What social transformations were carried out under Khrushchev. Khrushchev's economic reforms

The solution of economic problems remained the most important task for Soviet society. In the organization of economic development of this period, two periods are clearly distinguished, which seriously differed from each other in terms of methods, goals and final results.

1953-1957 Economic course of G.M. Malenkov After Stalin's death the new economic course of the USSR was associated with the name of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G.M. Malenkov(1953-1955). It consisted in the social reorientation of the economy, which meant shifting the center of gravity to the development of the light, food industry, and agriculture.

An attempt was made to solve the food problem and bring agriculture out of the crisis by increasing productivity (i.e., intensifying production) and using the factor of personal interest of the collective farmer. To this end, it was planned to reduce taxes on personal subsidiary plots, raise procurement prices for agricultural products, write off agricultural tax arrears (1.5 billion poods of grain) to collective farms, and increase household plots. It was one of the variants of the new agrarian course.

Agricultural Transformation Agenda carried out N.S. Khrushchev, was somewhat different from the strategic plan of G.M. Malenkov. In addition to these measures, Khrushchev intended to ensure the rise of agriculture through the rapid expansion of sown areas through the development of virgin lands (an extensive path for the development of agriculture). He also paid special attention to the processes of mechanization of agriculture, for which it was planned in the future to turn collective farms into large industrial-type farms.

In 1954, the development of virgin lands in the Trans-Volga region, Siberia and Kazakhstan began. With the participation of 300 thousand volunteers, mostly young people, 42 million hectares of new land were developed.

The purchase prices for agricultural products were doubled, the debts of collective farms for agricultural tax of previous years (1.5 billion poods of grain) were written off, and expenditures on the social development of the village were increased several times. Taxes on personal subsidiary plots were abolished, which were allowed to be increased five times. In 1958, mandatory deliveries of agricultural products from household plots were abolished, and taxes on it were reduced.

On the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev, the criteria for planning in agriculture were changed, the collective farms received the right to amend their charters.

For 1953-1958 the growth of agricultural production amounted to 34% compared with the previous five years. In order to solve the food problem, the area under corn was increased: from 1955 to 1962. from 18 to 37 million ha.

Administrative and economic reform. In 1957, N.S. Khrushchev tried to decentralize the management of industry, to create a new organizational and economic structure built on the management of industry not according to sectoral (through ministries), but according to the territorial principle.

In order to limit the possibility of interference of local party apparatuses in economic activity, economic councils who were directly subordinate to the Union Ministry. 141 all-union and republican ministries were abolished and 105 economic councils were created instead.

The reorganization of the management system gave certain results: industrial specialization and intersectoral cooperation increased, and the process of technical reconstruction of the economy took place. The rights and economic powers of the union republics were expanded. However, the reform as a whole not only did not introduce any qualitative changes in the economic conditions, but also gave rise to a certain disunity in the sectoral mechanism of the Soviet economy.

Social politics. The economic policy of the post-Stalin leadership, despite the contradictions, had a pronounced social orientation. In the mid 50s. A program of measures aimed at raising the living standards of the population was developed.

The salaries of workers in industry were regularly raised. The real incomes of workers and employees increased by 60%, of collective farmers - by 90% (since 1956, collective farmers were transferred to a monthly advance payment of wages). The law on old-age pensions for workers and employees doubled their size and lowered the retirement age. The working week was reduced from 48 to 46 hours, and compulsory state loans were abolished. Trade unions have gained greater rights in production.

Housing construction has become one of the important achievements of social policy. From 1955 to 1964 the urban housing stock increased by 80%, 54 million people received new apartments. The material base of education, health care, and culture was strengthened.

1958-1964 At the end of the 50s. a transition was made from five-year to seven-year planning (1959-1965). Since that time, the process of displacing economic incentives in the development of the economy by administrative coercion began. IN agriculture this trend is most pronounced.

Kolkhoz policy. Among the disproportions of the seven-year plan, the most severe was the crisis in agriculture. Farms experienced a constant lack of electricity, chemical fertilizers, seeds of valuable crops.

In order to industrialize agriculture, collective farms were enlarged (as a result, their number decreased from 91,000 to 39,000). In the course of extensive communist construction, with the aim of turning all property into public property, there was a massive transformation of collective farms into state farms. A characteristic feature was also the consolidation of collective farms at the expense of the so-called unpromising villages. In 1959, a forced purchase of all the equipment of the liquidated machine and tractor stations (MTS) by collective farms was carried out, which undermined the financial situation of rural producers, given that they also did not have a sufficient number of technical personnel.

The corn epic did not give positive results, in 1962-1963. the crisis in the development of virgin lands worsened.

In order to achieve the tasks of communist construction as soon as possible, the authorities ordered attack on private farms. The land plots of collective farmers were again cut down (from 1.5 acres per one collective farm yard in 1955-1956 to one hundred square meters in 1959-1960; in 1950-1952 there were 32 acres), cattle were forcibly redeemed. Against this background, a campaign of public condemnation of traders and money-grubbers, a struggle against the invaders of collective farm lands, unfolded. As a result, there was a decline in personal subsidiary farming. Collective farm workers turned into hired workers.

As a result of the difficulties that arose, the seven-year plan for the development of agriculture was not fulfilled: instead of the planned 70%, the increase in agriculture amounted to only 15%. The food problem in the country has worsened. The resulting food shortage caused a rise in prices, in particular for meat by 25-30%. The economic difficulties coincided with a bad harvest in 1963, which had disastrous consequences. As a result, the crisis in agriculture led to the first mass purchases of grain abroad (12 million tons).

Industry. In general, during the period under review, the average annual growth rate of industrial production in the USSR exceeded 10%, which was ensured solely due to the harsh methods of the command economy. Scientific and technological progress was considered one of the levers for the development of industry.

Further development of the administrative system. There has been a process development of vertical centralization economic councils (SNKh). In June 1960, the Republican Council of National Economy was created, in March 1963 - Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh). The system of national economic planning became progressively more complex.

The system of governing bodies of the agrarian sector has changed. From March 1962 created kolkhoz-sovkhoz administrations (KSU).

The administrative reform affected and structures of party organizations. In order to strengthen the role of the party in the development of agriculture in rural areas, district committees were abolished (their functions were transferred to party organizations of the Constitutional Court, party organizers in production); regional committees were divided according to the production principle - into industrial and agricultural. On the whole, the management restructuring reform preserved the essence of the administrative and economic mechanism, the territorial management system led to sectoral imbalance and the growth of parochial tendencies of economic councils.

Reorganization of the administrative system became a permanent feature. Continuous shake-ups of the apparatus and personal displacements seriously disturbed party and government officials who were striving for the stability of their personal position. N.S. Khrushchev, on the other hand, declared his readiness to scatter everyone like kittens. It seemed to the apparatchiks that de-Stalinization did not bring the desired confidence in the future. In bureaucratic circles, dissatisfaction with N.S. Khrushchev was growing, a desire to subordinate him to the apparatus. A major step along this path was the campaign against the creative intelligentsia, as a result of which Khrushchev the reformer lost firm support among them.

Dissatisfaction with Khrushchev was also expressed by representatives of all levels of the party apparatus (after its division into two independent systems and the formation of a kind of dual power). Therefore, a conspiracy against N.S. Khrushchev became inevitable.

Social politics. At first in the social sphere continued positive developments. The material situation of the population improved, and public consumption funds grew. By 1960, the transfer of workers and employees to a 7-hour working day was completed. The introduction of pensions for collective farmers was being prepared. The housing stock increased (for 1959-1965 - by 40%).

