A. Akhmatova

The plan for Operation Barbarossa clearly stated: “After the defeat of Soviet troops in the Minsk-Smolensk region, the tank forces of Army Group Center turn north, where, in cooperation with Army Group North, they will destroy Soviet forces in the Baltic region and then They will take Leningrad." The order clearly stated: “The attack on Moscow should be continued only after the capture of Leningrad.” From a strategic point of view, this plan was completely correct and logical, especially in determining the center of gravity of the campaign and in the desire to quickly transform the Baltic states into a transit territory for the delivery of supply cargo and connect with the Finns as quickly as possible. Having rejected this reasonable course of action, Hitler changed his intentions after Smolensk. Why?

The main command of the ground forces and military generals urged him not to miss the chance that arose as a result of the unexpectedly rapid collapse of the Soviet Central Front and to capture Moscow - the heart, brain and main transport hub of the Soviet Union. But Hitler did not want to rush. For a month and a half, the process of pouring from empty to empty continued, precious time was wasted. As a result, Hitler neither adhered to the plan of first capturing Leningrad nor gave the green light to an attack on Moscow. Instead, on August 21, 1941, he chose a fundamentally new task - oil from the Caucasus and grain from Ukraine. He ordered Guderian's Panzer Group to travel 450 kilometers south and fight alongside Rundstedt in the Battle of Kyiv.

The Battle of Leningrad lasted from 1941. to 1944 The Soviet Armed Forces defended Leningrad from July 10, 1941 to August 10, 1944 from Nazi and Finnish troops and completely defeated them. But some Soviet military historians excludeThe Battle of Leningrad, the Vyborg and Svir-Petrozavodsk operations, limiting this chronological framework to February 28, 1944.

When launching an attack on the USSR, the fascist German leadership attached exceptional importance to the capture of Leningrad. It planned a strike by Army Group North (commanded by Field Marshal W. von Leeb) consisting of the 4th Panzer Group, the 18th and 16th Armies from East Prussia in the northeast direction and two Finnish armies (Karelian and South -Eastern) from the south-eastern part of Finland in the southern and south-eastern directions to destroy the Soviet troops located in the Baltic states, capture Leningrad, acquire the most convenient sea and land communications for supplying their troops and an advantageous starting area for striking in the rear of the Red Army troops covering Moscow. The offensive of fascist German troops directly towards Leningrad began on July 10, 1941 from the line of the river. Great. By this time, on the far southwestern and northwestern approaches to Leningrad, the fascist German and Finnish command had 38 divisions (32 infantry, 3 tank, 3 motorized), 1 cavalry and 2 infantry brigades, supported by powerful aviation.

The fascist German troops were opposed by the Northern Front (commanded by Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, member of the Military Council, Corps Commissar N. N. Klementyev) consisting of the 7th and 23rd armies (8 divisions in total) and the Northwestern Front ( Commander Major General P. P. Sobennikov, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General V. N. Bogatkin) as part of the 8th, 11th and 27th armies (31 divisions and 2 brigades), defending on a front of 455 km; in 22 divisions, losses in personnel and equipment amounted to over 50%.

To strengthen the defense of the southwestern approaches to Leningrad, the command of the Northern Front on July 6 formed the Luga operational group, from which, at the beginning of hostilities, only 2 rifle divisions, 1 division of the people's militia, personnel of two Leningrad military schools, a separate mountain rifle brigade, and a special artillery unit arrived group and some other parts. By July 10, the troops of Army Group North had superiority over the Soviet troops of the Northwestern Front: in infantry - 2.4, guns - 4, mortars - 5.8, tanks - 1.2, aircraft - 9 ,8 times.

To coordinate the actions of the fronts, on July 10, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) formed the North-Western direction (Commander-in-Chief - Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov, member of the Military Council, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) A.A. Zhdanov, Chief of Staff Major General M.V. Zakharov), subordinating to him the troops of the Northern and Northwestern Fronts, the Northern and Red Banner Baltic Fleets.

