First delivery under Lend Lease. About Lend-Lease and its significance for the USSR during the Great Patriotic War
The author is Mark Semyonovich Solonin (b. May 29, 1958, Kuibyshev) - Russian publicist, author of books and articles in the genre of historical revisionism dedicated to the Great Patriotic War, primarily its initial period. By education, he is an aviation design engineer.
Guns, oil, gold
The article was published (with minor, purely technical abbreviations) on September 28, 2010 in the weekly Military-Industrial Courier. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all participants in the discussion of the note “Beyond Limits,” whose interesting and informative messages largely determined the content and themes of this article
On September 29, 1941, a conference of representatives of the USSR, USA and Great Britain began in Moscow, during which fundamental decisions were made on large-scale supplies of weapons and military equipment to the Soviet Union. On October 1, the first (there will be four in total) protocol on supplies worth $1 billion over 9 months was signed. Thus began the history of American Lend-Lease for the USSR. Deliveries of various materials for military and civilian purposes continued until September 1945. In total, 17.3 million tons of property with a total value of 9.48 billion dollars were delivered to the Soviet Union (mainly from the USA). Taking into account the work and services performed, the total cost of Lend-Lease in the USSR amounted to 11 billion dollars. Dollars of the early 40s, when for one thousand “green” you could buy a weighty ingot of 850 grams of gold.
FOUR PERCENT
Is this a lot - 17 million tons of goods with a total value of 7 thousand tons of pure gold? What is the real contribution of Lend-Lease supplies to equipping the Red Army and to the work of the national economy of the USSR? The best Soviet economists deeply and comprehensively studied this question and gave an exhaustive, short and accurate answer to it. The answer was published in 1947 in the book “The Military Economy of the USSR during the Second World War,” published under the signature of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, deputy head of the government of the USSR (i.e., Stalin’s deputy), permanent (since 1938). ) Head of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, Doctor of Economic Sciences, Academician N.A. Voznesensky. Four percent. Only four percent of the volume of Soviet industry's own production came from these pitiful American handouts. There would be something to argue about - the amount of economic assistance from the allies turned out to be within the error limits of economic statistics.
Two years later, in October 1949, N.A. Voznesensky was arrested. Investigation according to the so-called The “Leningrad affair” lasted for almost a year. The best security officers, highly experienced Soviet investigators, revealed the insidious plans of seasoned enemies of the people. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, having comprehensively studied the materials of the case, having become familiar with the irrefutable evidence of the guilt of the conspirators, sentenced N.A. Voznesensky, A.A. Kuznetsov, P.S. Popkov, M.I. Rodionov and others to death. On April 30, 1954, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR rehabilitated Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Popkov, Rodionov and others. It turned out that the “Leningrad case” was fabricated from beginning to end, the “evidence” of guilt was grossly falsified, a lawless reprisal took place under the guise of a “trial,” the charges were dictated by the political assignment of the warring clans surrounded by Stalin. The execution sentence was considered a mistake. Unfortunately, no one bothered to officially recognize as a “mistake” the crazy four percent that appeared in Voznesensky’s book in accordance with the instructions of the political leadership of the USSR, which at that time was preoccupied with fanning the flames of the Cold War.
There was no economic calculation behind these notorious “four percent” initially, and how could it be possible to express the ratio of the volumes of a huge range of goods in one single number? Of course, money and prices were invented precisely for this purpose, but in the conditions of the Soviet economy, prices were set prescriptively, without any connection with a completely absent market, and were calculated in non-convertible rubles. Finally, war and war economics have their own laws - is it possible to estimate the cost of flour delivered to besieged Leningrad by simply multiplying the weight in tons by pre-war prices? At what cost should hundreds of thousands of human lives saved be measured? How much do a barrel of water and an iron bucket cost in a fire? The Soviet Union received about 3 thousand km of fire hose under Lend-Lease. How much does it cost in war? Even in those cases where Lend-Lease supplies amounted to tiny fractions of a percent of the mass-dimensional volumes of Soviet production, their real significance in war conditions could be enormous. "Small spool but precious". 903 thousand detonators, 150 thousand insulators, 15 thousand binoculars and 6199 sets of semi-automatic anti-aircraft sights - is this a lot or a little?
The Americans supplied the USSR with 9.1 thousand tons of molybdenum concentrate for the “pathetic” amount of 10 million dollars (one thousandth of the total cost of Lend-Lease goods). On the scale of Soviet metallurgy, where the count was in the millions of tons, 9.1 thousand tons is an insignificant detail, but without this “trifle” it is impossible to smelt high-strength structural steel. And in the endless lists of Lend-Lease supplies there is not only molybdenum concentrate - there are also 34.5 thousand tons of zinc metal, 7.3 thousand tons of ferro-silicon, 3.3 thousand tons of ferro-chrome, 460 tons of ferro-vanadium , 370 tons of cobalt metal. And also nickel, tungsten, zirconium, cadmium, beryllium, 12 tons of precious cesium... 9570 tons of graphite electrodes and 673 tons (i.e. thousands of kilometers!) of nichrome wire, without which the production of electric heating devices and furnaces will stop. And another 48.5 thousand tons of electrodes for galvanic baths. Statistical data on the production of non-ferrous metals in the USSR remained strictly classified for half a century. This circumstance does not allow us to give a correct assessment of the value of those hundreds of thousands of tons of aluminum and copper that were supplied under Lend-Lease. However, even the most “patriotic” authors agree that Lend-Lease covered up to half the needs of Soviet industry - and this does not take into account the colossal amount of American electrical wires and cables supplied ready-made.
There are endless rows of figures for the supply of a wide variety of chemicals. Some of them were not supplied in “spool” volumes: 1.2 thousand tons of ethyl alcohol, 1.5 thousand tons of acetone, 16.5 thousand tons of phenol, 25 thousand tons of methyl alcohol, 1 million liters of hydraulic mixture. .. It is especially worth paying attention to 12 thousand tons of ethylene glycol - with this amount of antifreeze it was possible to fill about 250 thousand powerful aircraft engines. But, of course, the main component of the Lend-Lease “chemistry” was explosives: 46 thousand tons of dynamite, 140 thousand tons of smokeless gunpowder, 146 thousand tons of TNT. According to the most conservative estimates, Lend-Lease supplies covered one third of the Red Army's needs (and this estimate does not yet take into account the share of imported components used for the production of explosives in Soviet factories). In addition, 603 million rifle-caliber cartridges, 522 million large-caliber cartridges, 3 million shells for 20-mm air cannons, 18 million shells for 37-mm and 40-mm anti-aircraft guns were received from America in “ready form”.
Anti-aircraft guns, by the way, were also supplied from the USA - about 8 thousand small-caliber anti-aircraft guns (a significant part of which were installed on the chassis of a light armored personnel carrier), which amounted to 35% of the total MZA resource received by the Red Army during the war years. The share of imports of automobile tires and chemical raw materials (natural and synthetic rubber) for their production is estimated within the same limits (at least one third of the total resource).