In the context of a slowdown in development and the growth of crisis economic phenomena social policy was not consistent. The government froze for twenty years payments on domestic loans issued before 1957 (in order to reduce the budget deficit). ).

It caused spontaneous actions of workers. In 1959, with the help of the troops, a 1,500-strong uprising of workers - builders of the Kazakhstan Magnitka (Temirtau) was suppressed. In 1962, a 7,000-strong workers' demonstration took place in Novocherkassk, also dispersed by troops using tanks (24 people died, 105 participants in the unrest were convicted). Working performances were held in many industrial areas - in Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass, Kemerovo, Ivanovo.

RESULTS. During the Khrushchev thaw, a serious modernization attempt. N.S. Khrushchev set the impetus for the development of political processes, embarking on the path of liberalization.

However use of the old political and economic mechanism in the course of the reforms predetermined their failure. Course N.S. Khrushchev was characterized by the absolutization of organizational factors, the solution of economic problems by administrative and political methods. The situation was aggravated by the absence of any scientific and managerial foundations for administrative reforms, the randomness and subjectivity of the transformations carried out in the administrative and economic system.

N.S. Khrushchev and the leadership of the party, remaining on the positions of the communist ideology and preserving many of the traditions of the Stalinist leadership, not only turned out to be unprepared, but also did not seek radical change.

After the failures of N.S. Khrushchev’s contradictory transformative activity, a fatigue syndrome arose in society, striving for sustainable forms of social and personal life. During this period, the party-state bureaucracy, thirsting for stability, came to the fore in the hierarchy of power, or nomenclature, which played a decisive role in the removal of N.S. Khrushchev in October 1964.

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The main directions of the economic and political development of the country in 1965-1984, the mechanism of inhibition of socio-economic progress.

Approved by N.S. Khrushchev mistakes, voluntarism in domestic and foreign policy, mass campaigns,

Khrushchev's reforms and their results.

The solution of economic problems remained the most important task for Soviet society. In the organization of economic development of this period, two periods are clearly distinguished, which seriously differed from each other in terms of methods, goals and final results.
1953-1957 Economic course of G.M. Malenkov After the death of Stalin, the new economic course of the USSR was associated with the name of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G.M. Malenkov (1953-1955). It consisted in the social reorientation of the economy, which meant shifting the center of gravity to the development of the light, food industry, and agriculture.
An attempt was made to solve the food problem and bring agriculture out of the crisis by increasing productivity (i.e., intensifying production) and using the factor of personal interest of the collective farmer. To this end, it was planned to reduce taxes on personal subsidiary plots, raise procurement prices for agricultural products, write off agricultural tax arrears (1.5 billion poods of grain) to collective farms, and increase household plots. It was one of the variants of the new agrarian course.
The program for the transformation of agriculture, carried out by N.S. Khrushchev, was somewhat different from the strategic plan of G.M. Malenkov. In addition to these measures, Khrushchev intended to ensure the rise of agriculture through the rapid expansion of sown areas through the development of virgin lands (an extensive path for the development of agriculture). He also paid special attention to the processes of mechanization of agriculture, for which it was planned in the future to turn collective farms into large industrial-type farms.
In 1954, the development of virgin lands in the Trans-Volga region, Siberia and Kazakhstan began. With the participation of 300 thousand volunteers, mostly young people, 42 million hectares of new land were developed.
The purchase prices for agricultural products were doubled, the debts of collective farms for agricultural tax of previous years (1.5 billion poods of grain) were written off, and expenditures on the social development of the village were increased several times. Taxes on personal subsidiary plots were abolished, which were allowed to be increased five times. In 1958, mandatory deliveries of agricultural products from household plots were abolished, and taxes on it were reduced.
On the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev, the criteria for planning in agriculture were changed, the collective farms received the right to amend their charters.
For 1953-1958 the growth of agricultural production amounted to 34% compared with the previous five years. In order to solve the food problem, the area under corn was increased: from 1955 to 1962. from 18 to 37 million ha.
Administrative and economic reform. In 1957, N.S. Khrushchev tried to decentralize the management of industry, to create a new organizational and economic structure built on the management of industry not according to sectoral (through ministries), but according to the territorial principle.
In order to limit the possibility of interference by local party apparatuses in economic activity, economic councils were created, which were directly subordinate to the union ministry. 141 all-union and republican ministries were abolished and 105 economic councils were created instead.
The reorganization of the management system gave certain results: industrial specialization and intersectoral cooperation increased, and the process of technical reconstruction of the economy took place. The rights and economic powers of the union republics were expanded. However, the reform as a whole not only did not introduce any qualitative changes in the economic conditions, but also gave rise to a certain disunity in the sectoral mechanism of the Soviet economy.
Social politics. The economic policy of the post-Stalin leadership, despite the contradictions, had a pronounced social orientation. In the mid 50s. A program of measures aimed at raising the living standards of the population was developed.
The salaries of workers in industry were regularly raised. The real incomes of workers and employees increased by 60%, of collective farmers - by 90% (since 1956, collective farmers were transferred to a monthly advance payment of wages). The law on old-age pensions for workers and employees doubled their size and lowered the retirement age. The working week was reduced from 48 to 46 hours, and compulsory state loans were abolished. Trade unions have gained greater rights in production.
Housing construction has become one of the important achievements of social policy. From 1955 to 1964 the urban housing stock increased by 80%, 54 million people received new apartments. The material base of education, health care, and culture was strengthened.
1958-1964 At the end of the 50s. a transition was made from five-year to seven-year planning (1959-1965). Since that time, the process of displacing economic incentives in the development of the economy by administrative coercion began. In agriculture, this trend manifested itself most clearly.
Kolkhoz policy. Among the disproportions of the seven-year plan, the most severe was the crisis in agriculture. Farms experienced a constant lack of electricity, chemical fertilizers, seeds of valuable crops.
In order to industrialize agriculture, collective farms were enlarged (as a result, their number decreased from 91,000 to 39,000). In the course of extensive communist construction, with the aim of turning all property into public property, there was a massive transformation of collective farms into state farms. A characteristic feature was also the consolidation of collective farms at the expense of the so-called unpromising villages. In 1959, a forced purchase of all the equipment of the liquidated machine and tractor stations (MTS) by collective farms was carried out, which undermined the financial situation of rural producers, given that they also did not have a sufficient number of technical personnel.
The corn epic did not give positive results, in 1962-1963. the crisis in the development of virgin lands worsened.
In order to achieve the tasks of communist construction as soon as possible, the authorities launched an attack on private subsidiary plots. The land plots of collective farmers were again cut down (from 1.5 acres per one collective farm yard in 1955-1956 to one hundred square meters in 1959-1960; in 1950-1952 there were 32 acres), cattle were forcibly redeemed. Against this background, a campaign of public condemnation of traders and money-grubbers, a struggle against the invaders of collective farm lands, unfolded. As a result, there was a decline in personal subsidiary farming. Collective farm workers turned into hired workers.
As a result of the difficulties that arose, the seven-year plan for the development of agriculture was not fulfilled: instead of the planned 70%, the increase in agriculture amounted to only 15%. The food problem in the country has worsened. The resulting food shortage caused a rise in prices, in particular for meat by 25-30%. The economic difficulties coincided with a bad harvest in 1963, which had disastrous consequences. As a result, the crisis in agriculture led to the first mass purchases of grain abroad (12 million tons).
Industry. In general, during the period under review, the average annual growth rate of industrial production in the USSR exceeded 10%, which was ensured solely due to the harsh methods of the command economy. Scientific and technological progress was considered one of the levers for the development of industry.
Further development of the administrative system. There has been a process of development of vertical centralization of economic councils (SNKh). In June 1960, the Republican Council of National Economy was created, in March 1963 - the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh). The system of national economic planning became progressively more complex.
The system of governing bodies of the agrarian sector has changed. From March 1962 collective-farm and state-farm administrations (KSU) were created.
The administrative reform also affected the structure of party organizations. In order to strengthen the role of the party in the development of agriculture in rural areas, district committees were abolished (their functions were transferred to party organizations of the Constitutional Court, party organizers in production); Regional committees were divided according to the production principle - into industrial and agricultural. On the whole, the management restructuring reform preserved the essence of the administrative and economic mechanism, the territorial management system led to sectoral imbalance and the growth of parochial tendencies of economic councils.
The reorganization of the administrative system has become a permanent phenomenon. Continuous shake-ups of the apparatus and personal displacements seriously disturbed party and government officials who were striving for the stability of their personal position. N.S. Khrushchev, on the other hand, declared his readiness to scatter everyone like kittens. It seemed to the apparatchiks that de-Stalinization did not bring the desired confidence in the future. In bureaucratic circles, dissatisfaction with N.S. Khrushchev was growing, a desire to subordinate him to the apparatus. A major step along this path was the campaign against the creative intelligentsia, as a result of which Khrushchev the reformer lost firm support among them.
Dissatisfaction with Khrushchev was also expressed by representatives of all levels of the party apparatus (after its division into two independent systems and the formation of a kind of dual power). Therefore, a conspiracy against N.S. Khrushchev became inevitable.
Social politics. Initially, positive changes continued in the social sphere. The material situation of the population improved, and public consumption funds grew. By 1960, the transfer of workers and employees to a 7-hour working day was completed. The introduction of pensions for collective farmers was being prepared. The housing stock increased (for 1959-1965 - by 40%).
In the context of a slowdown in development and the growth of crisis economic phenomena, social policy was not consistent. The government froze for twenty years payments on domestic loans issued before 1957 (in order to reduce the budget deficit). ).
This caused spontaneous demonstrations of the workers. In 1959, with the help of the troops, a 1,500-strong uprising of workers - builders of the Kazakhstan Magnitka (Temirtau) was suppressed. In 1962, a 7,000-strong workers' demonstration took place in Novocherkassk, also dispersed by troops using tanks (24 people died, 105 participants in the unrest were convicted). Working performances were held in many industrial areas - in Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass, Kemerovo, Ivanovo.
RESULTS. During the Khrushchev thaw, a serious attempt was made to modernize. N.S. Khrushchev set the impetus for the development of political processes, embarking on the path of liberalization.
However, the use of the old political and economic mechanism in the course of the reforms predetermined their failure. Course N.S. Khrushchev was characterized by the absolutization of organizational factors, the solution of economic problems by administrative and political methods. The situation was aggravated by the absence of any scientific and managerial foundations for administrative reforms, the randomness and subjectivity of the transformations carried out in the administrative and economic system.
NS Khrushchev and the leadership of the party, remaining on the positions of the communist ideology and preserving many of the traditions of the Stalinist leadership, not only were not ready, but also did not strive for radical changes.
After the failures of N.S. Khrushchev's contradictory transformative activity, a fatigue syndrome arose in society, a desire for sustainable forms of social and personal life. During this period, the party-state bureaucracy, or nomenklatura, thirsting for stability, came to the fore in the hierarchy of power, which played a decisive role in the removal of N.S. Khrushchev in October 1964.