A defense system consisting of several belts was created around Leningrad. On the near approaches to Leningrad in the southwestern and southern directions, the Krasnogvardeysky and Slutsk-Kolpinsky fortified areas were built, and the Karelian fortified area was improved to the north of the city. A belt of defensive structures was also erected along the line Peterhof (Petrodvorets), Pulkovo; Defensive structures were also created inside Leningrad. The civilian population provided great assistance to the troops in the construction of defense lines. In a short time, 10 divisions of the people's militia and dozens of partisan detachments were formed. Children, some factory equipment, and cultural property were evacuated from the city. The remaining industry in the city was converted to the production and repair of weapons.

Defense on the distant and near approaches to Leningrad (July 10 - end of September 1941). Having overcome the fierce resistance of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the enemy invaded the Leningrad region. Nazi troops captured the city of Ostrov on July 5, and Pskov on July 9. On July 10, 1941, the enemy launched an offensive on the southwestern and northern approaches to Leningrad. Almost simultaneously, the enemy launched attacks in the Luga, Novgorod and Staraya Russian directions, in Estonia, in the Petrozavodsk and Olonets directions. In the last ten days of July, at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy reached the line of the Narva, Luga and Mshaga rivers, where he was forced to go on the defensive and regroup. On the Karelian Isthmus, from July 31, Soviet troops fought defensive battles with the advancing Finnish troops and by September 1 stopped them at the state border of 1939. In the Olonets, Petrozavodsk and Svirsk directions, ground forces with the support of the Ladoga military flotilla (commander since August, captain 1st rank , from September Rear Admiral B.V. Khoroshkhin, from October 1941 - Captain 1st Rank V.S. Cherokov), waging stubborn battles from July 10, by the end of September they stopped the enemy at the turn of the river. Svir.

On July 12, 1941, enemy motorized units broke through into the Luga area. Our units, cadets of the Leningrad Infantry School, and soldiers of the people's militia not only selflessly repelled enemy attacks, but also launched counterattacks themselves. The front in the Luga area stabilized until August 10. The fascist German troops advancing on Leningrad from Kingisepp managed to advance only 60 kilometers in a month.

The first Heroes of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War were born on the Leningrad Front. They were pilots P. Kharitonov, S. Zdorovtsev, M. Zhukov, who rammed enemy bombers in air battles.

In the battles in the Novgorod region, political instructor A.K. Pankratov. He was the first of many Soviet soldiers to accomplish an outstanding feat, covering an enemy machine gun with his body. Here is what was said about this in the award sheet for awarding Pankratov the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: “The enemy’s left-flank machine gun did not allow a group of brave men led by Pankratov to enter the monastery’s location. Then Pankratov rushed forward to the machine gun, threw a grenade, and wounded the machine gunner. The machine gun fell silent for a while. Then he opened furious fire again. Political instructor Pankratov shouting “Forward!” rushed at the machine gun a second time and covered the enemy’s destructive fire with his body.”

In August, fighting broke out on the near approaches to Leningrad. On August 8, the enemy went on the offensive in the Red Guard direction. On August 16, after heavy fighting, Kingisepp was abandoned; by August 21, the enemy reached the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area, trying to bypass it from the south-east. and break into Leningrad, but his attacks were repelled. From August 22 to September 7, intense fighting took place in the Oranienbaum direction. The enemy was stopped northeast of Koporye. The combat operations of the ground forces developed in close cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (commander Vice Admiral V.F. Tribun, member of the Division Military Council Commissar N.K. Smirnov) and the Ladoga Military Flotilla. In addition to supporting the ground forces with aviation and powerful artillery, the fleet solved independent tasks: defended the approaches to Leningrad, disrupted enemy communications in the Baltic Sea, fought for the Moonsund archipelago, the main fleet base - Tallinn and for the Hanko Peninsula. During the defense of Leningrad, the fleet sent over 160 thousand personnel to land (in marine brigades, separate rifle battalions, etc.). The fleet's long-range artillery operated successfully against the Nazi troops. Under the Arc, all enemy attacks were repelled.

