Attempts to create a system of collective security in Europe and the reasons for their failures. The collapse of the “collective security” policy The failure of the idea of collective security
Return to Collective Security
In the 1930s Soviet diplomacy sought, on the one hand, to implement a plan for collective security in Europe, to prevent the creation of a broad united anti-Soviet front, to maintain maximum caution and not succumb to enemy provocations, and on the other, to take all necessary measures to strengthen the country's defense.
In April 1939, the Soviet government came up with a proposal to conclude a mutual assistance agreement between the USSR, England and France, according to which, in the event of fascist aggression against a number of European states, the three powers would jointly come to their aid. Foreign Secretary Chamberlain said he would "rather resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets."
At the same time, the partners of England and France - Romania, Poland and the Baltic countries - reacted negatively to the proposal of the Soviet Union: to send troops to the territory of these countries in the event of a German attack. They feared that later the USSR would not want to withdraw its troops.
In June, delegations from England and France arrived in Moscow without the authority to make any decisions. They were given the mindset to conduct “negotiations for the sake of negotiations.” There were 12 meetings that did not lead to a concrete result.
On August 15, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, D. Shaposhnikov, announced that the USSR was ready to field 136 divisions against the aggressor in Europe. At the same time, he outlined options for joint actions and noted that the USSR, with the beginning of the war, “does not intend to adhere to defensive tactics.” However, the Soviet proposals did not find support.
Meanwhile, secret negotiations were held between representatives of England, France and Germany, aimed at pushing Nazi Germany to war against the USSR. In conditions when negotiations between the USSR and England and France reached a dead end in 1939, the Soviet leadership accepted Germany’s proposal for peace negotiations, as a result of which on August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression treaty was signed in Moscow (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact ) for a period of 10 years.
At the same time, an additional secret protocol was signed, which delimited the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR. The sphere of interests of the USSR included the eastern part of Poland, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Bessarabia (now Moldova).
This protocol implemented Stalin’s idea of returning to the USSR the lands ceded to Poland under the Treaty of Riga of 1921.
Was concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany the best option for solving the problems facing the Soviet government?
There are different points of view among historians on this matter. The USSR was faced with a choice: either come to an agreement with England and France and create a system of collective security in Europe, or conclude a pact with Germany, or remain alone.
Some experts view the conclusion of a treaty with Germany as the worst option, arguing that the pact provoked World War II. Another point of view comes down to an attempt to consider it as an example of compromise, the ability to use inter-imperialist contradictions. What prompted Germany and the USSR to enter into an alliance?
For Hitler, this was a tactical move: initially he needed to guarantee the unhindered capture of Poland, and then other states. The Soviet Union, by signing the treaty, sought, on the one hand, to protect itself on the eve of Germany’s war against Poland by limiting the advance of German troops and Germany’s refusal to use the Baltic states for anti-Soviet purposes, and on the other, to secure the Far Eastern borders of the USSR from Japanese attack.
Thus, by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939, the USSR avoided a war on two fronts.
You can speculate as much as you like on the Soviet-German pact of 1939, portray it as a conspiracy of two totalitarian monsters, but for people with any sense of reality, it is clear that the pact is a mutual ploy to gain time before the main battle.
In general, this pact did not allow the creation of a united anti-Soviet front in Europe, delayed the start of hostilities for a while and allowed the USSR to move its borders away from the vital centers of the country. However, the USSR used the resulting delay less effectively than its pact partner.
Collective defense
Foreign experience of social protection of children
Data protection
Environment protection
Protection against pickpockets
Subject and categories of social protection
Back | | Up
©2009-2018 Financial Management Center. All rights reserved. Publication of materials
permitted with the obligatory indication of a link to the site.
Toland J. - American journalist, Pulitzer Prize winner:
“Both Stalin and Hitler believed that they could use each other for their own purposes. Both dictators were wrong, of course, but in that tumultuous summer of 1939 there was not a single country that did not act on one erroneous concept or another.
Europe was a center of mistrust, deceit and double-dealing. Even when Ribbentrop was preparing to go to Moscow, Stalin did not lose hope for an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance against Hitler. And the British, who were reluctantly inclined towards such an alliance, secretly invited Goering to England.”
Bullock A. – famous English historian:
“The failure of the governments of England and France to take effective measures to conclude an alliance with the Russians was then sharply criticized; subsequently it was rightly stated by everyone who wondered about the causes of the war.”