  • reforms Khrushchev And their results. The solution of economic problems remained the most important task for Soviet society. In the organization of economic development of this period, two periods are clearly distinguished, which seriously differed from each other in methods ...


  • reforms Khrushchev And their results


  • reforms Khrushchev And their results. The solution of economic problems remained the most important task for Soviet society. In the organization ho.


  • Industrialization in the USSR, goals and results. The socialist industrialization of the USSR (Stalin's industrialization) is a process of forced on ... more ».
    reforms Khrushchev and reform unable to give big results, and such activities could not be carried out without the allocation of significant funds by the state. Major social and political results reforms.


  • reforms began in the army in connection with the war for access to the Baltic Sea (1700), for them others followed. IN result reforms significantly changed the position of the estates of Russia.


  • reforms results.
    With the elimination of I.S. Khrushchev
    IN result


  • reforms 1960-1970s: essence, goals, methods and results.
    With the elimination of I.S. Khrushchev the role of the army leadership and security agencies has increased.
    IN result over 25 years (1964-1988), the developed arable land decreased by 22 million hectares.

Found similar pages:10


1. Introduction

2. Change of political course

3. Changes in the field of agriculture.

a) agricultural production

b) development of virgin lands

c) sale of agricultural equipment to state farms

d) "cult of corn"

e) the outflow of the rural population to the cities

4. Changes in the industry

a) The course towards mechanization and automation of production

b) accelerated development of the chemical industry

c) space exploration and nuclear energy

d) reform of the management of the national economy (org. economic councils)

e) XXI Congress com. parties - to catch up and overtake the developed capitalists

cal countries by production per capita.

f) XXII Congress of the CPSU - a new program of the party.

5. Changes in foreign policy.

6. Crisis of power. Offset N.S. Khrushchev.

From the second half of 1953 to the end of the 1950s, reforms were carried out in the USSR, which had a beneficial effect both on the pace of development of the national economy and on the well-being of the people.

The main reason for the success of the reforms was that they revived the economic methods of managing the national economy and were started with agriculture, and therefore received wide support among the masses.

The main reason for the defeat of the reforms is that they were not supported by the democratization of the political system. Having broken the repressive system, they did not touch its basis - the command-administrative system. Therefore, already after five or six years, many reforms began to be curtailed by the efforts of both the reformers themselves and the powerful administrative and managerial apparatus, the nomenklatura.

Where could the country go after Stalin's death? The answer to this question must be sought in the correlation of forces in the highest stratum of the party-state leadership. Either a temporary continuation of Stalinism was possible, which posed a serious threat to the lives and well-being of millions of people and entire nations, or some softening of it while maintaining the general political course, or a turn towards de-Stalinization. De-Stalinization did not mean the elimination of the totalitarian regime. Society as a whole was not yet ready for this. It could only be about the initial cleansing of the legacy of Stalinism: the release of the repressed, a turn towards solving the most acute agrarian problems, and the weakening of the dogmatic pressure in culture. The first option was associated with the prospect of Beria coming to power, Molotov and Bulganin would probably take part in the implementation of the second, but in practice the third option began to be implemented. And N.S. Khrushchev connected himself with him.

The most influential political figures in the leadership were Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev. The balance was extremely unstable.

The policy of the new leadership in the spring days of 1953. was controversial, reflecting the contradictions in its composition. At the request of Zhukov, a large group of military men returned from prison. But the Gulag continued to exist, the old slogans and portraits of Stalin hung everywhere.

Each of the contenders for power sought to seize it in their own way. Beria - through control over the bodies and troops of state security.