CRUCIAL CONTRIBUTION
It is not at all difficult to find positions for which Lend-Lease supplies turned out to be larger than Soviet own production. And these are not only all-terrain passenger cars (the famous Jeeps, 50 thousand delivered), all-wheel drive trucks (the equally famous Studebakers, 104 thousand delivered), motorcycles (35 thousand), armored personnel carriers (7.2 thousand), amphibious vehicles (3.5 thousand). No matter how great the role of American automotive technology was (in total, more than 375 thousand trucks alone were delivered) - incredibly reliable in comparison with domestic "GAZ" and "ZIS" - the supply of railway rolling stock was much more important.
The technology of war in the mid-20th century was based on the use of enormous quantities of ammunition. The theory and practice of the “artillery offensive” (which remains a source of legitimate pride for Soviet military science) involved the expenditure of many thousands of tons of ammunition per day. In that era, such volumes could only be transported by rail, and the steam locomotive became a weapon no less important (albeit unfairly forgotten by the public and journalists) than a tank. Under Lend-Lease, the USSR received 1911 steam locomotives and 70 diesel locomotives, 11.2 thousand carriages of various types, 94 thousand tons of wheels, axles and wheel pairs.
American supplies were so huge that they made it possible to practically curtail our own production of rolling stock - in four years (1942-1945) only 92 steam locomotives and a little more than 1 thousand cars were produced; the released production capacity was loaded with the production of military equipment (in particular, the Ural Carriage Works in Nizhny Tagil became one of the main producers of the T-34 tank). To complete the picture, it remains only to recall the 620 thousand tons of railway rails supplied under Lend-Lease.
It is difficult to overestimate the role of Lend-Lease in the re-equipment (quantitative and qualitative) of the Soviet Armed Forces with radio communications. 2,379 complete on-board radio stations, 6,900 radio transmitters, 1 thousand radio compasses, 12.4 thousand headphones and laryngophones - and this is only for aviation. 15.8 thousand tank radio stations. More than 29 thousand various radio stations for the ground forces, including 2092 high-power (400 W) radio stations SCR-399 installed on the Studebaker chassis, with the help of which communications were provided at the corps-army-front link, and another 400 of the same radio stations, but without a car. To provide radio communications at the tactical level (regiment-division), 11.5 thousand SCR-284 portable radio stations and 12.6 thousand V-100 Pilot walkie-talkies were supplied (the latter were already supplied with inscriptions and scales in Russian at the manufacturing plant).
Simple, reliable and noise-proof wired communications were not forgotten - 619 thousand telephone sets, 200 thousand headphones, 619 telegraph stations, 569 teletypes and an absolutely astronomical amount of telephone wire (1.9 million km) were supplied to the USSR. As well as 4.6 million dry batteries, 314 diesel generators, 21 thousand battery charging stations, tens of thousands of various control and measuring instruments, including 1340 oscilloscopes. And another 10 million radio tubes, 170 ground and 370 airborne (!!!) radars. American radio stations served regularly in the national economy of the USSR, in the river and navy until the 60s, and the Soviet radio industry was provided with samples for study, development and unlicensed copying for at least 10 years in advance.
Such lists can be listed for a long time, but still, in first place in importance, I would put the provision of aviation gasoline to the Soviet Air Force (however, even in terms of tonnage, this category was in first place).
On the eve of the war, the situation with the provision of aviation fuel moved from the stage of a “gasoline crisis” to a “gasoline catastrophe.” New aircraft engines, increased in compression and supercharging, required gasoline with a higher octane number than the B-70, which was produced in significant quantities. The planned (and actually not achieved in 1941) production volume of high-octane gasoline B-74 and B-78* (450 thousand tons) was only 12% of the mobilization request of the NPO (for B-78 it was 7.5%). The country, which at that time had the largest oil production in the entire Old World, kept its aviation on a strict starvation ration. The outbreak of war did not improve the situation at all - a large amount of gasoline was lost in blown-up warehouses in the western military districts, and after German troops reached the foothills of the Caucasus in the summer of 1942, the evacuation of Baku oil refineries further aggravated the crisis.
* Contrary to a widespread misconception, the numbers in the designation of the brand of aviation gasoline are not equal to its octane number. B-74 gasoline had an octane number, determined by the “motor method,” of 91, B-78 gasoline had an octane number of 93. For comparison, it is worth noting that the best Russian motor gasoline, AI-98, has an octane number of 89.
Soviet aviation, nevertheless, flew and fought. In total, during the war, 3 million tons of high-octane aviation gasoline were consumed (for all needs and by all departments) (2.998 thousand tons - to be precise) Where did it come from? 720 thousand tons are direct import supplies. Another 1,117 thousand tons of aviation gasoline were obtained by mixing imported high-octane (with an octane number from 95 to 100) components with Soviet-made low-octane gasoline. The remaining 1.161 thousand tons of aviation gasoline (slightly more than one third of the total resource) were produced by Baku factories. True, they produced this gasoline using Lend-Lease tetraethyl lead, which was obtained in the amount of 6.3 thousand tons. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that without the help of the allies, the red star planes would have had to remain on the ground throughout the war.
LEND-LEASE IN THE HUMAN DIMENSION
People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin talks about such an episode of the war in his memoirs. At one of the three main aircraft engine plants, the implementation of the plan was systematically disrupted. Arriving at the plant, Shakhurin found out that production was limited to the work of two highly qualified turners, who could be entrusted with boring engine crankshafts; These workers could barely stand on their feet from hunger. A high-ranking Moscow boss successfully solved the problem, and from a certain “special base of the regional executive committee” an enhanced special ration was allocated for two people. Lend-Lease solved the same problem, but on a different scale.
238 million kg of frozen beef and pork, 218 million kg of canned meat (including 75 million kg designated as “tushenka”), 33 million kg of sausages and bacon, 1.089 million kg of chicken meat, 110 million kg of eggs powder, 359 million kg of vegetable oil and margarine, 99 million kg of butter, 36 million kg of cheese, 72 million kg of milk powder... It is no coincidence that I cited the volumes of Lend-Lease food supplies in precisely such strange units of measurement ( "millions of kilograms") It’s easier to divide by the number of possible consumers. For example, during the entire war, 22 million wounded were admitted to hospitals. This means that it was theoretically possible to consume 4.5 kg of butter, 1.6 kg of cheese, 3.3 kg of dry milk, 60 kg of meat to feed each of them (of course, this list does not include stewed meat - this is for a sick person not food). I trust our respected veterans to compare these lists with the actual diet of military hospitals...
Adequate and plentiful nutrition is, of course, an important condition for the recovery of the wounded, but first of all, the hospital needs medicines, surgical instruments, syringes, needles and suture thread, chloroform for anesthesia, and various medical devices. With all this we were not bad, but very bad.
On the eve of the war, huge volumes of military medical equipment were concentrated in the border districts (there were more than 40 million individual dressing packages there alone). Most of it remained there. The loss and/or evacuation of most of the pharmaceutical industry led to production volumes falling to 8.5% of pre-war levels by the end of 1941, despite the fact that the situation required a manifold increase in the production of medicines. Hospitals washed used bandages; doctors had to work without such vital drugs as ether and morphine for anesthesia, streptocide, novocaine, glucose, pyramidon and aspirin.