Baltic Fleet battleship "October Revolution"

In the Novgorod-Chudivo direction, where the enemy delivered the main blow, Soviet troops tried to counterattack the enemy advancing on Novgorod, but did not achieve significant results. On August 19, the enemy captured Novgorod, and on August 20, Soviet troops left Chudovo. At the expense of the liberated troops, the fascist German command strengthened the group advancing on Leningrad and transferred the main aviation efforts of Army Group North here. There was a danger of encirclement of Leningrad. On August 23, the Headquarters divided the Northern Front into Karelian (commander Lieutenant General V.A. Frolov, member of the Military Council Corps Commissar A.S. Zheltov) and Leningrad (commander Lieutenant General M.M. Popov, from September 5 Marshal of the Soviet Union K E. Voroshilov, from September 12, Army General G. K. Zhukov, from October 10, Major General I. I. Fedyuninsky, from October 26, Lieutenant General M. S. Khozin; member of the Military Council A. A. Zhdanov). On August 29, the GKO united the Main Command of the North-Western Direction with the command of the Leningrad Front, and subordinated the North-Western Front directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The situation near Leningrad remained extremely tense. The enemy resumed the offensive with large forces along the Moscow-Leningrad highway and captured Lyuban on August 25, Tosno on August 29, and reached the river on August 30. Neva and cut the railways connecting Leningrad with the country. From August 30 to September 9, fierce fighting took place in the Krasnogvardeysk area, where the enemy suffered heavy losses and his attacks were repulsed. However, having broken through the Mga station to Shlisselburg on September 8, fascist German troops cut off Leningrad from land. The blockade of the city began. The message was supported only for Lake Ladoga. and by air. The supply of everything necessary to the troops, population and industry was sharply reduced. On September 4, 1941, the enemy began barbaric artillery shelling of the city and systematic air raids.

The enemy's advance to Krasnogvardeisk and Kolpino forced the Soviet troops defending in the Luga area to retreat to the north. On September 9, fascist German troops resumed their attack on Leningrad, delivering the main blow from the area west of Krasnogvardeisk. Concentrating 8 divisions (5 infantry, 2 tank and 1 motorized), the enemy tried to take the city by storm. The command of the Leningrad Front transferred some formations from the Karelian Isthmus to threatened sections of the front, replenished reserve units with militia detachments, and transferred a significant part of the sailors from ships to land. The fighting in the Krasnogvardeysk area continued continuously for 9 days. Naval artillery was especially effective. The enemy was exhausted, drained of blood, and by September 18 was stopped at the Ligovo-Pulkovo line. The outcome of the defensive battle near Krasnogvardeysk and Kolpino was influenced by the offensive of Soviet troops from the Volkhov area to Mga and Sinyavino, which began on the instructions of Headquarters on September 10, which pinned down significant enemy forces.

At the same time, from the right bank of the Nova in the direction of Sinyavino - Mga, the troops of the Neva operational group went on the offensive, which crossed the river by September 26. Neva and captured a small bridgehead in the Moscow Dubrovka area (the so-called Nevsky “patch”). In mid-September, fascist German troops reached the Gulf of Finland in the Strelna area and cut off the Soviet troops located to the west, who, thanks to the powerful support of the fleet, managed to hold the Primorsky (Oranienbaum) bridgehead, which then played a large role in the defense of the city.