Malenkov - declaring his desire to pursue a popular policy of improving the well-being of the people, "to take care of the maximum satisfaction of his material needs", calling in "2-3 years to achieve the creation in our country of an abundance of food for the population and raw materials for light industry." But Beria and Malenkov had no connections among the top military leaders, who did not trust them. The main thing was in the mood of the party apparatus, which wanted to preserve the regime, but without repression in relation to the apparatus. Objectively, the situation was favorable for Khrushchev. Khrushchev showed unusual activity these days. In September 1953, N.S. Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Articles began to appear in the press about the dangers of the cult of personality. It was paradoxical that their authors referred to the works of Stalin, declaring that he was an opponent of the cult. A review of the "Leningrad case" and the "case of doctors" began. Party and economic leaders and doctors convicted in these cases were rehabilitated. But at the same time, at the end of 1953, in the mines of Vorkuta, which were under the jurisdiction of the still existing GULAG, the strikes of prisoners were brutally suppressed.

After Stalin's death, certain hopes arose among the prisoners of the Gulag associated with amnesty and rehabilitation. These sentiments played the role of a detonator of unrest. A year later, the rehabilitation of the political trials of the 1930s began. People began to return from exile and prisons. Now it is possible to evaluate that first step in different ways: from the height of the past years, everything is more visible and more obvious. But one thing still cannot be denied: despite all the costs and reticences, it was a step from a permanent civil war to civil peace.

There has been a turn in real politics. And this turn had to be supported by decisions of an economic nature. In August 1953 At the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Malenkov for the first time raised the question of turning the economy towards people, of the priority attention of the state to the welfare of the people through the accelerated development of agriculture and the production of consumer goods. "Now, on the basis of the successes achieved in the development of heavy industry, we have all the conditions for organizing a steep rise in the production of consumer goods." It was supposed to drastically change the investment policy, significantly increase the financial “feeding” of non-material production sectors focused on the production of goods for the people, pay special attention to agriculture, and attract machine-building plants and heavy industry enterprises to the production of consumer goods. Thus, a course was taken for the social reorientation of the economy, which quickly began to be embodied in specific goods, money, and housing.

The choice of a new political path required a change in the orientations in the economy. However, at that time no one in the country's political leadership questioned the principles of the command-administrative system. It was about overcoming its extremes, such as the almost complete lack of material incentives for workers, the lag in the mass introduction of scientific and technological achievements into production. The rejection of the market, commodity-money relations still dominated, and the advantages of socialism were seen as something given once and for all, capable of ensuring development and prosperity in itself.

In the first place among the national economic problems was agricultural production. Khrushchev, we must give him his due, by origin, and by interests, was always closer to the needs of the peasants than any of the other top political leaders. At the Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev made a series of proposals, important for that time, for the development of agriculture. From the standpoint of today, they may seem insufficient, but then they were of no small importance. Purchase prices for agricultural products were increased, advances were introduced for the labor of collective farmers (before that, payment was made to them only once a year), etc.

Khrushchev condemned the practice of the existence of weak farms by transferring the funds of strong ones to them, criticized the swollen administrative apparatus, and the insufficient assistance of the city to agriculture. The cultivation of poultry and small livestock by peasants began to be somewhat encouraged. Cows appeared on many farms, which was unthinkable for a collective farmer a year ago.

The ideas expressed, the adopted resolutions could give a return only a few years later. And it was necessary to correct the grain economy immediately. The way out was found in the development of virgin and fallow lands. It was a pronounced extensive version of development. Suitable lands were located on the territory of Kazakhstan, Southern Siberia, in the Volga region, in the Urals, in the North Caucasus. Among them, Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia looked the most promising. The very idea of ​​developing these lands was not new. Thoughts about the possibility of their use were expressed at the beginning of the century. A feature of the mid-50s is the revival of mass enthusiasm, especially among young people. Changes were slowly but steadily taking place in the country, arousing in millions of young people a sincere desire to make their personal contribution to strengthening the material foundations of Soviet society. Enthusiasm lived in the souls of people, and not only in slogans, appeals and marches. A favorable, from a socio-psychological point of view, moment was created when mass enthusiasm, backed up by material incentives and attention to social problems, could give a long-term economic and political effect. However, the outburst of youth enthusiasm was perceived by management as permanent, unchanging and always in the future.

controlled force.

By the spring of 1954. over 120 state farms were organized in the virgin lands of Kazakhstan. The first virgin lands had to live in tents, in off-road conditions, in a change of severe cold and sweltering heat. Round-the-clock work during the period of sowing and harvesting was replaced by construction work during a relatively short rest period. The first results of the virgin epic could not but inspire optimism. In 1954 virgin lands gave more than 40 percent of the gross grain harvest. The production of meat and milk increased.

All this made it possible to somewhat improve the food supply of the population. However, progress was only in the early years. The yield of grain crops on the newly developed lands remained low, land development took place in the absence of a scientifically based farming system. There was also traditional mismanagement. The granaries were not built by the deadline, reserves of equipment and fuel were not created.

It was necessary to transfer equipment from all over the country, which increased the cost of grain, and, consequently, meat, milk, etc.

The development of virgin lands pushed back the revival of old-arable agricultural regions of Russia. And yet, the initial stage of the development of virgin lands will remain in history as a true epic of labor, as a real surge of enthusiasm, as a bright feature of the time when the country was moving towards a historical turn made by the 20th Party Congress.

The country lived in renewal. Numerous meetings were held with the participation of workers in industry, construction, and transport. In itself, this phenomenon was new - after all, before all the most important decisions were made in a narrow circle, behind closed doors. The meetings spoke openly about the need for change, about the use of world technical experience.

But with the novelty of a number of approaches, persistent stereotypes of the old were also observed. The reasons for the delays were seen in the fact that "weak leadership" is carried out by "ministers and leaders", it was proposed to create new departments for the introduction of new technology. But the principle of a planned-centralized, command-bureaucratic system was not questioned.

1956 - the year of the XX Congress - turned out to be very favorable for the country's agriculture. It was this year that a great success was indicated in the virgin lands - the harvest was a record one. Chronic difficulties in previous years with grain procurement seemed to be a thing of the past. Yes, and in the central regions of the country, the collective farmers, freed from the most oppressive shackles of the Stalinist system, which often resembled state serfdom, received new incentives to work, and the share of monetary payment for their labor increased. Under these conditions, at the end of 1958. on the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev, a decision was made to sell agricultural machinery to collective farms. The fact is that before that, the equipment was in the hands of machine and tractor stations (MTS). Collective farms had the right to buy only trucks. Such a system has developed since the late 1920s and was the result of a deep distrust of the peasantry as a whole, which was not allowed to own agricultural machinery. For the use of machinery, the collective farms had to pay the MTS in kind.

The sale of machinery to collective farms had a positive impact on agricultural production far from immediately. Most of them were not able to buy immediately and paid the money in installments. This at first worsened the financial situation of a significant part of the collective farms and gave rise to a certain discontent. Another negative consequence was the actual loss of personnel of machine operators and repairmen. previously concentrated in MTS By law, they were supposed to move to collective farms, but this meant for many of them a lowering of living standards, and they found work in regional centers and cities. The attitude towards equipment deteriorated, since the collective farms, as a rule, did not have parks and shelters for storing it in the winter, and the general level of technical culture of the collective farmers was still low.

There were also traditional shortcomings in the prices of agricultural products, which were extremely low and did not recoup the costs.

But the main thing was not discussed - the need to provide the peasantry with the freedom to choose forms of management. An unshakable confidence in the absolute perfection of the collective-farm and state-farm system, which was under the close tutelage of party and state bodies, prevailed.