Fest I.K. – German journalist:
“However, now, when after the Moscow Pact all its policies were defeated, England understood why it would have to fight and die under any circumstances. The policy of appeasement was based not least on the fear of the bourgeois world of the communist revolution. According to the views of English statesmen, Hitler played the role of a militant defender against this threat ... "
⦁Explain why the idea of collective security was not implemented. Who won and who lost in the end?
From the memoirs of the repressed resident of Bessarabia, Euphrosyne Kersnovskaya, “How much is a person worth.” Ed. 2001 – 2002
The first of January 1941. Plebiscite day.
Judgments of foreign historians and journalists about the failure of the idea of collective security in 1939
Election Day! I have always believed that a plebiscite is the free expression of the will of the people. Elections are a civic duty that obliges each person to choose the best from several possible ones, and if there is no better, to abstain. In both cases, a person must be calm and free. No coercion, no fear! There is no need to talk about the fact that secrecy must be maintained. Not a plebiscite, but a sham. I'm ashamed…<…>Long hall. Everywhere there are portraits of Stalin and many other subjects unfamiliar to me. Only Voroshilov recognized her.<…>Having put the ballots in the envelope, I headed to the ballot box, but before I had time to put the envelope in, the chairman very unceremoniously took it from my hands... But before he could unfold it, I tore the envelope out of his hands and managed to put it in the ballot box... The next day... in one of the NKVD authorities entered the room... Leaning on the table with his fists, he said: “The counting of votes ended at night: 35,000 - “for” and one “against” ...” I had no idea that I was playing with fire, although ... there was no escape from fate you won’t leave... It’s not important what your fate is, but how you meet it!
⦁Why was it possible to achieve universal support for the proposed project during the plebiscites? How objective could the results of such elections be?
§ 36. Soviet economic policy: plans, difficulties, results. Materials for the workshop lesson
Here is a selection of documents from the times of the first five-year plans. Based on these texts and documentary fragments given at the end of the paragraphs, write a short work “Catch up and overtake ...”, followed by discussion in a practical lesson.
1. Formation of the initial contradiction and formulation of the problem. Do you see the problematic contradiction that is already reflected in the topic of the workshop lesson?
2. Brief description of the historical moment. In what historical situation were the cited documents created?
3. Characteristics of sources and their capabilities for illuminating the problem.
4. Comparative analysis of documentary material from the point of view of the problem being studied.
5. Conclusion and conclusions.
It is necessary to indicate with numbers the parts of the work corresponding to the points of this plan.
It is very important to demonstrate the ability to clearly formulate provisions and argue them with the help of a source.
Previous12345678910Next
Samara College of Finance and Economics
(Samara branch of the Financial University)
Lecture notes
in the discipline "History"
specialties
02.38.01 “Economics and accounting” (by industry)
02/38/06 “Finance”
(basic training)
Explanatory note
Lecture notes on the discipline "History" are intended for students with a complete secondary education based on 11 classes, studying in the following specialties: 02/38/01 "Economics and Accounting" (by industry), 02/38/06 "Finance", 02/38/07 "Banking" case".
The purpose of these notes is to summarize the knowledge previously acquired by students in the discipline “History” with a deeper understanding of general issues.
The academic discipline “History” is a discipline of the humanitarian and socio-economic cycle in the structure of the main professional educational program.
As a result of studying the discipline, the student must
know:
— Main directions of development of key regions of the world at the turn of the century;
— The essence and causes of local, regional, interstate conflicts at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries;
— Basic integration, multicultural, migration and other processes of political and economic development of leading states and regions of the world;
— Purpose of the UN, NATO, EU and other organizations and the main directions of their activities;
— On the role of science, culture, and religion in preserving and strengthening national and state traditions;
be able to:
— navigate the current economic, political and cultural situation in Russia and the world;
- analyze historical facts and events, give them your assessment;
— reveal the main directions of development of world regions at the turn of the century;
— identify the interconnection of domestic, regional, global socio-economic, political and cultural problems;
— methodologically competently analyze various historical facts;
- understand the current political situation in Russia and the world in general, compare political and economic problems in different regions of the world, applying theoretical knowledge;
This lecture notes consists of the main topics and concepts of the course.
As a result of studying the topic: “Post-war peace settlement in Europe,” the student should know the features and patterns of the post-war political development of the countries of Europe and America, and be able to trace the stages of the formation of the Cold War.