The order came to begin the siege of Leningrad at a moment when the city, as it seemed to the Germans, could be taken with one final blow. The decision to proceed to the siege of Leningrad, no doubt, was largely dictated by the position of the Finns. Field Marshal von Mannerheim, the commander-in-chief of the Finnish forces, had certain hesitations regarding the advisability of crossing the old Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus and attacking Leningrad. Yes, he was ready to cross the Svir to the east of Lake Ladoga when the Germans reached Tikhvin, but he opposed any attempts on the part of the Finns to participate in the assault on Leningrad. It is clear from the marshal's memoirs that he did not want the participation of Finnish troops in the almost inevitable destruction of the city.

Mannerheim adhered to the principles of “actively defensive war” and opposed any form of “war of conquest.” Regardless of Hitler's motives in making the decision not to take a city as strategically and economically important as Leningrad, it represented a violation of all the laws of war. A violation for which a bitter price was later paid.

From a military point of view, the fall of Leningrad and Oranienbaum meant the disarmament of about forty Soviet divisions. No less important was the destruction of Leningrad's military industry. Tank, artillery and other factories continued to produce products throughout the war, supplying the Red Army with all the necessary combat equipment. Finally, Leningrad could become an invaluable supply base for German troops on the Eastern Front. Without being attacked by partisans, supplies could flow through the Baltic. A connection with the Finns would have turned the fighting in the Far North beyond Petrozavodsk and the transshipment point for weapons supplied by the Allies, Murmansk, in a different direction, where no progress was observed at all simply because there were not enough troops. Instead of all these advantages, the German command, having decided to abandon the capture of Leningrad, received only problems.

To the defense of Leningrad

The most serious miscalculation of the German command was the fact that in reality Leningrad remained surrounded only in the summer. Large natural obstacles, such as lakes, rivers and swamps, which served as an extension of the German blockade ring in the warm season, turned into gaps and served as excellent arteries of communications when frost bound Lake Ladoga and the Neva. Throughout the long winter, cargo and reinforcements flowed into the city along these routes. Moreover, since the Finns never crossed their old border on the Karelian Isthmus, from the east Leningrad was constantly connected to Lake Ladoga by an 80-kilometer corridor. As a result, this allowed Defense Commissioner Zhdanov to build the so-called “Road of Life” along the ice of Lake Ladoga, including a highway and a railway line connecting to the Murmansk railway. Along this route, the city received cargo from the eastern shore of the lake. As a result, in 1941, Hitler did not achieve his goals either in the North or on the Central Front: Leningrad and Moscow remained unconquered, and it was not possible to do too much in too many places at once.

By the end of September, the front on the approaches to Leningrad had finally stabilized, and the plan to capture it by storm failed. On October 20, the Sinyavinsk offensive operation of the troops of the Leningrad Front began with the goal of unblocking the city, but it was not possible to complete the operation, because The Soviet Supreme High Command was forced to transfer some troops to the Tikhvin direction, where the enemy launched an offensive. On November 8, the enemy managed to capture Tikhvin. Although Soviet troops did not allow the enemy to break through to Svir, the last railway (Tikhvin - Volkhov), along which cargo was transported to Lake Ladoga, was cut. In November 1941, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive; on November 20 they captured Malaya Vishera, and on December 9 - Tikhvin and drove the enemy beyond the river. Volkhov. However, the situation in Leningrad continued to be difficult. Supplies of raw materials were very limited, food and fuel were running out. From November 20, the daily ration of bread was 125-250 g. A famine began, from which 641,803 people died from November 1941 to October 1942. The Party and the Soviet government took measures to supply food, ammunition, fuel and fuel to the city.

General Zakharov was appointed commandant of the city, to protect the center of which he assembled five brigades of 10,000 people each. Twenty divisions of the Red Militia were formed from among the 300,000 workers of Leningrad. Such fighters continued to work in factories, but at the same time they were soldiers - workers in military uniform, ready to fight the enemy at the first order. Around the clock, soldiers, militias and civilians, including women and children, built defense lines around the city. They consisted of two rings of fortifications - external and internal. The outer line - a semicircle approximately 40 kilometers long - ran from the city center, from Peterhof through Krasnogvardeysk to the Neva River. The internal, or second, line was a semicircle of fortifications of considerable depth, ran 25 kilometers from the center, its key point being the Duderhof Heights. The cornerstones in it were the industrial suburb of Kolpino and the ancient Tsarskoye Selo.