But some solution had to be found. Visiting the USA in 1959 Khrushchev visited the fields of an American farmer who grew hybrid corn. Khrushchev was literally captivated by her. He came to the conclusion that it is possible to raise "virgin meat" only by solving the problem of fodder production, and that, in turn, is based on the structure of sown areas. Instead of grass fields, it is necessary to switch to wide and widespread sowing of corn, which produces both grain and green mass for silage. In the same place where corn does not grow, resolutely replace leaders who "withered themselves and dry the corn." Khrushchev began to introduce corn into Soviet agriculture with great zeal. It was promoted up to the Arkhangelsk region. This was a mockery not only of the centuries-old experience and traditions of peasant agriculture, but also of common sense. feed for livestock, really helped to cope with the problems of agriculture.

Agriculture, as before, was under pressure from the stereotypes of report mania, the desire of administrative workers to achieve significant indicators by people, even illegally, without realizing the negative consequences.

Agriculture was on the verge of a crisis. The increase in cash incomes of the population in the cities began to outstrip the growth of agricultural production. And again, it seemed, a way out was found, but not in economic ways, but in new endless reorganizational rearrangements. In 1961 The Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR was reorganized and turned into a consultative body. Khrushchev himself traveled to dozens of regions, giving personal instructions on how to conduct agriculture. But all his efforts were in vain. The desired breakthrough never happened. Many collective farmers were undermined by the belief in the possibility of change. The outflow of the rural population to the cities increased; Seeing no prospects, the village began to leave the youth. Since 1959 renewed persecution of private farms. It was forbidden for townspeople to have cattle, which rescued the supply of residents of small towns. Then farms and villagers were persecuted. For four years, the number of livestock in the personal farmstead has halved. It was a real defeat of the peasantry, which had just begun to recover from Stalinism. The slogans sounded again that the main thing is the public and not the private economy, that the main enemy is "speculators and parasites" who trade in the markets. Collective farmers were expelled from the markets, and real speculators began to inflate prices.

However, the miracle did not come, and in 1962. The government decided to stimulate animal husbandry by increasing meat prices by 1.5 times. The new prices did not increase the amount of meat, but caused unrest in the cities. The largest of them in Novocherkassk was suppressed by force of arms. There were casualties.

There were also strong, prosperous farms in the country, headed by skillful leaders who knew how to get along both with superiors and with subordinates. But they existed rather contrary to the prevailing situation. Difficulties in the agricultural sector were growing.

The following year there were shortages not only in meat, milk and butter, but also in bread. Long queues lined up at the bakery shops from the night. Anti-government sentiment was on the rise. And then it was decided to get out of the crisis with the help of purchases of American grain. This temporary measure became an organic part of state policy until the death of the USSR. The gold reserves of the Soviet Union were used to support, strengthen and develop American farms, while the farms of their own peasants were persecuted. But the organizers of this "exchange" received a new and seemingly inexhaustible source of personal enrichment.

The seven-year plan for the development of the national economy (1959-1965) in terms of the development of agricultural production was a failure. Instead of the planned 70 percent growth was only 15 percent.

The USSR has become a mighty industrial power. Emphasis was still placed on production, which by the beginning of the 1960s accounted for a general rise in industrial production. The industry of building materials, mechanical engineering, metalworking, chemistry, petrochemistry, and electric power industry developed especially rapidly. The volume of their production increased by 4-5 times.

Group "B" enterprises (first of all, light, food, woodworking, pulp and paper industries) developed much more slowly. However, their growth was also twofold. On the whole, the average annual rate of industrial production in the USSR exceeded 10 percent. Such high rates could be achieved only by actively using the harsh methods of administrative economics. The leaders of the USSR were confident that the country's industrial growth rates would not only be high, but also increasing. The conclusions of Western economists about the inevitable "fading" of rates as the economic potential of the USSR grew were rejected as attempts to judge socialism by analogy with capitalism. The thesis about the accelerating development of the national economy in the USSR (primarily industry) has become firmly established in political propaganda and the social sciences.

Despite the summing up of the machine base for the national economy, its scientific and technical level began to lag behind the needs of the time.

The proportion of workers and peasants engaged in heavy manual and low-skilled labor was high (40 percent in industry, 75 percent in agriculture). These problems were discussed at the plenum of the Central Committee in 1955, at which the course towards mechanization and automation of production was determined. A few years later, the main link was also named, seizing on which, they hoped to stretch the entire chain of the scientific and technological revolution - chemistry. The accelerated development of the chemical industry was justified by the strengthening of its role in creating the material and technical base of communism.

However, the space assault became a symbol of the scientific and technological progress of the USSR. In October 1957 The first artificial earth satellite was launched. Then space rockets carried animals into space, flew around the moon. And in April 1961. a man stepped into space, the first man on the planet, a Soviet man - Yuri Gagarin.

The conquest of space required colossal funds. They weren't behind the price. This was not only scientific, but also military interest. They believed that the time was not far off when Soviet cosmonauts, as hospitable hosts, would meet envoys from other countries, including the United States, in outer space. It seemed that the Soviet Union had become the leader of the scientific and technological progress of mankind.

Impressive for the Soviet people, for the whole world was the commissioning of the first nuclear icebreaker "Lenin", the opening of the Institute for Nuclear Research. Of course, these were big events. But then nothing was said about the dangers posed by the mass development of nuclear energy, about the need for the strictest observance of technological discipline, and the need to increase the level of safety at nuclear facilities. The Soviet people did not even know about the accident in the city of Kyshtym near Chelyabinsk, which resulted in the contamination of the territory of a number of regions with radioactive substances. Hundreds of people were irradiated, over ten thousand villagers were evicted from the radioactive zone, although tens of thousands of villagers continued to live there for many decades to come.

In 1957, attempts were made to reform the management of the national economy. The existing super-centralized sectoral ministries, according to Khrushchev, were unable to ensure the rapid growth of industrial production. Instead, territorial administrations were established - councils of the national economy. The very idea of ​​decentralizing economic management for such a huge country initially met with positive responses. However, in the spirit characteristic of the administrative-command system, this reform was presented by its authors as a miraculous one-time act that could radically change the economic situation in the country: destroy the departmental monopoly, bring management closer to the localities, raise their initiative, balance the economic development of the republics and regions, strengthen internal their economic ties, as a result - to accelerate economic development. The management of the defense sector of the economy remained centralized. The existing doubts about the reform were not expressed, since it came from Khrushchev himself.

It should be said that the organization of economic councils had some effect. Senseless counter transportation of goods was reduced, hundreds of duplicating each other small production enterprises of different ministries were closed. The freed up areas were used for the production of new products. The process of technical reconstruction of many enterprises has accelerated: in 1956-1960, three times more new types of machines, units, and instruments were put into operation than in the previous five-year plan. There was a significant reduction in administrative and managerial personnel in production.

However, there were no fundamental changes in the development of the economy.

Instead of the petty tutelage of the ministries, the enterprises received the petty tutelage of the economic councils. The reform did not reach the enterprise, the workplace, and could not reach it, since it was not even oriented towards this. The top economic leaders of the ministries in the capital were also dissatisfied, as they were losing a considerable part of their already customary power. But the provincial bureaucracy supported Khrushchev's steps.

Instead of looking for the material interest of each worker in the results of their work, changes were made in rationing and payment. The result was a significant reduction in workers working on a piece-rate basis and an increase in the number of time workers. And besides that, low material incentives to work began to decline sharply. The promises, repeated many times from high tribunes, about the growth of wages led to the fact that the workers began to en masse make statements that "wages should be increased for everyone without exception, as Khrushchev said." ", i.e. adjustment of wages to a certain level.