In the topic: “Early Conflicts and Crises of the Cold War,” the student should know the major political conflicts between the two superpowers and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.
Section II “Main socio-economic and political trends in the development of countries in the second half of the 20th century” is aimed at developing knowledge about the socio-political and economic development of developed and developing countries of the world after the Second World War, understanding the specifics of their internal political relations and the peculiarities of their foreign policy.
This section studies the political development of such countries as the USA, Germany, Japan, China, India, countries of Eastern Europe, and countries of Latin America. This section also draws attention to international relations of the second half of the twentieth century. The student can use lecture material to study missed topics or to prepare for a test and in independent work on educational material.
The final form of discipline control is a test.
Section 1. Post-war peace settlement in Europe
Topic 1. Post-war peace settlement
1. Consequences of the Second World War. Interests of the leading world powers in Europe.
2. Allied policy towards Germany.
3. Ideas of collective security in Europe.
4. Winston Churchill's speech in Fulton.
5. The Marshall Plan and the beginning of the Cold War.
Consequences of the Second World War. Interests of the leading world powers in Europe
The Second World War left its mark on the entire history of mankind in the second half of the 20th century. In the USSR alone, 27 million died (54 million in total). 46% of cities, villages, and buildings were destroyed. 10 million people became refugees. Almost every country participating in the war was subjected to famine, losses and had serious material, economic difficulties and losses. The main task of the post-war period is to restore the destroyed economy and improve life. The main countries that claimed world domination after the war were the USSR, Great Britain, and France. Each of them had its own national claims and interests that it would like to dictate to the whole world. A situation of international tension and misunderstanding arose, which eventually resulted in the Cold War.
The United States was the least affected party in the war and managed to preserve most of its national wealth, therefore it laid claim to world leadership. Britain and France competed economically and militarily and tried to turn the world towards democracy and capitalism. The USSR sought to win more allies and turn world politics towards a socialist order.
Allied policy towards Germany.
All the most important agreements on post-war problems were reached by the allies at the Crimean Conference (February 1945) between the USSR, USA, Great Britain and the Potsdam Conference (July - August 1945). After the war, Germany was to be divided into four occupation territories, each of which was controlled by one of the victorious countries. The eastern zone was under the control of the USSR; in the three western zones, control was exercised by the USA, Great Britain and France. Berlin was also divided into four zones. In Germany, the following measures were taken to restore peaceful life and destroy the remnants of fascism:
1) demilitarization - the elimination of all military production and complete disarmament.
2) the dissolution of all military fascist organizations, institutions, the fascist party, the arrest of war criminals and fascist leaders.
3) the destruction of cartels and syndicates that produced military products.
4) denomination - carrying out monetary reform.
5) permission to establish any public, civil unions and associations of civilians, providing them with democratic freedoms for the speedy restoration of normal life in Germany.
Conclusion: instead of creating a unified Germany, the country split into two systems. In 1949, the Western state of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the East German Democratic Republic (GDR) were created.
Ideas of collective security in Europe.
The idea of national security developed gradually and in stages.
In February 1947 At the Paris Peace Conference, peace treaties were signed with the parties to the former Hitlerite coalition (Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Italy). The issue of a peace treaty with Austria was postponed due to disagreement between the USSR and the USA regarding the domestic and foreign policies of Austria and the USSR's demand to prohibit the creation of military-political alliances in Austria.
September 2, 1945 The war with Japan was over and the positions of the two states (USSR and USA) finally diverged. The USSR wanted to withdraw all troops from Japan and insisted on prohibiting Japan from joining various alliances, but America wanted the opposite, so the USA concluded a peace treaty with Japan, and the USSR and some other countries refused to join the international treaty. The world was in a precarious position. The idea of collective security was primarily to unite all states against a new military threat and against the revival of fascism. In 1949, the UN international organization was formed with two main goals:
1) ensuring and protecting world security
2) development of interethnic friendly contacts and international cooperation between countries and states.
First, the UN united five permanent members, then the number of UN members increased due to non-permanent members.
Today the UN has five permanent members, including the Russian Federation. The UN structure includes such international organizations as the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Union, the International Court of Justice and the UN Security Council.