German aerial reconnaissance reported huge fortifications and huge anti-tank ditches behind them. The system of trenches and trenches was supplemented by pillboxes with guns and machine guns installed in them. Only assault infantry units had the opportunity to pass here. The armored vehicles could only rely on the gaps made in the defense in order to follow the first wave of attackers and support them with the fire of their cannons. The Duderhof Heights served as the key to the second ring of the city’s fortifications. Powerful concrete pillboxes with heavy weapons, scarp galleries with naval guns, machine-gun points for mutual support and a deep-echelon system of trenches with underground communication passages covered the approaches to all dominant heights.

The fascist German command tried to break the resistance of the defenders of Leningrad with air bombing and heavy artillery fire. In September - November 1941, 64,930 incendiary and 3,055 high-explosive bombs were dropped on the city and 30,154 artillery shells were fired (September - December). But the enemy did not break the fighting spirit of the defenders of the city of Lenin. An exceptional role in the life of Leningrad during the days of the siege was played by the City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (committee secretaries A.A. Zhdanov, A.A. Kuznetsov, Ya.F. Kapustin) and the Council of Working People's Deputies (chairman P.S. Popkov). In the 2nd half of November, a road was built on the ice of Lake Ladoga, along which ammunition, weapons, food, medicine, and fuel were transported, and the sick, wounded, and disabled were evacuated from Leningrad (in November 1941 - April 1942, 550 thousand people were evacuated). Human). The work of the route did not stop, despite the bombing, shelling, and bad weather. City party and Soviet organizations took all possible measures to save people from hunger. With the start of work on the Ladoga highway, the bread ration began to gradually increase (from December 25, 1941).

Residents of the city continued to work in the name of victory, cared for the wounded, helped hungry children and the elderly. In besieged Leningrad, people of art continued to work.D. Shostakovich wrote his famous Seventh Symphony at this time.

Attempts to relieve the blockade of Leningrad in 1942 (an offensive in the Lyuban direction in January - April and in the Sinyavinsk direction in August - September) due to a lack of forces and means, and shortcomings in organizing the offensive were not successful, however, these active actions of the Soviet troops thwarted the new assault on the city that was being prepared . Successful strategic counter-offensive of Soviet troops in the winter of 1942-43. near Stalingrad, it pulled back some of the enemy forces from the Leningrad area and created a favorable environment for its relief from the blockade.

The capture of Shlisselburg meant that Leningrad was locked from the east. The city thus became an island, surrounded by water and troops. Only one narrow corridor remained open to the western shore of Lake Ladoga, since the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus still stood motionless. They waited for the Germans to reach Tikhvin. Only after that Mannerheim was going to move along the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga through Svir and thereby create an eastern wedge of coverage of a giant cauldron with Leningrad in the center. Unfortunately, the goal turned out to be unattainable.

Breaking the blockade of Leningrad

January 12-30, 1943 troops of the 67th Army of Leningrad (commander from June 1942, Lieutenant General, later Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov), 2nd shock and part of the forces of the 8th Army Volkhovsky (created December 17, 1941, commander General of the Army K.A. Meretskov) of the fronts, with the support of long-range aviation, artillery and aviation of the Baltic Fleet, with counter strikes in a narrow ledge between Shlisselburg and Sinyavin (south of Lake Ladoga), they broke the blockade ring and restored the land connection between Leningrad and the country. A railway and a highway were built through the resulting corridor (8-10 km wide) within 17 days, but the problem of supplying the city had not yet been completely resolved: an important point was the Mga station on the railway. The Leningrad-Volkhov line remained in enemy hands, the roads in the liberated zone were under constant fire from enemy artillery.