The lives and health of millions of wounded were saved by medical Lend-Lease - another carefully forgotten page in the history of the war. In general, allied supplies provided up to 80% of the needs of the Soviet military medical service. In 1944 alone, 40 million grams of streptocide alone were obtained. American antibiotics and sulfonamides became an invaluable treasure. And at what price can one measure one million kg of vitamins supplied to the USSR? Lend-Lease surgical instruments, X-ray machines, and laboratory microscopes served well for many years during and after the war. And 13.5 million pairs of leather army boots, 2 million sets of underwear, 2.8 million leather belts, 1.5 million wool blankets to supply the Red Army were not superfluous...
"FREEDOM" CARAVANS
The Soviet Union and the United States were not close neighbors. Accordingly, all these millions of tons of goods, including many hundreds of thousands of tons of explosives that fly into the air from the very first fragment of an aerial bomb (and no less flammable and explosive aviation gasoline), still had to be delivered to the ports of the USSR across the vast expanses of the world's oceans. The Soviet navy was able to transport only 19.4% of this gigantic tonnage; the allies supplied everything else themselves.
To solve this problem, unprecedented in scale and complexity, an equally unprecedented means was found - the Americans were able to organize high-speed mass production of ocean-going ships of the Liberty series. The figures characterizing the Liberty construction program cannot but shake the imagination. Huge ocean-going ships with a displacement of 14.5 thousand tons (length 135 m, carrying capacity 9.14 thousand tons) were built in the amount of 2,750 units. The average duration of construction of one vessel was increased to 44 days. And this is on average - in November 1942, the ship of this series, Robert Peary, was launched 4 days, 15 hours and 29 minutes after the moment of laying.
The main feature of the Liberty series ships (it was this that made it possible to achieve phenomenal production rates) was the replacement of riveting with welding. It was believed that the service life of such ships would be very low, but in war conditions it was decided to neglect this. However, "Freedom" turned out to be surprisingly tenacious - the "welded ships" sailed the seas for decades; Thus, the above-mentioned Robert Peary was in operation until 1963, and even at the beginning of the 21st century at least three Liberty were still in service!
The task was by no means exhausted by the ultra-high-speed construction of a huge number of ships. Berlin also understood the military significance of these endless caravans of ships with aviation gasoline, weapons and ammunition, and tried to take their own countermeasures. Guiding ships through the waters of the North Atlantic (about a third of all cargo was delivered along this “Murmansk” route), infested with German submarines, under the gun of German bombers, who received all the airfields of Norway for their base, became, in fact, a naval campaign of strategic scale. And the Allies won this campaign brilliantly - even in the “Murmansk direction” only 7% of the tonnage was lost; caravans heading to the ports of Iran or the Soviet Far East lost no more than 1%.
Everything is relative. How can we compare the naval miracle performed by the Allies? It is possible with the history of the “siege” of Leningrad, when the delivery of several barges with food per day across Lake Ladoga - and this over a distance of 50-80 km, and not 5 thousand nautical miles - turned into an almost insoluble problem. It is possible with the history of the ill-fated “Tallinn passage”, when the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, on a 400 km journey from Tallinn to Leningrad, without encountering a single German submarine at sea, or a single enemy vessel of the destroyer class or higher, lost 57% of the civilian ships being escorted. It is possible (although it is better not to do so) to recall the history of the many-month defense of Sevastopol, when the Black Sea Fleet - again, having practically no enemy worth mentioning at sea - was unable to either ensure uninterrupted supply of the ground forces fighting for the city, nor the evacuation of the last surviving defenders of Sevastopol ( from 15 to 20 thousand people, including at least 5 thousand wounded, were simply abandoned to the mercy of the enemy)
“Completely shameless and cynical...”
And after all this, on September 1, 2010, on the next anniversary of the start of World War II, on the state (which in this case is very important) TV channel “Culture”, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) gives a big lecture. , director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, comrade A.N. Sakharov, and he says the following words: “It was agreed that the United States and other allied countries would provide great assistance to the Soviet Union under the so-called Lend-Lease system... America demanded payment in gold and not just someday, but already during military actions, during the war itself. In this sense, the Americans knew how to count money and in this sense were completely shameless and cynical. Everything that was requested was paid for, including in gold..."
Even if this shameless and cynical lie were true, we should thank the Americans for their invaluable help. This is a huge success - during a devastating war, when the fate of the country hung by a thin thread, to find a supplier who, in exchange for stupid soft metal (you can’t make a simple one out of gold and a bayonet), will sell millions of tons of military goods at normal (and not “blockade”) prices property, food, gasoline and medicine. Moreover, he himself will bring three-quarters of this cargo from the other side of the globe.
However, a lie remains a lie - in accordance with the terms of Lend-Lease, not a ruble, not a dollar, not a cent was paid during the war. After the end of hostilities, most of the supplies were simply written off as property spent during the war. At negotiations in 1948-1951 Americans billed $0.8 billion - less than one tenth of the total cost of the goods supplied. The Soviet side agreed to recognize only 0.3 billion. However, recognizing the debt and returning it are two very different things. A long, multi-decade history of disputes and squabbles has ended with the fact that to date no more than one percent of Lend-Lease supplies have been paid (taking into account dollar inflation).
Lend-Lease is a system for the United States of America to loan or lease military equipment, weapons, ammunition, equipment, strategic raw materials, food and other various goods to countries allied in the anti-Hitler coalition. The Lend-Lease Act was approved by the US Congress on March 11, 1941. According to this document, the president received the authority to transfer, exchange, lease and loan weapons and strategic materials to the government of any country in the event that its fight against aggressors is vital for defense U.S.A. Countries receiving Lend-Lease assistance signed bilateral agreements with the United States, which stipulated that materials destroyed, lost or consumed during the war would not be subject to any payment after its end. The remaining materials suitable for civilian consumption must be paid for in whole or in part on the basis of long-term American loans. In total, from March 11, 1941 to August 1, 1945, the United States provided the allied countries with materials and services worth $46 billion under the Lend-Lease system, including Great Britain and other countries of the British Commonwealth - worth $30.3 billion , the Soviet Union - by 9.8 billion, France - by 1.4 billion, China - by 631 million, Latin American countries - by $421 million.
In the first five months of the Great Patriotic War, the Lend-Lease law did not apply to the USSR. During this period, the United States sent $41 million worth of weapons and materials to the Soviet Union in cash. And only on November 7, 1941, US President F. D. Roosevelt extended the Lend-Lease law to the USSR.
Until this point, deliveries of goods to the USSR under Lend-Lease were carried out in accordance with the Anglo-Soviet mutual assistance agreement of July 12, 1941 from Great Britain. Already at the end of July 1941, as part of these deliveries, the English minelayer Adventure delivered a cargo of depth charges and magnetic mines to Arkhangelsk. And in August 1941, the first convoy with Lend-Lease cargo left England for the northern ports of the USSR.
The delivery of Anglo-American equipment and weapons to the Soviet Union was carried out by three routes. It was originally planned that up to 75% of all economic assistance from the Western allies would be sent by ships through the Arctic seas to the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. Until the spring of 1942, 12 sea convoys consisting of 103 ships were sent along this route, of which only one ship was lost. However, then the situation changed dramatically. The fascist German command began to attract significant aviation forces, submarines and large surface ships to fight the Allied convoys. As a result, convoys RO-13,16 and 17 suffered heavy losses.