4. Winston Churchill's speech in Fulton.
March 5, 1946 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech on the Fulton campus, in which he called on all the peoples of Europe for freedom and democracy through unification and defense against the main enemy of democracy, communism and totalitarianism. He pointed out that the United States today is at the pinnacle of world glory, and it has the power to unite all free nations around itself in order to protect itself from war and tyranny. The only salvation from Bolshevism and communism is the fraternal association of English-speaking peoples, that is, the union of the USA, Great Britain and France, Switzerland, Luxembourg and others that have joined them. It is necessary to prevent the influence of the USSR, which could “infect Europe with communism like a plague.”
Conclusion: After Churchill’s speech, Western countries called on the peoples of Europe to unite and cooperate, and Russia and, in particular, Stalin accused Churchill of racism and warmongering. The creation of military-political blocs of allied countries began in order to strengthen their positions. In the West, NATO was created in 1949, the USSR, in turn, created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949, and in 1955 the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO).
The Marshall Plan and the beginning of the Cold War.
March 12, 1947 American President Harry Truman announced a new political direction for the United States, which was called the “Truman Doctrine.” The essence of the Truman Doctrine was as follows: the United States will consistently and steadily intervene in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples in order to protect them from the negative influence of the USSR. Truman believed that it was necessary to secure the borders of European states and provide assistance to Greece and Turkey, whose borders were in danger, in order to enlist their support in the fight against the USSR. It is also necessary to develop international diplomacy and intelligence in order to be prepared for aggression and attack.
Attempts to create a system of collective security in Europe and the reasons for their failures.
A continuation of the Truman Doctrine was the plan of the American Secretary of State Marshall, according to which the United States would provide assistance to European countries wishing to join their union. It was planned to allocate about 13 billion US dollars.
The main shares of allocations came from England, France, Spain, West Germany and Holland. In total, 16 countries signed the Marshall Plan. As a necessary condition for providing assistance, the United States demanded that the communists be removed from the governments of the countries that signed the treaty. Thus, the United States secured the image of the world leader of a country that was considered a stronghold of democracy, freedom and liberalism.
In the 1930s The Soviet leadership also became politically active in the international arena. Thus, on the initiative of the USSR, in May 1935, the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak pacts on mutual assistance against aggression were signed. This could be a serious step towards curbing the aggressive policies of Nazi Germany and its allies and serve as the basis for the creation of a system of collective security in Europe. The Soviet Union strongly condemned the aggressive actions of Germany and proposed holding an international conference to organize a system of collective security and protect the independence of countries that were threatened aggression. However, the ruling circles of Western states did not express the necessary interest in its creation.
In 1939, the USSR continued to take active steps to encourage the governments of Great Britain and France to create a system of collective security in Europe. The Soviet government made a specific proposal to conclude an agreement between the USSR, Great Britain and France on mutual assistance in the event of aggression against any of the countries party to the agreement. In the summer of 1939, trilateral negotiations were held in Moscow on the creation of a collective security system.
By the end of July, some progress was nevertheless achieved in the negotiations: the parties agreed to the simultaneous signing of a political and military agreement (previously, England proposed signing a political agreement first, and then negotiating a military convention).
On the way to World War II: the failure of the idea of collective security. Annexation of the Czech Republic
From the Soviet Union they were led by People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, from England - Admiral Drax, from France - General Dumenk. The governments of England and France did not rate the Red Army highly and considered it incapable of active offensive operations. In this regard, they did not believe in the effectiveness of the alliance with the USSR. Both Western delegations received instructions to delay the negotiations as much as possible, hoping that the very fact of their holding would have a psychological impact on Hitler.
The main stumbling block in the negotiations was the question of the consent of Poland and Romania to the passage of Soviet troops through their territory in the event of war (the USSR did not have a common border with Germany). The Poles and Romanians categorically refused to agree to this, fearing Soviet occupation.
Only on August 23 did the Polish government somewhat soften its position. Thus, the opportunity to obtain consent from Poland to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory was not yet irretrievably lost. It is also clear that the Poles were gradually inclined to make concessions under pressure from Western diplomacy. Given goodwill, the negotiations could probably still be brought to a successful conclusion. However, the mutual distrust of the parties destroyed this possibility.
The British and French military missions were not given the authority to make decisions. It became obvious to the Soviet leadership that the leadership of Western states did not want to quickly achieve positive results. Negotiations have reached a dead end.