Moral incentives began to play an increasingly active role. A new movement arose, the brigades of communist labor. The members of these brigades, like the members of the DIP brigades ("catch up and overtake") in the early 30s, tried to introduce communist methods into their daily lives, spend their free time together, and improve their general educational, technical and professional level. However, the idealism of the initiators, the movement for communal labor faded rather quickly, faced with both the "gross" needs of everyday life, and the fact that the initiative was quickly made by the bureaucracy of the party, trade union, Komsomol, which made it another column in the "table of socialist competition."

The civil sector of the economy had the greatest success in the direction of housing construction. In the USSR, mass housing construction was not carried out; in other pmeriods, they simply did not build housing. The war deprived millions of families of their homes, people lived in dugouts, in barracks, in communal apartments. To get a separate comfortable apartment for many was an almost unrealizable dream. The pace at which housing construction was carried out in the first half of the 60s, our country did not know before or after this period.

To stay at a high level was not for everyone. This movement could not be massive. But the trade union organizations, in pursuit of numbers, tried to involve as many people as possible in it. In the end, everything was formalized. Love for a ringing phrase, slogan, precocity of conclusions and decisions were characteristic features of that time, where genuine innovations, concern for the common people were intricately intertwined with projectorism, idle talk, and sometimes even elementary social ignorance.

The 21st Congress is yet another attempt at radical acceleration. The reform, the changes made led to confusion in the administrative apparatus, failures in the implementation of the sixth five-year plan. However, the country's leadership did not recognize this and make the necessary adjustments. Another solution was found: to replace the five-year plan for 1956-1960 with the seven-year plan for 1959-1965. Then the "shortage" of the first years of the five-year plan will be covered by new plans. As a justification for this measure, the scale of the economy, the need to establish a long-term perspective of economic planning were given.

Although the seven-year plan spoke of the need to make a decisive breakthrough in providing the people with housing and consumer goods, its main ideas, as before, boiled down to the invariable priority development of the capital-intensive industries of group "A". Clearly unrealistic tasks were set for the complete mechanization of the construction industry.

It was this congress that marked the starting point for an inaccurate, exaggeratedly optimistic forecast of the development of the USSR for the next decade. He solemnly proclaimed that the country had entered "a period of extensive construction of a communist society."

The task was set - in the shortest possible time to catch up and overtake the most developed capitalist countries in terms of production per capita. Looking to the future, Khrushchev estimated that this would happen around 1970. In his report, Khrushchev also touched upon some questions of theory. He drew the conclusion about the complete and final victory of socialism in our country. Thus, in his opinion, the question of the possibility of building socialism in one country was resolved.

The 22nd Congress of the CPSU was also the most important internal political event of the period under study. It adopted a new party program. The XXII Congress of the CPSU was at the same time the triumph of all politics associated with the name of N.S. Khrushchev, and the beginning of its end. In the course of his work and decisions, all the inconsistency of the era was reflected: the real achievements of the de-Stalinization process, certain successes in economic development and fantastic, utopian plans, steps towards the democratization of inner-party life, a sharp increase in the personality cult of Khrushchev himself. The main line towards the decentralization of the management of the national economy was lost.

To build communism, it was supposed to solve a triune task:

in the economic sphere - to build the material and technical base of communism (that is, to reach the first place in the world in terms of output per capita; to achieve the highest labor productivity in the world; to ensure the highest standard of living for the people in the world); in the field of socio-political - go over to communist self-government; in the field of spiritual and ideological - to educate a new, comprehensively developed person. The historical framework of the CPSU program was basically limited to twenty years.

In the early 60s, the image of communism in the mass consciousness was associated with specific major social programs. Social programs-obligations were reduced to the following:

firstly, to solve the food issue, fully providing the people with high-quality products of rational and uninterrupted nutrition;

secondly, to fully satisfy the demand for consumer goods;

thirdly, to solve the housing problem by providing each family with a separate comfortable apartment;

finally, to eliminate low-skilled and heavy manual labor in the national economy.

There was nothing utopian in these tasks. They became such after the USSR got involved in a new round of an unprecedented arms race that decided their material base.

The Cold War had a great influence on international relations. After the end of World War II, the allies' trust in each other in the anti-Hitler coalition began to melt inexorably. The growth of the influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the formation of communist-led governments there, the victory of the Chinese revolution, the growth of the anti-colonial liberation movement in Southeast Asia led to a new alignment of forces on the world stage, to a gradual confrontation between yesterday's allies. The most acute clash of the two forces in the early 50s was the Korean conflict. He showed how easily a "cold war" can escalate into an armed clash.

The new leadership of our country has demonstrated a desire for dynamism in foreign policy. It undertook a number of trips abroad in order to establish personal contacts with the leaders of friendly countries.

An important milestone in the strengthening of relations between the socialist states was the creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization - the Union, which proclaimed its goal to pursue a defense policy. The thaw also affected the relations of our country with the countries of the West. A treaty was concluded on collective security in Europe with the participation of the United States. The peak between East and West was the "Caribbean crisis" caused by the deployment of nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union in Cuba. The crisis that brought the world to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe was resolved through negotiations and compromises reached on them. After this climax of the Cold War, a slow process of improvement in relations between East and West began. The thaw in international relations was real and allowed the people of many countries to look at each other differently.

In the development of culture in the late 50's - early 60's contradictory trends were manifested. The general approach to the cultural environment was distinguished by the former desire to put it at the service of the administrative-command ideology. But the very process of renewal could not but revitalize cultural life. At the same time, Khrushchev quite sensitively felt the need for reforms in one of the main links of culture - in school: the period of study in secondary school was increased to 11 years, and from the ninth grade, students had to master industrial specialties. Neither the material base nor the teaching staff for this did not exist. An important role in spiritual life was played by some emancipation in historical science. Undoubtedly, there was a revival in artistic culture. There were new literary and art magazines: "Youth", "Young Guard". A new theater "Sovremennik" was opened in Moscow, which attracted attention not only with topical productions, but also with the play of many actors. Television has become a part of people's lives. However, the inconsistency of cultural policy made itself felt in the fact that some works were taken hostile by Khrushchev and a number of cultural figures. The political leadership of the country in the early 60s sought to keep culture within a strict framework. But all the same, bold, highly artistic, imbued with truth and citizenship works made their way. Documentary novels and memoirs of those who revealed the horrors of illegal repressions and the inhuman life of Stalin's camps were printed.

1962-1964 remained in the memory of many people as the years of internal turmoil and rising tensions. The food supply for the growing urban population has deteriorated. Prices turned out to be frozen. The reason for this was a sharp increase in purchase prices, which began to overtake retail prices.

The sympathy of ordinary people for Khrushchev began to wane. In the autumn of 1963 a new crisis broke out. Bread has disappeared from stores, because the virgin gave nothing. There were coupons for bread.

The rise in prices and the appearance of new deficits were a reflection of the growing crisis in the country's economy as a whole. Industrial growth began to slow down. Technological progress has slowed down. Khrushchev and his entourage tried to rectify the failures in the work of industry by drifting towards the restoration of a centralized bureaucratic command-administrative system of the Stalinist type. Khrushchev, on the one hand, sought to improve the situation in the economy by rearranging the party apparatus, and on the other hand, to push the two parts of the party apparatus together in order to protect himself with the policy of "divide and rule". The party apparatus grew sharply. Regional committees, Komsomol and trade union organizations began to share. The entire reform was reduced to swelling the apparatus of party and state bodies. The collapse of power was evident.