Connected - the blockade is broken

Memorial "Broken Ring"

Attempts to expand land communications (the offensive in February - March 1943 on MGU and Sinyavino) did not achieve their goal. In July - August, at the Mginsky ledge, Soviet troops inflicted a heavy defeat on the troops of the 18th German Army and did not allow the transfer of enemy troops to other fronts.

The offensive operation of Soviet troops near Leningrad and Novgorod 1944, lifting the blockade of Leningrad. As a result of the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, near Smolensk, in Left Bank Ukraine, in the Donbass and on the Dnieper in late 1943 - early 1944, favorable conditions developed for a major offensive operation near Leningrad and Novgorod. By this time, Army Group North, consisting of the 18th and 16th armies (from January 1942 to January 1944, commander Field Marshal G. Küchler, from late January to early July 1944, Colonel General G. Lindemann, in July 1944 - General of Infantry G. Friesner, from July 23, 1944 Colonel General F. Schörner) numbered 741 thousand soldiers and officers, 10,070 guns and mortars, 385 tanks and assault guns, 370 aircraft and had the task of preventing a breakthrough of occupied positions that had important for covering the approaches to the Baltic, keeping Finland as an ally and ensuring freedom of action for the German fleet in the Baltic Sea. By the beginning of 1944, the enemy had created a defense in depth with reinforced concrete and wood-earth structures, covered with minefields and wire barriers.

The Soviet command organized an offensive with forces from the 2nd shock, 42nd and 67th armies of the Leningrad, 59th, 8th and 54th armies of the Volkhov, 1st shock and 22nd armies of the 2nd Baltic (commander General of the Army M. M. Popov) of the fronts and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Long-range aviation (commanded by Air Marshal A.E. Golovanov), partisan detachments and brigades were also involved. In total, the fronts included 1,241 thousand soldiers and officers, 21,600 guns and mortars, 1,475 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,500 aircraft.

The goal of the operation was to defeat the flank groups of the 18th Army, and then, by actions in the Kingisepp and Luga directions, complete the defeat of its main forces and reach the line of the river. Meadows; in the future, acting in the Narva, Pskov and Idritsa directions, defeat the 16th Army, complete the liberation of the Leningrad region and create conditions for the liberation of the Baltic states. In preparation for the operation, the ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet transported over 52 thousand people and about 14 thousand people across the Gulf of Finland to the Primorsky bridgehead. T cargo. On January 14, Soviet troops went on the offensive from the Primorsky bridgehead to Ropsha, and on January 15 from Leningrad to Krasnoe Selo. After stubborn fighting on January 20, Soviet troops united in the Ropsha area and eliminated the encircled Peterhof-Strelninsky enemy group. At the same time, on January 14, Soviet troops went on the offensive in the Novgorod area, and on January 16 - in the Lyuban direction, and on January 20 they liberated Novgorod. Thus, from January 14 to 20, the enemy’s defenses were broken through and the flank groups of the 18th Army were defeated; the troops of its center, fearing encirclement, began to withdraw from the Mga-Tosno area on January 21. To commemorate the final lifting of the blockade, a fireworks display was given in Leningrad on January 27, 1944.

The Leningrad blockade had enormous political and strategic significance. In the battle for Leningrad, Soviet troops took over up to 15-20% of the enemy forces on the Eastern Front and the entire Finnish army, and defeated up to 50 German divisions. The soldiers and residents of the city showed examples of heroism and selfless devotion to the Motherland. Many units and formations that took part in the Battle of Leningrad were converted into guards units or became decorated. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers received government awards, hundreds received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, of which five twice: A.E. Mazurenko, P.A. Pokryshev, V. I. Rakov, N.G. Stepanyan and N.V. Chelnokov. The daily care of the Party Central Committee, the Soviet government and the support of the entire country were inexhaustible sources of strength for the Leningraders to overcome the trials and hardships of the 900-day blockade. On December 22, 1942, the Soviet government established the medal "For the Defense of Leningrad". On January 26, 1945, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR awarded Leningrad the Order of Lenin, and on May 8, 1965, in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, it awarded Leningrad the honorary title of Hero City.