3 Soviet-German relations and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact The position of the West, which constantly made concessions to Germany and rejected an alliance with the USSR, caused severe irritation in the Kremlin since the mid-1930s. It especially intensified in connection with the conclusion of the Munich Agreement, which in Moscow was regarded as a conspiracy directed not only against Czechoslovakia, but also against the Soviet Union, to whose borders the German threat had approached.
Since the autumn of 1938, Germany and the USSR began to gradually establish contacts in order to develop trade between the two countries. True, it was not possible to reach a real agreement then, since Germany, which had embarked on the path of accelerated militarization, did not have a sufficient number of goods that could be supplied to the USSR in exchange for raw materials and fuel.
Nevertheless, Stalin, speaking in March 1939 at the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), made it clear that a new rapprochement with Berlin was not excluded. Stalin formulated the goals of the foreign policy of the USSR as follows:
1 Continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries;
2 Do not let war provocateurs, who are accustomed to raking in the heat with the wrong hands, drag our country into conflicts.
In such a difficult situation, the USSR was forced to negotiate with Nazi Germany. It should be noted that the initiative to conclude the German-Soviet Pact belonged to the German side. So, on August 20, 1939, A. Hitler sent a telegram to I.V. Stalin, in which he proposed concluding a non-aggression pact: “...I once again propose that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, or at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Reich Foreign Minister will be given all the necessary powers to draw up and sign a non-aggression pact."
Consent was received on August 23, 1939. Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop flew to Moscow. After negotiations on the evening of August 23, 1939, a German-Soviet non-aggression treaty (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) was signed for a period of 10 years. At the same time, a “secret additional protocol” was signed.
As can be seen, in August 1939 the situation in Europe reached the highest tension. Hitler's Germany did not hide its intention to take military action against Poland. After the signing of the German-Soviet treaty, the USSR could not fundamentally influence the aggressive actions of the Berlin authorities.
Lecture 3 The beginning of World War II and events in Belarus
1 The outbreak of war, its causes and nature.
2 Accession of Western Belarus to the BSSR.
3 Germany’s preparation for war against the USSR. Plan "Barbarossa".
“Ensuring security” - the Constitution of the Russian Federation is the fundamental law of the state. The Law of the Russian Federation “On Security” establishes the legal basis for ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state. Laws and other regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation to ensure security. The law provides for mandatory training of the population, including schoolchildren, in fire safety measures.
“Ecology and safety” - Prokopyevsk. Training of managers and specialists in the field of environmental protection and environmental safety. Guryevsk. Kemerovo. Mundybash. Environmental safety is an area of strategic interest of the state. Number of people trained at the Center for Environmental Safety. Preparation requirement.
“Student Safety” - Do not walk near roofs and balconies! Always put out the fire behind you! Sledding away from the road! Student Safety Data Sheet. In case of fire in a house (apartment). Always take mosquito and tick ointment with you into the forest! Rules of conduct on the railway. Work with construction tools carefully!
“Safety Rules” - Driving requires full concentration. Drugs can cause an accident. Warning. Unnecessary travel should be avoided. The company's requirements are described in the access control policy and procedure. Error. Exceed the speed. Catastrophe. IPF rating 0.8). Effective HSE activities?
"School Safety" - Choose and Understand Children identify and evaluate their health concerns and priorities. Security is the context of the project. Implementation of a set of measures to prevent and neutralize identified threats. Prohibition of physical punishment of schoolchildren by school personnel. Security in the context of UNICEF programs.
"Business ideas" - Business ideas. Market niche. Tasks: Present a business idea. Investors? 1. Market. Research methods. Use of borrowed funds. Marketing research. The iconic Post-it-Notes are made from plain paper and glue. Countrymen? The main condition is that the observer does not interfere with events and does not influence the behavior of buyers.
(Presentation – slide No. 6)
Since 1936, two opposing directions in international relations have been emerging in Europe: the policy of appeasement and the policy of collective security.
A) Policy of appeasement. Message from a student from group 1.
An active supporter of this policy was the British Prime Minister in 1937-1940, Neville Chamberlain.
In his opinion, the main danger was not the actions of Germany, but the possibility of losing control over the development of events. He believed that the First World War arose precisely because the great powers temporarily lost control over the development of events. As a result, the local conflict over Serbia escalated into a world war. In order to prevent such a danger, it is necessary not to lose contacts with all participants in the international conflict and try to solve the problems that arise on the basis of mutual concessions. In fact, this meant that Hitler put forward more and more new claims, they became the object of discussion, after which it was necessary to make more and more concessions to Germany. Such a policy required sacrifices and territorial concessions on the part of third countries, i.e. those against whom Germany made claims.