The second supply route under Lend-Lease ran from the ports of the Persian Gulf, through the deserts and mountains of Iran and Iraq to the Soviet Transcaucasus. Cargoes were sent by rail, highways and air. From December 1941 to the end of 1942, thanks to the joint work of Soviet, British and American specialists, the throughput capacity of Middle Eastern ports was significantly increased, and already in 1943, 3,447 thousand tons of cargo and military equipment, and in 1944 this figure increased 1.5 times and amounted to 5,498 thousand tons.
At the beginning of 1945, all supplies through Iran and Iraq were stopped. In total, during the Great Patriotic War, over 10 million tons of cargo were delivered to the USSR via the southern route.
In the summer of 1942, during negotiations, a third route was approved - sending aircraft by air through Alaska and Siberia. The length of the route from the American city of Fairbanks to Krasnoyarsk was 14 thousand km. It was along this route that about 8 thousand American combat aircraft were delivered during the war years.
Over the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, the United States and England supplied the Soviet Union with 18.7 thousand aircraft, about 11 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and up to 10 thousand guns of various calibers from the main types of weapons. In relation to the military equipment and weapons produced in the USSR, this amounted to 16.7% for aviation, 10.5% for tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 2% for artillery of the total production volume of our country.
History of lend-lease for the USSR
Already on August 30, 1941, British Prime Minister W. Churchill wrote to his cabinet minister Lord Beaverbrook:
“I want you to go to Moscow with Harriman to negotiate long-term supplies for the Russian armies. This can be done almost exclusively with American resources, although we have rubber, boots, etc. A large new order must be placed in the United States. The pace of deliveries, of course, is limited by ports and the lack of ships. When the second tracks of the narrow gauge road from Basra to the Caspian Sea are laid in the spring, this road will become an important supply route. Our duty and our interests require providing all possible assistance to the Russians, even at the cost of serious sacrifices on our part.".
On the same day Churchill wrote to Stalin
“I have sought to find some way of assisting your country in its magnificent resistance pending the implementation of the longer-term measures on which we are negotiating with the United States of America and which will serve as the subject of the Moscow Conference.”
The Moscow Supply Agreement for the USSR was signed on October 1, 1941. Then three more treaties were concluded: Washington, London and Ottawa
Letter from Stalin to Churchill September 3, 1941:
“I am grateful for the promise, in addition to the previously promised 200 fighter aircraft, to sell another 200 fighter aircraft to the Soviet Union... I must, however, say that these aircraft, which, apparently, may not be put into action soon and not immediately, but at different times time and separate groups, will not be able to make serious changes on the eastern front... I think that there is only one way out of this situation: to create a second front somewhere in the Balkans or in France this year, which can pull back 30 - 40 German divisions, and at the same time provide the Soviet Union with 30 thousand tons of aluminum by the beginning of October. and monthly minimum assistance in the amount of 400 aircraft and 500 tanks (small or medium)»
Churchill to Stalin September 6, 1941.
“...3. On the issue of supplies. We...will make every effort to help you. I am telegraphing President Roosevelt...and we will try to inform you even before the Moscow Conference about the number of aircraft and tanks that we jointly promise to send you monthly along with supplies of rubber, aluminum, cloth and other things. For our part, we are ready to send you from British products half the monthly number of aircraft and tanks that you request... We will make every effort to begin sending you supplies immediately.
4. We have already given orders to supply the Persian railway with rolling stock in order to increase its current capacity from two trains each way per day... to 12 trains each way per day. This will be achieved by the spring of 1942. Steam locomotives and carriages from England will be sent around the Cape of Good Hope after they are converted to oil fuel. A water supply system will be developed along the railway. The first 48 locomotives and 400 carriages are about to be sent..."
Lend-lease supply routes
- Soviet Arctic
- Arctic convoys
- Far East
- Black Sea
Most of the cargo under the lend-lease program (46%) was transported from Alaska through the Soviet Far East
Stalin to Churchill September 13, 1941
“...I express my gratitude for the promise of monthly assistance from England with aluminum, planes and tanks.
I can only welcome that the British Government is thinking of providing this assistance not through the purchase and sale of aircraft, aluminum and tanks, but through comradely cooperation...”
The Lend-Lease Act was signed by US President Roosevelt on March 11, 1941. It was extended to the Soviet Union on October 28, 1941. According to this law, countries that received assistance under the Lend-Lease program neither during the war nor after did not pay for this assistance and did not have to pay. It was necessary to pay only for what remained intact after the war and could be used
Lend-lease deliveries to the USSR
- 22150 aircraft
- 12,700 tanks
- 13,000 guns
- 35,000 motorcycles
- 427,000 trucks
- 2000 locomotives
- 281 warships
- 128 transport vessels
- 11,000 wagons
- 2.1 million tons of petroleum products
- 4.5 million tons of food
- 15 million pairs of shoes
- 44600 metal cutting machines
- 263,000 tons of aluminum
- 387,000 tons of copper
- 1.2 million tons of chemicals and explosives
- 35,800 radio stations
- 5899 receivers
- 348 locators
Historians are still arguing about the benefits of Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR. The importance of assistance is assessed from unimportant to essential
Britain's debt to the United States at the end of the war was $4.33 billion. It was fully repaid in 2006. France paid off America in 1946. The USSR refused to repay the debt in the amount of 2.6 billion dollars. Negotiations on this matter have been conducted with varying success up to the present time, as stated in Wikipedia, Russia has partially paid off the debt. And it must finally settle accounts with the United States in 2030
The history of Lend-Lease has been mythologized by both supporters of the Soviet regime and its opponents. Read about the real volumes of Lend-Lease and its contribution to the Victory in this article.
From the editor's website:
The history of Lend-Lease has been mythologized by both opponents of Soviet power and its supporters. The former believe that without military supplies from the USA and England the USSR could not have won the war, the latter believe that the role of these supplies is completely insignificant. We bring to your attention a balanced view of this issue by historian Pavel Sutulin, originally published in his LiveJournal.
History of Lend-Lease
Lend-Lease (from the English “lend” - to lend and “lease” - to rent) is a unique program for lending to allies by the United States of America through the supply of equipment, food, equipment, raw materials and materials. The first step towards Lend-Lease was taken by the United States on September 3, 1940, when the Americans transferred 50 old destroyers to Britain in exchange for British military bases. On January 2, 1941, Oscar Cox, an employee of the Ministry of Finance, prepared the first draft of the Lend-Lease law. On January 10th, this bill was transmitted to the Senate and House of Representatives. On March 11, the Law received approval from both chambers and was signed by the President, and three hours later the President signed the first two directives to this law. The first of them ordered the transfer of 28 torpedo boats to Britain, and the second ordered the transfer of 50 75-mm cannons and several hundred thousand shells to Greece. This is how the history of Lend-Lease began.The essence of Lend-Lease was, in general, quite simple. According to the Lend-Lease law, the United States could supply equipment, ammunition, equipment, etc. countries whose defense was vital for the States themselves. All deliveries were free of charge. All machinery, equipment and materials spent, used up or destroyed during the war were not subject to payment. Property left over after the end of the war that was suitable for civilian purposes had to be paid for.