Memorial complex "Piskarevskoye Cemetery"

Medal "For the Defense of Leningrad"

Mobilization in Leningrad in the summer of 1941

Leningrad strategic defensive operation is the name adopted in Soviet historiography for the defensive operation of the Red Army and the USSR Navy carried out during the Great Patriotic War in the Pskov, present-day Novgorod, Leningrad, Kalinin regions, Estonia and the Baltic Sea from July 10 to September 30, 1941. As part of the strategic operation, the following were carried out:

• Kingisepp-Luga defensive operation


• Novgorod-Chudov defensive operation


• Counterattack on the enemy group in the areas of Soltsy, Porkhov, Novorzhev


• Counterattack on the enemy group in the Staraya Russa area and in the Kholm area


• Demyansk defensive operation

At the first stage of the operation, it developed in accordance with the offensive of German troops, unfolding in three directions: in Estonia, in the central sector in the direction of Luga, Soltsy and Staraya Russa and in the south to Novorzhev.

During the operation, German troops occupied a large territory, fully ensuring navigation in the Baltic Sea, deeply penetrated into the territory of the Soviet Union north and south of Lake Peipus, creating a front along the Volkhov (blocking Leningrad with the prospect of connecting with Finnish troops) and east of Demyansk (in difficult-to-reach areas going on the defensive, securing the left flank of the group aimed at Moscow). At the same time, this also brought its own negative results: the front of Army Group North was stretched so that German troops often had to defend themselves with separate strong points; supply problems arose in difficult-to-reach areas; finally, on such a wide front one way or another it was necessary to maintain very combat-ready formations, since the Soviet attacks did not stop.

The Soviet troops suffered a severe defeat and suffered considerable losses: 1,492 tanks, 9,885 guns and mortars, 1,702 aircraft, the human losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 344,926 people. The losses among the Baltic Fleet's sailors were especially sensitive, both during the Tallinn crossing and during the further bombing of Kronstadt. From the beginning of the war to December 3, 1941, the Baltic Fleet lost 1 leader, 16 destroyers, 28 submarines, 43 minesweepers, 5 patrol ships, 5 hydrographic ships, 3 minelayers, 23 torpedo boats, 25 hunting boats, transport ships and the main a number of them were lost during the Leningrad defensive operation.

Also, the Baltic Fleet lost more than 10% of its total personnel permanently (9,384 people), and the total losses amounted to more than a quarter of all personnel, or 24,177 people. However, it was not possible to completely disorganize the resistance to German troops.

German losses were much more modest: from June 22, 1941 to October 1, 1941, Army Group North lost about 60 thousand people, taking into account Operation Beowulf. However, due to the fact that the most combat-ready formations were removed from the army group, due to losses in equipment and weapons, Army Group North could neither take Leningrad nor continue the offensive east to Svir without replenishment.

Nevertheless, we should talk about the operational victory of the German troops.

Comments:

Introduction

The Great Patriotic War saw many outstanding battles and battles on the way to the world-historical Victory over German fascism and its allies. A special place among them and in world military history in general belongs to the persistent and heroic defense of Leningrad.

The battle for Leningrad lasted 900 days and nights. The defenders and residents of the city, being under blockade, selflessly repelled the superior forces of the Nazi troops. Despite unprecedented difficulties and hardships, countless sacrifices and losses, they survived and won. The history of wars does not know such a feat.

More than 60 years have passed since the momentous victory in the Battle of Leningrad (from July 1941 to January 1944). But to this day, the feat of the Leningraders, the soldiers of the army and navy who defended our northern capital, personifies the military glory of Russia. He serves as an example for current generations of fidelity to patriotic and military duty, courage and bravery in defending the freedom and independence of the Fatherland.