B) Collective security policy.
Message from a student from group 2.
The policy of collective security was proposed by the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou. This policy was aimed at maintaining the status quo in Europe, the immutability of existing borders. States interested in this had to conclude mutual assistance agreements among themselves. Barth considered the participation of the USSR in this system vitally important. The conductor of this policy in our country was the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov. During the implementation of this course, the Soviet Union managed to strengthen its position:
- in 1934, the USSR was admitted to the League of Nations as a member of its Council;
- in 1935, a Soviet-French mutual assistance treaty was signed (the text of the treaty is on the tables and the respondent can refer to it);
- in 1936, an agreement was signed with Czechoslovakia;
- In 1935, the VII Congress of the Comintern set a course for the development of an anti-fascist struggle.
Why did other states not support the policy of collective security?
Answers:
1. The USSR did not have a common border with Germany. To fulfill its promises under the treaty, its troops must be allowed to pass through the territory of Poland or Romania, but the governments of both sides feared the USSR more than Germany and categorically refused to make promises regarding the possible passage of Soviet troops through their territory.
2. The military potential of the USSR was assessed extremely low after mass repressions among the command staff of the Red Army.
Result: France in 1938 abandons the policy of collective security and follows the British policy of appeasement.
C) Implementation of the policy of pacification.
- Frontal conversation.
1. Remember what, according to Hitler, was the historical mission of German fascism?
Answer: Conquering world domination. And for this it is necessary: to eliminate the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, to create a powerful army, to unite all Germans in a single state, to conquer the necessary “living space” in the East.
2. Which points of this plan have already been implemented by Hitler?
Answer: The terms of the Versailles Treaty regarding restrictions on Germany were partially eliminated, and a powerful army was created. It was possible to begin the implementation of the next stage - the unification of all Germans in a single state.
- Computer presentation prepared by 1 creative team..
3. German Field Marshal General W. Keitel said after the end of the war: “During the Munich period, Germany was not prepared for an armed conflict. If the Allies had allowed the Czechoslovak Republic to mobilize in March 1938, Hitler would not have been able to occupy even Austria...” Was the concession to Hitler by the Western powers at Munich due to Germany's clear military superiority or other circumstances?
The content of the presentation: In 1938, Hitler decided to begin implementing his foreign policy program: the redistribution of borders in order to include all regions inhabited by Germans into Germany. First on the list was Austria, Hitler's birthplace. Hitler issued an ultimatum demanding that power in Austria be transferred to the hands of local Nazis. They invited German troops to help them restore order. On March 12, 1938, the Wehrmacht invaded Austria. Its independence was eliminated and it became a region of Germany. Although most Austrians enthusiastically accepted the annexation, seeing only the future of the country in it. But one way or another, a sovereign state ceased to exist in Europe. Nobody could stop this.
Following this, Hitler made claims against Czechoslovakia, demanding the annexation of the Sudetenland, populated mainly by Germans, to Germany. But Czechoslovakia turned out to be a tough nut to crack. She had one of the best armies in Europe and was not going to give in. Hitler decided to achieve the separation of the Sudetenland, frightening the great powers with the prospect of starting a new war. On September 30, 1938, in Munich, with the participation of England, Germany, Italy and France, it was decided to satisfy Hitler's claims. Czechoslovakia, which was not even invited to the conference, lost 1/5 of its territory, the border was 40 km from Prague.
(Response to PP)
4. What were the results of the pacification policy by the end of 1938?
Answer: Germany has become the strongest state in Europe. Hitler believed in his impunity. This brought the start of the war closer. The West was blind: the assessment of the conspiracy was enthusiastic: “Peace to this generation!”
D) The collapse of the policy of appeasement. Teacher's story.
What actions of England and France indicated that their policy of appeasement was a complete failure?
Answer: March-April 1939 provision by England and France of guarantees of military assistance to all states bordering Germany in the event of an attack by Germany.
5. Foreign policy of the USSR in the 30s. ( Presentation - slide number 7)
A) Reasons for the rapprochement between the USSR and Germany.. Frontal conversation.