As for the USSR, Roosevelt and Churchill made a promise to supply it with the materials necessary for war immediately after Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, that is, on June 22, 1941. On October 1, 1941, the First Moscow Protocol on Supply to the USSR was signed in Moscow, the expiration of which was set on June 30. The Lend-Lease Act was extended to the USSR on October 28, 1941, as a result of which the Union was granted a loan of $1 billion. During the war, three more protocols were signed: Washington, London and Ottawa, through which supplies were extended until the end of the war. Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR officially ceased on May 12, 1945. However, until August 1945, deliveries continued according to the “Molotov-Mikoyan list.”
Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR and their contribution to victory
During the war, hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo were delivered to the USSR under Lend-Lease. Military historians (and, perhaps, everyone else) are of greatest interest, of course, in allied military equipment - we’ll start with that. Under Lend-Lease, the following were supplied to the USSR from the USA: light M3A1 “Stuart” - 1676 pcs., light M5 - 5 pcs., light M24 - 2 pcs., medium M3 “Grant” - 1386 pcs., medium M4A2 “Sherman” (with a 75 mm cannon) - 2007 pcs., medium M4A2 (with a 76 mm cannon) - 2095 pcs., heavy M26 - 1 pc. From England: infantry "Valentine" - 2394 units, infantry "Matilda" MkII - 918 units, light "Tetrarch" - 20 units, heavy "Churchill" - 301 units, cruising "Cromwell" - 6 units. From Canada: Valentine - 1388. Total: 12199 tanks. In total, during the war years, 86.1 thousand tanks were delivered to the Soviet-German front.
"Valentine" "Stalin" is coming to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program.
Thus, Lend-Lease tanks accounted for 12.3% of the total number of tanks produced/delivered to the USSR in 1941-1945. In addition to tanks, self-propelled guns/self-propelled guns were also supplied to the USSR. ZSU: M15A1 - 100 pcs., M17 - 1000 pcs.; Self-propelled guns: T48 - 650 pcs., M18 - 5 pcs., M10 - 52 pcs. A total of 1,807 units were delivered. In total, 23.1 thousand self-propelled guns were produced and received in the USSR during the war. Thus, the share of self-propelled guns received by the USSR under Lend-Lease is equal to 7.8% of the total number of equipment of this type received during the war. In addition to tanks and self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers were also supplied to the USSR: English “Universal Carrier” - 2560 units. (including from Canada - 1348 pcs.) and American M2 - 342 pcs., M3 - 2 pcs., M5 - 421 pcs., M9 - 419 pcs., T16 - 96 pcs., M3A1 “Scout” - 3340 pcs. ., LVT - 5 pcs. Total: 7185 units. Since armored personnel carriers were not produced in the USSR, Lend-Lease vehicles made up 100% of the Soviet fleet of this equipment. Criticism of Lend-Lease very often draws attention to the low quality of armored vehicles supplied by the Allies. This criticism actually has some basis, since American and British tanks were often inferior in terms of performance characteristics to both their Soviet and German counterparts. Especially considering that the Allies usually supplied the USSR with not the best examples of their equipment. For example, the most advanced modifications of the Sherman (M4A3E8 and Sherman Firefly) were not supplied to Russia.
The situation with supplies under Lend-Lease to aviation is much better. In total, during the war years, 18,297 aircraft were delivered to the USSR, including from the USA: P-40 "Tomahawk" fighters - 247, P-40 "Kitihawk" - 1887, P-39 "Airacobra" - 4952, P-63 " Kingcobra - 2400, P-47 Thunderbolt - 195; A-20 Boston bombers - 2771, B-25 Mitchell - 861; other types of aircraft - 813. 4171 Spitfires and Hurricanes were delivered from England In total, the Soviet troops received 138 thousand aircraft during the war. Thus, the share of foreign equipment in the receipts of the domestic aircraft fleet amounted to 13%. True, even here the allies refused to supply the USSR with the pride of their Air Force - the B-17, B-24 and B- strategic bombers 29, of which 35 thousand were produced during the war.At the same time, it was these types of vehicles that the Soviet Air Force needed most.
Under Lend-Lease, 8 thousand anti-aircraft and 5 thousand anti-tank guns were supplied. In total, the USSR received 38 thousand units of anti-aircraft and 54 thousand anti-tank artillery. That is, the share of Lend-Lease in these types of weapons was 21% and 9%, respectively. However, if we take all Soviet guns and mortars as a whole (receipts during the war - 526.2 thousand), then the share of foreign guns in it will be only 2.7%.
During the war, 202 torpedo boats, 28 patrol ships, 55 minesweepers, 138 submarine hunters, 49 landing ships, 3 icebreakers, about 80 transport ships, about 30 tugs were transferred to the USSR under Lend-Lease. There are about 580 ships in total. In total, the USSR received 2,588 ships during the war years. That is, the share of Lend-Lease equipment is 22.4%.
The most noticeable were the Lend-Lease deliveries of cars. In total, 480 thousand cars were delivered under Lend-Lease (85% of them from the USA). Including about 430 thousand trucks (mainly US 6 companies Studebaker and REO) and 50 thousand jeeps (Willys MB and Ford GPW). Despite the fact that the total receipt of vehicles on the Soviet-German front amounted to 744 thousand units, the share of Lend-Lease vehicles in the Soviet vehicle fleet was 64%. In addition, 35,000 motorcycles were supplied from the United States.
But the supply of small arms under Lend-Lease was very modest: only about 150,000 thousand units. Considering that the total supply of small arms to the Red Army during the war amounted to 19.85 million units, the share of Lend-Lease weapons is approximately 0.75%.
During the war years, 242.3 thousand tons of motor gasoline were supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease (2.7% of the total production and receipt of motor gasoline in the USSR). The situation with aviation gasoline is as follows: 570 thousand tons of gasoline were supplied from the USA, and 533.5 thousand tons from Britain and Canada. In addition, 1,483 thousand tons of light gasoline fractions were supplied from the USA, Britain and Canada. From light gasoline fractions, gasoline is produced as a result of reforming, the yield of which is approximately 80%. Thus, from 1,483 thousand tons of fractions, 1,186 thousand tons of gasoline can be obtained. That is, the total supply of gasoline under Lend-Lease can be estimated at 2,230 thousand tons. During the war, the USSR produced about 4,750 thousand tons of aviation gasoline. This number probably includes gasoline produced from fractions supplied by the Allies. That is, the USSR's production of gasoline from its own resources can be estimated at approximately 3,350 thousand tons. Consequently, the share of Lend-Lease aviation fuel in the total amount of gasoline supplied and produced in the USSR is 40%.
622.1 thousand tons of railway rails were supplied to the USSR, which is equal to 36% of the total number of rails supplied and produced in the USSR. During the war, 1,900 steam locomotives were delivered, while in the USSR in 1941-1945, 800 steam locomotives were produced, of which 708 in 1941. If we take the number of steam locomotives produced from June to the end of 1941 as a quarter of the total production, then the number of locomotives produced during the war will be approximately 300 units. That is, the share of Lend-Lease steam locomotives in the total volume of steam locomotives produced and delivered in the USSR is approximately 72%. In addition, 11,075 cars were delivered to the USSR. For comparison, in 1942-1945, 1092 railway cars were produced in the USSR. During the war years, 318 thousand tons of explosives were supplied under Lend-Lease (of which the USA - 295.6 thousand tons), which is 36.6% of the total production and supply of explosives to the USSR.