Khrushchev's loss of personal popularity, support from the party and economic apparatus, the break with a considerable part of the intelligentsia, the absence of visible changes in the standard of living of the majority of working people played a fatal role in the implementation of anti-bureaucratic reforms. Yes, and reform attempts took place in the apex, anti-democratic ways. Most of the people did not participate in them. Real decisions were made by a very limited circle of top political leaders. Naturally, in case of failure, all political responsibility fell on the person who held the first post in the party and government. Khrushchev was doomed to resign. In 1964 he tried to intensify reform activities by ordering the preparation of a draft of a new Constitution of the USSR.

The stormy consequences of the transformation in the USSR, inconsistent and contradictory, nevertheless managed to pull the country out of the stupor of the previous era.

The party-state nomenklatura succeeded in strengthening its position, but dissatisfaction with the restless leader in its ranks grew. The disappointment of the intelligentsia with the strictly dosed nomenklatura "thaw" grew. The workers and peasants are tired of the noisy struggle for a "bright future" while the current life is getting worse.

All this helped the party-state nomenclature to get rid of N.S. Khrushchev without any social upheavals. He was accused of "voluntarism", removed from all posts and retired. L.I. Brezhnev became the first secretary of the Central Committee.

The new government decides to start new economic reforms. The first steps of the reform in 1965. gave hope. Economic growth accelerated. The Eighth Five-Year Plan, which coincided with the implementation of the reform, turned out to be fulfilled in a number of important economic indicators. But by the early 70s. the essence of the reform turned out to be so distorted that it actually ceased to operate. The main reasons that led to the failure of the reform were the unwillingness of most of the leaders of the administrative-command economy to abandon the usual methods of management, which was accompanied by the curtailment of timid changes in the political sphere.

LITERATURE.

1. "History of the Fatherland" Textbook for the 11th grade Wednesdays. school V.P.

Ostrovsky, V.I. Startsev, B.A. Starkov, G.M. Smirnov. Moscow, Ed. Enlightenment, 1992

2. Light and shadows of the "great decade" N.S. Khrushchev and his time 1989.

3. Agrarian policy of the CPSU in the 50s - 60s. Journal N9 "Questions of the history of the CPSU" I.V. Rusinov, Moscow, 1988

After Stalin's death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev unexpectedly came to power. For a long time, Lavrenty Beria claimed the post of general secretary, but Khrushchev and his associates managed to purge the party in time and remove the obvious candidate from all positions.

Khrushchev's period in power is called a time of thaw and unexpected state reforms. The actions of Nikita Sergeevich in power were not consistent, which led to a crisis in the economy and his removal from office. What were the main reforms that Khrushchev managed to carry out, and is it possible to single out their advantages and disadvantages?

Advantages and disadvantages of Khrushchev's reforms

Khrushchev's reform

Advantages of the reform

Shortcomings of the reform

1. 1957 - the consistent introduction of market elements into the socialist model of the economy.

The reform helped to make a turn in the economy towards the consumer, to expand the market. Also, this reform was evidence of a thaw in relations with other powers that prefer to use a market economy model.

The reform led to the fact that bond payments stopped for many years, and this led to significant monetary losses among the population. In addition, there was a general increase in prices for many groups of goods.

2. The anti-religious campaign of 1954-1964, during which Khrushchev tried to reduce the influence of the church on the country's population

The anti-religious campaign, in fact, did not bring any results, because people continued to attend church, hang icons at home. Contrasting the power of the general secretary with church influence was lost by Khrushchev, and this also affected his authority among citizens.

3. Debunking the cult of Stalin and the anti-reforms.

Khrushchev tried to restore the justice of history by amending the understanding of the period of Stalin's rule. Many repressed citizens convicted during the Stalin period on unfair charges were also released.

In the minds of the people, Stalin was a great leader, and Khrushchev's desire to "slander" (actually, restore the truth) the leader was resented. In addition, Nikita Sergeevich placed too much emphasis on the abolition of all Stalinist reforms, which only hindered the development of the economy and the social sphere.

4. Social reforms 1957-1965

Khrushchev influenced the reduction of the working day to seven hours, wages were increased for workers. In addition, the housing stock increased, apartments were distributed to workers throughout the country, the so-called "Khrushchev" buildings were erected. Housing became more affordable.

An increase in the housing stock had no effect on the law itself, and one could only dream of privatization. In addition, Khrushchev's reforms were not consistent, which led to workers' protests.

5. International reforms

Khrushchev succeeded in achieving a thaw in international relations, reducing the degree of tension between the USSR and Europe. In addition, international trade improved, the market expanded, and the number of citizens restricted to travel abroad decreased. The development of the space program, which began under Khrushchev, helped strengthen the USSR in the status of a superpower.

The construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 almost led to World War III. The USSR was teetering internationally on a fine line, and war could break out at any moment. Here, again, the inconsistency of Khrushchev's reforms manifested itself.

6. The school reform of 1958, during which the previous model of education was abolished, labor schools were introduced

Khrushchev abandoned the secondary school model, introducing compulsory education in 8 classes and the subsequent 3 years of labor school. Thus, the general secretary wanted to bring the school closer to real life, but achieved only a general decline in academic performance. In addition, the involvement of the intelligentsia in working specialties led to discontent and speeches. The reform was abolished in 1966.

7. Personnel reforms within the party.

Young cadres capable of leading the country forward were attracted to work in the party.

Young cadres could not count on high positions, career advancement within the party was very difficult. The fight against the cult of Stalin led to the fact that many respected people who supported the former leader lost their jobs. Also, the Secretary General introduced the so-called “permanence of personnel” reform, which led to the fact that the same person could hold a specific position for the rest of his life, regardless of his professional success.

The results of Khrushchev's reform actions

What conclusions can be drawn regarding the reforms carried out by Khrushchev? During the years of being in power, Nikita Sergeevich repeatedly changed the line of his policy. And if the first years of his reign were invariably called the "thaw", then by the beginning of the 60s, the USSR was at the epicenter of the largest political crisis in the last 20 years.

Similar inconsistency was observed in everything. Many reforms were not carried through to completion, and some of them, such as dispelling the cult of Stalin, were based on Khrushchev's personal attitude to politics and economics.

By the beginning of the 60s, the USSR found itself in a deep economic crisis, which could also be explained by the inconsistency of reforms. Khrushchev wanted to preserve the socialist model of power, but at the same time bring the country closer to the democratic norms of the West.

Indignation at the illogicality of the policy was heard both from ordinary people and from members of the party. It was not for nothing that Khrushchev was removed from his post, realizing that he would not be able to lead the USSR to a happy future. However, the replacement of Khrushchev by Brezhnev did not lead to the desired results, and the country was in for an economic and social crisis.

Transformations N.S. Khrushchev touched on different aspects of the life of Soviet society and were partly associated with criticism of the personality cult of I. Stalin.

Governance reform

At the end of January 1957, a note by N.S. was sent to a wide circle of leaders of the country for discussion. Khrushchev on improving the management of industry and construction. The essence of the note was a proposal to abolish the departmental subordination of enterprises and give them to the jurisdiction of the regions.

After discussion, in May 1957, a law was adopted on the management of industry through the Councils of the National Economy (Sovnarkhozes), subordinate directly to the Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics. The reform consisted in dividing the territory of the USSR into so-called "economic administrative regions" with the creation within the regions, territories and republics of the USSR of a network of territorial councils of the national economy, under whose jurisdiction were transferred enterprises that were previously subordinate to the industrial and agro-industrial ministries. At the same time, many ministries, both federal and republican, were abolished.