1. What conclusions did the Soviet leadership draw for itself after the signing of the Munich Agreement?
Answer: They are trying to push the USSR away from active participation in European affairs. An attempt to direct German aggression to the East, against the USSR.
2. How did Soviet-Japanese relations develop in 1938 – 1939?
Answer: In the summer of 1938, Japanese troops invaded the territory of the USSR in the area of Lake Khasan. In the summer of 1939, the Japanese army provoked a conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region, in Mongolia, which was bound by a military treaty with the USSR. The USSR could find itself in a state of war on two fronts.
3. Why does Germany begin to look for ways of rapprochement with the USSR in 1939?
Answer: The main object of Hitler's claims was now Poland. But England and France provided Poland with guarantees of military assistance. By attacking it, Germany risked finding itself in a state of war with England and France. The capture of Poland brought Germany to the border with the USSR, and if the USSR continues its anti-German policy, then Germany will find itself in a state of war on two fronts. Having learned of the guarantees to Poland and the firm intention of England and France to honor them, he pounded his fists on the marble of his desk, promising to brew England’s “damn potion.” This potion was the rapprochement with the USSR.
B) Working with documents. (Appendix 3 – worksheet No. 1)
Why did England and France, realizing the military danger from Nazi Germany, nevertheless avoid concluding an alliance with the USSR?
Why did the USSR begin to move away from the policy of collective security in August 1939?
Answer: The USSR insisted on granting it the right to send its troops into the territory of Poland and Romania to repel German aggression, establishing its control over Eastern Europe. The Soviet side saw in the position of Poland and Romania a pretext for delaying negotiations and proof that England and France did not want to truly cooperate with the USSR, but were using negotiations as a means of putting pressure on Hitler in an attempt to come to an agreement with him.
B) The choice has been made. Teacher's story.
In mid-August 1939, the USSR found itself at the center of world politics. His favor was actively sought by both Germany and its military opponents. The Soviet Union was faced with the problem of choosing between opposing opponents. The fate of the world depended on this choice. The turnaround occurred on August 21, 1939. Stalin received a telegram from Hitler, in which he stated that he was committed to concluding a non-aggression pact with the USSR and was ready to sign any additional agreement regarding the settlement of all controversial issues. It became clear to Stalin that the USSR could gain control of Eastern Europe, but not in exchange for agreeing to participate in the war, but as a price for non-participation in it. On the same day, negotiations with England and France were interrupted indefinitely. On August 23, a non-aggression pact was signed.
D) Non-aggression pact. Secret protocols. Work with documents. (Appendix 4 – worksheet No. 2).
1. Did the treaty comply with international law?
2. Did he violate the interests of other states?
3. What benefits did each state receive by signing this document?
4. What assessment can be given to this document?
III. Consolidation.
Teacher's word. The documents signed in Moscow completed the reorientation of the USSR's foreign policy. The meaning of this turn cannot be assessed unambiguously - an attempt to ensure the security of the country through a direct agreement with Germany. The USSR was turning into a non-combatant ally of Germany. The image of a country that consistently opposed fascism and its aggressive policies was destroyed, which in a historical perspective far outweighed the temporary advantages provided by the pact.
The immediate result of the signing of these documents was Hitler's final decision to launch aggression against Poland.
(Presentation – slide No. 8)
On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. On September 3, 1939, England and France declared war on Germany. The Second World War began - the bloodiest, most cruel, engulfing 61 states of the world, where 80% of the world's population lived. The death toll was 65-66 million people.
Answer on PPZ: Could the Second World War have been prevented?
Without encountering any real opposition, in March 1938 Hitler carried out the Anschluss(annexation to Germany) Austria. The Western powers viewed the absorption of Austria not as an act of Nazi aggression and a revision of the Treaty of Versailles, but as a step towards “pacifying” Germany.
The next victim was Czechoslovakia. Taking advantage of the unresolved national problems in this country, the Fuhrer demanded the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, mainly populated by Germans. In September 1938, an international conference of the heads of government of Germany, Italy, England and France was held in Munich, at which Western countries actually betrayed their ally, Czechoslovakia, by agreeing to secede the industrialized Sudetenland from it. Having lost border fortifications and weapons depots, the Czechoslovak army lost the opportunity to provide serious resistance to the aggressor. In March 1939, German troops occupied the Czech Republic, and a puppet state was created in Slovakia. The Anschluss of Austria and the seizure of Czechoslovakia announced to the governments and peoples of Europe that war was approaching and the need for effective measures to block German aggression.