Under Lend-Lease, the Soviet Union received 328 thousand tons of aluminum. If we believe B. Sokolov (“The Role of Lend-Lease in the Soviet War Efforts”), who estimated Soviet aluminum production during the war at 263 thousand tons, then the share of Lend-Lease aluminum from the total amount of aluminum produced and received by the USSR will be 55%. 387 thousand tons of copper were supplied to the USSR - 45% of the total production and supply of this metal to the USSR. Under Lend-Lease, the Union received 3,606 thousand tons of tires - 30% of the total number of tires produced and supplied to the USSR. 610 thousand tons of sugar were supplied - 29.5%. Cotton: 108 million tons – 6%. During the war, 38.1 thousand metal-cutting machines were supplied from the USA to the USSR, and 6.5 thousand machines and 104 presses were supplied from Great Britain. During the war, the USSR produced 141 thousand machine tools and forging presses. Thus, the share of foreign machine tools in the domestic economy was 24%. The USSR also received 956.7 thousand miles of field telephone cable, 2.1 thousand miles of sea cable and 1.1 thousand miles of submarine cable. In addition, 35,800 radio stations, 5,899 receivers and 348 locators, 15.5 million pairs of army boots, 5 million tons of food, etc. were supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease.
According to the data summarized in diagram No. 2, it is clear that even for the main types of supplies, the share of Lend-Lease products in the total volume of production and supplies to the USSR does not exceed 28%. In general, the share of Lend-Lease products in the total volume of materials, equipment, food, machinery, raw materials, etc. produced and supplied to the USSR. Typically estimated at 4%. In my opinion, this figure, in general, reflects the real state of affairs. Thus, we can say with a certain degree of confidence that Lend-Lease did not have any decisive impact on the USSR’s ability to wage war. Yes, under Lend-Lease such types of equipment and materials were supplied that made up the majority of the total production of such in the USSR. But would the lack of supply of these materials become critical? In my opinion, no. The USSR could well have redistributed its production efforts so as to provide itself with everything it needed, including aluminum, copper, and locomotives. Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease at all? Yes, I could. But the question is, what would it cost him? Without Lend-Lease, the USSR could have taken two ways to solve the problem of the shortage of those goods that were supplied under Lend-Lease. The first way is to simply turn a blind eye to this deficiency. As a result, the army would experience a shortage of cars, aircraft and a number of other types of equipment and equipment. Thus, the army would certainly be weakened. The second option is to increase our own production of products supplied under Lend-Lease by attracting excess labor to the production process. This force, accordingly, could only be taken at the front, and thereby again weaken the army. Thus, when choosing any of these paths, the Red Army found itself a loser. The result is a prolongation of the war and unnecessary casualties on our part. In other words, Lend-Lease, although it did not have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front, nevertheless saved hundreds of thousands of lives of Soviet citizens. And for this alone Russia should be grateful to its allies.
Speaking about the role of Lend-Lease in the victory of the USSR, we should not forget about two more points. Firstly, the vast majority of equipment, equipment and materials were supplied to the USSR in 1943-1945. That is, after the turning point during the war. For example, in 1941, goods worth approximately $100 million were supplied under Lend-Lease, which amounted to less than 1% of the total supply. In 1942, this percentage was 27.6. Thus, more than 70% of deliveries under Lend-Lease occurred in 1943-1945, and during the most terrible period of the war for the USSR, allied assistance was not very noticeable. As an example, in diagram No. 3 you can see how the number of aircraft supplied from the USA changed in 1941-1945. An even more telling example is cars: as of April 30, 1944, only 215 thousand of them were delivered. That is, more than half of the Lend-Lease vehicles were delivered to the USSR in the last year of the war. Secondly, not all of the equipment supplied under Lend-Lease was used by the army and navy. For example, out of 202 torpedo boats delivered to the USSR, 118 never had to take part in the hostilities of the Great Patriotic War, since they were put into operation after its end. All 26 frigates received by the USSR also entered service only in the summer of 1945. A similar situation was observed with other types of equipment.
And finally, to conclude this part of the article, a small stone in the garden of Lend-Lease critics. Many of these critics do not focus on the insufficient supplies of the allies, reinforcing this by the fact that, they say, the United States, given its level of production, could supply more. Indeed, the USA and Britain produced 22 million small arms, but delivered only 150,000 thousand (0.68%). Of the tanks produced, the Allies supplied the USSR with 14%. The situation with cars was even worse: in total, about 5 million cars were produced in the USA during the war years, and about 450 thousand were delivered to the USSR - less than 10%. And so on. However, this approach is certainly wrong. The fact is that supplies to the USSR were limited not by the production capabilities of the allies, but by the tonnage of available transport ships. And it was with him that the British and Americans had serious problems. The Allies simply did not physically have the number of transport ships necessary to transport more cargo to the USSR.
Delivery routes
Lend-Lease cargo reached the USSR via five routes: through Arctic convoys to Murmansk, along the Black Sea, through Iran, through the Far East and through the Soviet Arctic. The most famous of these routes, of course, is Murmansk. The heroism of the sailors of the Arctic convoys is glorified in many books and films. It is probably for this reason that many of our fellow citizens had the false impression that the main deliveries under Lend-Lease went to the USSR precisely by Arctic convoys. Such an opinion is pure delusion. In diagram No. 4 you can see the ratio of cargo transportation volumes along various routes in long tons. As we see, not only did most of the Lend-Lease cargo not pass through the Russian North, but this route was not even the main one, giving way to the Far East and Iran. One of the main reasons for this state of affairs was the danger of the northern route due to the activity of the Germans. In diagram No. 5 you can see how effectively the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine operated in Arctic convoys.
The use of the trans-Iranian route became possible after Soviet and British troops (from the north and south, respectively) entered the territory of Iran, and already on September 8, a peace agreement was signed between the USSR, England and Iran, according to which British and Soviet troops were stationed on the territory of Persia troops. From that moment on, Iran began to be used for supplies to the USSR. Lend-Lease cargo went to the ports of the northern tip of the Persian Gulf: Basra, Khorramshahr, Abadan and Bandar Shahpur. Aircraft and automobile assembly plants were established in these ports. From these ports to the USSR, cargo traveled in two ways: by land through the Caucasus and by water through the Caspian Sea. However, the Trans-Iranian route, like the Arctic convoys, had its drawbacks: firstly, it was too long (the convoy route from New York to the coast of Iran around the South African Cape of Good Hope took approximately 75 days, and then the passage of cargo took time across Iran and the Caucasus or the Caspian Sea). Secondly, navigation in the Caspian Sea was hampered by German aviation, which sank and damaged 32 ships with cargo in October and November alone, and the Caucasus was not the calmest place: in 1941-1943 alone, 963 bandit groups with a total number of 17,513 were liquidated in the North Caucasus Human. In 1945, instead of the Iranian route, the Black Sea route began to be used for supplies.