In November 1962, on the initiative of Khrushchev, the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU set a course for the restructuring of all the governing bodies according to the production principle. Party organizations - from the regional and below - were divided into industrial and rural. After that, the regional organizations and departments of communications, trade, public education, and health care, which were subordinate to both industrial and rural party and Soviet bodies, began to receive daily duplicate resolutions and orders on the same issues.

In 1962-1963 there was a further enlargement of the economic councils, new bodies were built over them (republican and all-union economic councils). In March 1963, the Supreme Council of the National Economy was created, which actually revived the centralized structure of economic management.

In order to pursue a unified technical policy, instead of the abolished industrial ministries, state production committees were formed - sectoral management bodies that concentrated scientific research, design and design organizations in their jurisdiction to provide direct assistance to enterprises subordinate to economic councils. They switched from decentralization to centralization, but attempts to correct the reform still failed to give the necessary impetus to economic development, since the reform was formed back in the 1930s. the command-administrative management system continued to exist even when trying to introduce some features of territorial administration.

In July 1964, Khrushchev proposed the idea of ​​another restructuring of agricultural management: it was planned to create about a dozen specialized central departments responsible for the production of certain types of products. The rise of agriculture and the increase in the production of consumer goods, he proposed to carry out by reducing the cost of the army and armaments.

Industry

In the 1950s, the USSR carried out the first stage of the scientific and technological revolution of the 20th century, which was expressed in the development of new branches of the economy, such as electronics, nuclear power, and astronautics. At the same time, heavy industry developed at a faster pace, Group B enterprises (light, food, and other industries) developed more slowly, but their growth was also twofold. The years of Khrushchev accounted for 2 five-year plans (1951-1955; 1955-1958) and a seven-year plan (1959-1965).

Average annual growth rates of industrial production in the USSR in 1951-1955. accounted for, according to official figures, 13.1%, and 1956-1960. - 10.3%, in 1961-1965. - 8.6%.

On June 27, 1954, the world's first nuclear power plant in Obninsk gave current. In June 1959, the Angara was blocked, where the Bratsk hydroelectric power station was being built, which, after the introduction of all capacities, became the most powerful in the world in 1964.

The course for the restructuring of the fuel and energy complex of the country was taken in 1956-1961, the USSR gradually moved away from the use of coal in favor of gas and oil. The development of the gas industry in the North Caucasus and the Volga region made it possible to gasify more than 160 cities. In 1962, the development of the first oil-rich deposits in Siberia began. By 1963, the total production of oil and gas for the first time in the history of the USSR exceeded the share of coal fuel.

agrarian reform

The new course, proclaimed in August 1953 at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, proclaimed, among other things, the rise of agriculture, which was going through difficult times. The foundations of the new agrarian policy were approved at the September plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1953. Since that time, the economic position of collective farms has been strengthened, the amount of agricultural tax has been reduced, and purchase prices have increased. The farms were given loans, new equipment arrived. To strengthen the leading cadres of collective farms, party workers (“thirty-thousanders”) were sent to work in them.

In 1954, a campaign was launched to develop virgin lands in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals and the Volga region. Already in the first three years of the campaign, 32 million hectares of new land were developed. A sharp jump followed with unprecedented harvests. The Komsomol appeal played an important role in the development of virgin lands. But due to wind erosion of the soil, most of the developed land had to be converted to pastures. The non-chernozem center of the country fell into complete decline, due to increased attention to virgin lands (all equipment, young people were sent there).

In 1957, Khrushchev declared that in the next few years the USSR would not only catch up, but even surpass the USA in per capita meat, milk and butter production. This competition turned into an embarrassment associated with postscripts and mass slaughter of livestock. The most famous was the case that occurred in Ryazan, the secretary of the local regional committee A.N. Larionov received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, but at the end of 1960 the deceit was revealed and the secretary shot himself.

In February 1958, a decision was made to reorganize the machine and motor stations (MTS) into repair and tractor stations at collective farms. Such a merger laid a heavy burden on the poor collective farms, which were forced to purchase equipment. To solve this problem, Khrushchev proposed to enlarge the collective farms - to transform them into state farms. Then economic councils were created.

In order to achieve the tasks of communist construction as soon as possible, the authorities launched an attack on private subsidiary plots. The land plots of collective farmers were again cut down (from 1.5 acres per one collective farm yard in 1955-1956 to one hundred square meters in 1959-1960; in 1950-1952 there were 32 acres), cattle were forcibly redeemed. Against this background, a campaign of public condemnation of traders and money-grubbers, a struggle against the invaders of collective farm lands, unfolded. As a result, there was a decline in personal subsidiary farming.

After the visit of the head of the USSR to the United States in 1959, the corn epic also became part of Khrushchev's image - this culture was intensively planted everywhere, even where it could not grow in principle. The reduction in the sowing of rye and wheat for the sake of corn led to a general decrease in the grain harvest. Therefore, a poor harvest in 1962 led to a shortage of wheat and rye. The deficit had to be made up by buying wheat from the United States. After that, it became clear that agriculture needs other ways out of the crisis. In December 1963, the plenum of the Central Committee adopted a special resolution on the development of the chemical industry, which was tasked with the development of mineral fertilizers in agriculture. The return from these measures came already in the 70s.

Social reforms

Standards of working time have been established, in particular - a 6-hour working day for teenagers of 16 years old. In 1956, the working day of workers and employees on Saturdays and pre-holiday days was reduced by 2 hours; in 1957, the transition to a seven-hour working day began. In March 1957, taxes on workers and employees were reduced.

The housing fund was actively expanding, while housing construction was based on industrial methods, Moscow Cheryomushki became a symbol of the new standard housing construction. Late 50s - early 60s. in terms of the pace of construction and the amount of residential space introduced, the USSR came out on top in the world. The country's housing stock is increasing by 40% over the seven-year period. This spurred the development of construction-related sectors of the economy. True, the built housing went down in history under the name "khrushchev", but the housing crisis was resolved in the country, communal apartments gradually began to become a thing of the past. For 1956-1960 almost 54 million people moved to new apartments.

From September 1956, a decision was made to abolish tuition fees in senior classes and universities. In 1958, instead of the seven-year period, a compulsory eight-year polytechnic school was established. Those wishing to receive a complete secondary education had to continue their studies at a secondary polytechnic school (in a vocational school, in an evening or correspondence school), and for those who wanted to continue their education at a university, a mandatory work experience was introduced. But such a reform did not achieve the desired effect, the level of education fell, and from 1964 the secondary school again became a ten-year one.

Under Khrushchev, a radical reform of pension legislation took place; from July 1956, men over 60 and women over 55 began to receive pensions. Since February 1958, a gradual passportization of collective farmers began. In July-November 1964, a set of measures was adopted to pay pensions to peasants, which was the last initiative in the career of N.S. Khrushchev. For the first time in the history of the Soviet countryside, old-age pensions began to be received by men at the age of 65, and women at 60. Payments were made from a fund created at the expense of funds from collective farms and the state budget. But at the same time, it should be noted that the pensions of collective farmers were significantly lower than those of workers and employees.

Results of reforms

A positive result of the reforms of N.S. Khrushchev were impressive in comparison with economically developed countries quantitative economic indicators. In particular, by 1965 the national income of the USSR increased by 53% compared to 1958, production assets increased by 91%, and industrial output by 84%. The real incomes of the population increased by one third.

At the same time, numerous reforms failed to solve the issue of modernizing the economy. After the failures of N.S. Khrushchev’s contradictory reforming activity, a syndrome of fatigue from constant reform arose in society, and after it the era of “stagnation” began.