Defense of Leningrad

The Battle of Leningrad was the longest during the Great Patriotic War, and lasted from July 10, 1941 to August 9, 1944. Soviet troops during the 900-day defense of Leningrad pinned down large forces of the German and the entire Finnish army, contributed to the victories of the Red Army in other sections of the Soviet-German front. The defense of Leningrad became a symbol of the courage and heroism of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. Leningraders showed examples of perseverance, endurance and patriotism. The residents of the city paid a heavy price, whose losses during the blockade amounted to about 1 million people.

During the war, Hitler repeatedly demanded to raze the city to the ground, exterminate its entire population, starve it out, and crush the resistance of the defenders with massive air and artillery strikes. About 150 thousand shells, over 102 thousand incendiary bombs and about 5 thousand high-explosive bombs were rained down on the city.

But his defenders did not flinch. The defense of Leningrad acquired a nationwide character, expressed in the close cohesion of troops and the population under the leadership of the city defense committee. In July - September 1941, 10 divisions of the people's militia were formed in the city. Despite the most difficult conditions, the industry of Leningrad did not stop its work. During the blockade, 2 thousand tanks, 1.5 thousand aircraft, thousands of guns, many warships were repaired and produced, 225 thousand machine guns, 12 thousand mortars, about 10 million shells and mines were manufactured. The city defense committee, party and Soviet bodies did everything possible to save the population from hunger. Assistance to Leningrad was carried out along the transport route across Lake Ladoga, called the Road of Life. Transportation during navigation periods was carried out by the Ladoga Flotilla and the North-Western River Shipping Company. On November 22, a military highway began to operate, laid on the ice of Lake Ladoga, along which more than 360 thousand tons of cargo were delivered in the winter of 1941/42 alone. Over the entire period of operation, over 1.6 million tons of cargo were transported along the Road of Life, and about 1.4 million people were evacuated. To supply oil products to the city, a pipeline was laid along the bottom of Lake Ladoga, and in the fall of 1942, an energy cable was laid. Leningrad was covered from the sea by the Baltic Fleet. It also provided military transport in the Gulf of Finland and along Lake Ladoga. In the enemy-occupied territory of the Leningrad, Novgorod and Pskov regions, partisans launched an active struggle. On January 12-30, 1943, an operation was carried out to break the blockade of Leningrad (“Iskra”). Strike groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts took part in the operation with the assistance of part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet and long-range aviation. The duration of the operation is 19 days. The width of the combat front is 45 km. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 60 km. The average daily rate of advance is 3-3.5 km. During the offensive, troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts broke the blockade of Leningrad, creating a corridor 8-11 km wide, which made it possible to restore land communications between the city and the country. The southern coast of Lake Ladoga was cleared of the enemy. Despite the fact that the further offensive of the Soviet troops did not develop, the operation to break the blockade was of great strategic importance and was a turning point in the battle for Leningrad. The enemy's plan to starve the defenders and residents of the city was thwarted. The initiative to conduct combat operations in this direction passed to the Red Army.

From January 14 to March 1, 1944, the Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation was carried out by troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and part of the forces of the 2nd Baltic Front, in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet.

As a result, by the end of March 1, Soviet troops reached the border of the Latvian SSR. As a result of the Leningrad-Novgorod operation, a heavy defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group North and the blockade of Leningrad was finally lifted, almost the entire Leningrad and Novgorod regions, as well as the main part of the Kalinin region, were liberated, Soviet troops entered Estonia. Thus, favorable conditions were created for the defeat of the enemy in the Baltic states.

According to the Federal Law “On the Days of Military Glory (Victory Days) of Russia” dated March 13, 1995, January 27 is celebrated in the Russian Federation as the Day of Lifting the Siege of the City of Leningrad.