However, the safest and most convenient route was the Pacific route from Alaska to the Far East (46% of total supplies) or through the Arctic Ocean to Arctic ports (3%). Basically, Lend-Lease cargo was delivered to the USSR from the USA, of course, by sea. However, most of the aviation moved from Alaska to the USSR under its own power (the same AlSib). However, this path also had its difficulties, this time associated with Japan. In 1941 - 1944, the Japanese detained 178 Soviet ships, some of them - the transports "Kamenets-Podolsky", "Ingul" and "Nogin" - for 2 months or more. 8 ships - the transports "Krechet", "Svirstroy", "Maikop", "Perekop", "Angarstroy", "Pavlin Vinogradov", "Lazo", "Simferopol" - were sunk by the Japanese. The transports “Ashgabat”, “Kolkhoznik”, “Kyiv” were sunk by unidentified submarines, and about 10 more ships were lost under unclear circumstances.
Lend-Lease payment
This is perhaps the main topic of speculation among people trying to somehow denigrate the Lend-Lease program. Most of them consider it their indispensable duty to declare that the USSR allegedly paid for all cargo supplied under Lend-Lease. Of course, this is nothing more than a delusion (or a deliberate lie). Neither the USSR nor any other countries that received assistance under the Lend-Lease program, in accordance with the Lend-Lease law, paid, so to speak, a single cent for this assistance during the war. Moreover, as was already written at the beginning of the article, they were not obliged to pay after the war for those materials, equipment, weapons and ammunition that were used up during the war. It was necessary to pay only for what remained intact after the war and could be used by the recipient countries. Thus, there were no Lend-Lease payments during the war. Another thing is that the USSR actually sent various goods to the USA (including 320 thousand tons of chrome ore, 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as gold, platinum, wood). This was done as part of the reverse Lend-Lease program. In addition, the same program included free repairs of American ships in Russian ports and other services. Unfortunately, I was unable to find the total amount of goods and services provided to the Allies under reverse Lend-Lease. The only source I found claims that this same amount was 2.2 million dollars. However, I personally am not sure of the authenticity of this data. However, they may well be considered as a lower limit. The upper limit in this case will be an amount of several hundred million dollars. Be that as it may, the share of reverse Lend-Lease in the total Lend-Lease trade turnover between the USSR and the allies will not exceed 3-4%. For comparison, the amount of reverse Lend-Lease from the UK to the USA is equal to 6.8 billion dollars, which is 18.3% of the total exchange of goods and services between these countries.So, no payment for Lend-Lease occurred during the war. The Americans provided the bill to the recipient countries only after the war. The volume of Great Britain's debts to the United States amounted to $4.33 billion, to Canada - $1.19 billion. The last payment in the amount of $83.25 million (to the United States) and $22.7 million (Canada) was made on December 29, 2006. The volume of China's debts was determined at 180 million. dollars, and this debt has not yet been repaid. The French paid the United States on May 28, 1946, providing the United States with a number of trade preferences.
The USSR's debt was determined in 1947 in the amount of 2.6 billion dollars, but already in 1948 this amount was reduced to 1.3 billion. However, the USSR refused to pay. The refusal also followed new concessions from the United States: in 1951, the amount of the debt was again revised and this time amounted to 800 million. An agreement on the procedure for repaying the debt to pay for Lend-Lease between the USSR and the USA was signed only on October 18, 1972 (debt amount was again reduced, this time to $722 million; repayment period - 2001), and the USSR agreed to this agreement only on the condition that it was provided with a loan from the Export-Import Bank. In 1973, the USSR made two payments totaling $48 million, but then stopped payments due to the implementation of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1972 Soviet-American trade agreement in 1974. In June 1990, during negotiations between the presidents of the USA and the USSR, the parties returned to discussing debt. A new deadline for the final repayment of the debt was set - 2030, and the amount - 674 million dollars. Currently, Russia owes the United States $100 million for supplies under Lend-Lease.
Other types of supplies
Lend-Lease was the only significant type of allied supplies to the USSR. However, not the only one in principle. Before the adoption of the Lend-Lease program, the United States and Britain supplied the USSR with equipment and materials in cash. However, the size of these supplies was quite small. For example, from July to October 1941, the United States supplied the USSR with cargo worth only $29 million. In addition, Britain provided for the supply of goods to the USSR on account of long-term loans. Moreover, these deliveries continued even after the adoption of the Lend-Lease program.
We should not forget about the many charitable foundations created to raise funds for the benefit of the USSR around the world. The USSR and private individuals also provided assistance. Moreover, such help came even from Africa and the Middle East. For example, the “Russian Patriotic Group” was created in Beirut, and the Russian Medical Aid Society was created in the Congo. The Iranian merchant Rahimyan Ghulam Hussein sent 3 tons of dried grapes to Stalingrad. And merchants Yusuf Gafuriki and Mamed Zhdalidi transferred 285 heads of cattle to the USSR.
Literature
1. Ivanyan E. A. History of the USA. M.: Bustard, 2006.
2. /Brief History of the USA / Under. ed. I. A. Alyabyev, E. V. Vysotskaya, T. R. Dzhum, S. M. Zaitsev, N. P. Zotnikov, V. N. Tsvetkov. Minsk: Harvest, 2003.
3. Shirokorad A. B. Far Eastern Final. M.: AST: Transizdatkniga, 2005.
4. Schofield B. Arctic convoys. Northern naval battles in World War II. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
5. Temirov Yu. T., Donets A. S. War. M.: Eksmo, 2005.
6. Stettinius E. Lend-Lease - a weapon of victory (http://militera.lib.ru/memo/usa/stettinius/index.html).
7. Morozov A. Anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War. The role of Lend-Lease in the victory over the common enemy (http://militera.lib.ru/pub/morozov/index.html).
8. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces / Under the general. ed. G. F. Krivosheeva. (http://www.rus-sky.org/history/library/w/)
9. The national economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Statistical collection.(http://tashv.nm.ru/)
10. Wikipedia materials.(http://wiki.lipetsk.ru/index.php/%D0%9B%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B4-%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B7)
11. Lend-Lease: how it happened. (http://www.flb.ru/info/38833.html)
12. Aviation Lend-Lease in the USSR in 1941-1945 (http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/lendl.htm)
13. Soviet historiography of Lend-Lease (http://www.alsib.irk.ru/sb1_6.htm)
14. What we know and what we don’t know about the Great Patriotic War (http://mrk-kprf-spb.narod.ru/skorohod.htm#11)
We often hear that the United States provided invaluable assistance to the Soviet Union in the war, but we did not appreciate it, did not pay, all payments to the USSR and Russia amount to a few percent of the volume of supplies, and taking into account inflation - even less.
This is not entirely true.
Or not even like that at all.
Firstly, we appreciated American assistance. And the Soviet leadership many times noted the importance of American supplies, and even more so the post-Soviet leadership.
But we would appreciate US participation in the defeat of fascism even more if American corporations had not collaborated with Hitler. And they collaborated.
Yes, I understand that these are “legal business rights” and all that. But how interesting it turns out: when the American government does not like the policies of Russia or Iran, sanctions are imposed, or even an embargo. And the American leadership prefers not to remember the “legal rights of business” at such moments. And when American corporations collaborated with Hitler, when banks gave him loans, when IBM supplied equipment for office work (in particular, file cabinets used by the Wehrmacht, SS and Gestapo), when components for poison gas (chemical weapons, by the way) were supplied - to these “legal business rights" the American leadership turned a blind eye. And for some reason they did not impose an embargo on cooperation with Germany.
Secondly, the American government provided assistance not only and not so much to the Soviet Union as to Great Britain, but at the same time to its own industry, its own economy.
And the American government paid enterprises for supplies under Lend-Lease in full. Therefore, the Lend-Lease program can be considered as a subsidization of one’s own economy, only targeted - subsidizing the production of certain goods.
Today, the US and EU also subsidize producers, and in some industries, for every $1 or euro of private investment there are 4-5 dollars or euros of subsidies. Without any lend-lease, they simply subsidize production so that it does not collapse in the conditions of an excellent market economy, so that the “invisible hand of the market” does not strangle the industry.
You can also consider lend-lease as the cutting of the American budget by American corporations under the plausible pretext of military assistance to the allies. After all, no one knows what the true cost of production of this or that equipment supplied to the USSR and Great Britain was and what part of the money American industrialists simply put in their pockets. And they certainly didn’t offend themselves.
Therefore, one should not think that the Americans provided military assistance to the Soviet Union disinterestedly, guided solely by considerations of solidarity in the fight against fascism.
Considerations of solidarity also took place, but the main ones for the American government and corporations were purely commercial interests.
It was beneficial for the Americans to provide assistance to the Soviet Union under the lend-lease program. It is beneficial regardless of whether the USSR later pays for these supplies or not.
Thanks to the lend-lease program, the Americans increased the production of equipment, modernized their industry, reduced production costs by increasing volumes, and subsequently recouped all costs by supplying the same or modernized equipment after the war, for real money.
Thus, the Lend-Lease program was simultaneously a program for subsidizing one’s own economy, a program for state investment in production, and a program for legalized budget cutting.
In the liberal economic model, it is considered bad manners to subsidize a market economy. And in the USA this was not very practiced in those days. And the lend-lease program has become a convenient solution so as not to violate the concept of a liberal economy and to support industry. It seems like it’s impossible to just give money to enterprises, but through the lend-lease program, in the interests of national security, it’s possible.
Therefore, there is no need to say that Americans are so kind and we are so ungrateful.
Americans are not so much kind as they are prudent. And they calculated everything very well when they adopted the lend-lease law. They did everything so that no matter what the outcome, they would be in the black. And they remained in the black.
We must also not forget that after the war the United States gained control over West Germany, which suffered the least during the war and had more industry there than in East Germany. And no one still knows exactly how many specialists, materials, documentation, equipment, gold and other valuables the Americans took from West Germany.
I wouldn’t be surprised if the valuables exported by the Americans alone were worth several lend leases.
Where did the Germans move everything that was looted from the occupied territories as the Soviet troops approached? To the west. And where did it go then?
By the way, German gold still lies on US territory and the Americans do not even allow the Germans to audit it. And this applies to what is officially stored! How many were exported unofficially? Who counted? Who did the Americans allow to count all this if they don’t even let them check what is officially stored?
But who paid with their lives so that the Americans could then freely manage the territory of West Germany, export valuables, specialists, equipment and materials, and then control Germany and other countries of Western Europe economically and politically?
The Soviet Union paid.
The Soviet people paid.
Therefore, to say that the USSR did not pay the USA for lend-lease is not entirely accurate. Or rather, even completely inaccurate. It’s just that the USSR paid not with money, but with the lives of the soldiers who liberated Europe in general and Germany in particular from fascism. They freed him so that the Americans could then rule this Europe.
And in the post-war world order, in the Yalta conference, the United States participated because it provided us with assistance. And this is also worth a lot.
If the United States had not helped us in the war, who would have invited them to this Yalta?
And the Americans would not have become the founders of the UN if they had not helped defeat Hitler. And the UN headquarters could have been not in New York, but somewhere in Switzerland, if the war in Europe had ended without American participation.
So the Americans received quite a bit for their lend-lease.
The United States became a superpower, the founders of the UN with headquarters in New York, gained control over Western Europe, took a ton of everything out of West Germany - and they got all this without almost directly participating in the war.
The only major and bloody operation involving American troops in Europe was the Normandy landing. But on the scale of the entire war, this is a rather small part, just one of many episodes.
And it was certainly not for the landing in Normandy that the Americans received control over Western Europe, the role of founder of the UN, headquarters on their territory and everything else.
Everything that the Americans received as a result of World War II, they received mainly for that same lend-lease.
And if we translate all the goodies received by the Americans into monetary form, then even with the most conservative calculations it turns out that lend-lease has paid for itself many times over.
And it paid off thanks to the Soviet Union, the Soviet army, the Soviet people, who with their lives, their labor, their efforts forged victory, cleared Europe in general and Germany in particular from Nazism, and smashed the Third Reich.
And we must not forget that the Soviet Union wrote off the debts of the GDR and helped restore what was destroyed in East Germany, and throughout Eastern Europe too. And who gets it all now? Everything ultimately went to West Germany, the European Union and indirectly to the same States.
But that's not all.
Following the results of World War II, it was planned to divide Japan, like Germany, into two zones of occupation - American and Soviet. However, the Soviet Union subsequently abandoned this, limiting itself to annexing the Kuril Islands. And all of Japan found itself in the zone of US influence. I don’t know why the Soviet leadership refused to divide Japan, but I don’t rule out that this was also a form of gratitude to the Americans for the assistance they provided during the war.
And this despite the fact that the volume of lend-lease deliveries on the scale of the USSR’s own production during the war years amounted to approximately 4% - not such a big figure.
And the main deliveries under lend-lease occurred in 1943-44, when the most difficult and dangerous stage of the war for the USSR was left behind.
Separately, it is worth mentioning about the supply of Airacobra fighters - they were originally created for delivery to the UK, but English pilots abandoned them without evaluating the characteristics. Then they began to be supplied to the USSR. Our pilots appreciated the Airacobra; our Soviet ace Alexander Pokryshkin even flew one of these fighters. But the fact is that Airacobras began to be supplied to the USSR after the British abandoned them.
And for reference, I quote:
"In total, deliveries under Lend-Lease amounted to about 50.1 billion US dollars ($612.88 billion in 2008 prices), of which 31.4 billion dollars were supplied to the UK, 11.3 billion to the USSR."
The USSR received a little more than 20% of the total lend-lease supplies. Most of them were delivered to the UK, for which Lend-Lease itself was originally created.
But who suffered the greatest losses during the war, who made the main contribution to the defeat of the Third Reich, who liberated most of Europe and Germany?..
Therefore, it is stupid to say that the Soviet Union did not pay for lend-lease.
The Soviet Union paid more than for lend-lease.
The Soviet Union provided more than half of what the United States received as a result of World War II - a new world order, the UN with headquarters in New York, control of what was called Western Europe, undivided control over West Germany in the first years after the war, control over Japan.
If everything that the United States received as a result of World War II is converted into dollars, then the Soviet Union paid for lend-lease twenty times, and maybe more.
If we take all this into account, then it is not we who owe the States, but the States who owe us several tens of billions of dollars in 1945 prices.
But it turned out that we paid them extra for that lend-lease, albeit a little, and we continue to pay them, buying their government bonds, selling oil and gas for their “candy wrappers,” buying their products with their added value instead of producing our own. However, that's another conversation...
The main thing is that the USSR paid for lend-lease.
Paid multiple times.
And even more than I just paid...