March 21, 1939, a week after annexation Czech Republic, Germany presented Poland with ultimatum demands for the transfer of the “free city” of Danzig to it and the granting of extraterritorial rights to build a highway and railway to East Prussia through the “Danzig Corridor” that belonged to Poland. On the same day, on board the cruiser Deutschland, A. Hitler headed to the Lithuanian port of Memel (Klaipeda) demanding the return of this city to Germany. Poland rejected the ultimatum demands, but Lithuania was forced to give up Klaipeda. Germany annulled the non-aggression treaty with Poland, concluded in 1934. Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on mutual assistance in the event of Hitler's aggression also began on March 21. These negotiations were conducted sluggishly, with no desire to achieve a speedy result. Hitler acted quickly and decisively, proactively.
The next two months were also eventful. On April 15, F. D. Roosevelt appealed to A. Hitler and B. Mussolini with a call to refrain from attacking the 31 states listed in the address for 10 years. In addition, the US President took the initiative to convene an international conference on disarmament and peaceful cooperation. The proposal was supported by Great Britain, France and the USSR, but the conference was disrupted by Germany and Italy. In turn, just two days later the USSR invited Great Britain and France to conclude a triple alliance of mutual assistance. But these countries, acting independently, declared their readiness to help Poland in the event of an attack on it, and also acted as guarantors of the independence of Romania and Greece. Although it was practically impossible for the two most powerful powers in Western Europe to actually fulfill these obligations without an alliance with the USSR.
Germany continued to pursue an aggressive policy: it denounced the Anglo-German naval treaty, presented a repeated ultimatum to Poland and prepared a plan of military action against it. In May, a military-political treaty was concluded between Germany and Italy. Mongolia was attacked by Japan in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River. The USSR, in accordance with its obligations, provided assistance to her. Military conflict in the Far East has acquired a large-scale character.
In August, events began to develop with incredible speed. An Anglo-French military delegation was sent to Moscow, which, however, did not have the proper authority to conclude a specific agreement on mutual obligations. The negotiations, which lasted from August 11 to August 21, reached a dead end. The German and Soviet political leadership began to look for ways to rapprochement. In order to free oneself for aggression against Poland Hitler decided to neutralize the USSR. J.V. Stalin, having lost faith in the possibility of concluding an agreement with Great Britain and France, but convinced that an imperialist war was imminent, decided to collude with Hitler. Material from the site
As a result, on August 23, 1939, Hitler's Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop and the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov was concluded non-aggression pact. From a formal point of view, there was nothing reprehensible in this document. However, everyone understood that the agreement opened up a “green street” for Hitler’s aggression against Poland. Moreover, an agreement was reached between Germany and the USSR on the division of spheres of influence in Europe - the so-called secret protocol, according to which the USSR laid claim to part of the Polish state, which included Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, i.e., the lands that went to Poland under the Treaty of Riga of 1921. Germany recognized the special interests of the USSR in the Baltic states, Finland and Bessarabia , which became part of Romania in 1918.
The Moscow trials and the purge of the Red Army convinced both the Germans and the French and British that the Soviet Union was experiencing a serious internal crisis (generally poorly understood), which for some time would deprive it of the opportunity to play a decisive role in the international arena. Outlining his plans for Austria and Czechoslovakia to the General Staff on September 5, 1937, Hitler categorically rejected any possibility of a military reaction to this by the Soviet Union in view of the chaos reigning in the country caused by the purge of military and political personnel. According to the German charge d'affaires in Paris, the French government also expressed serious doubts about the strength of the Soviet regime and the combat effectiveness of the Red Army. “The military and political circles of France,” he wrote at the beginning of 1938, “are increasingly wondering about the benefits of such an ally and about the trust in him.” While the French leadership was increasingly convinced that by signing an agreement with the USSR, it had, as P. Gaxotte put it, “gained nothing,” the West’s passivity in the face of German aggression further strengthened the Soviet Union’s mistrust of European democracies.
On March 17, 1938, the Soviet government proposed convening an international conference to consider “practical measures against the development of aggression and the danger of a new world massacre.” This proposal was rejected by London as inherently "strengthening the tendency towards the formation of blocs and undermining the prospects for peace in Europe." Having encountered such an attitude, the Soviet Union began to seek rapprochement with Germany and in March 1938 signed new economic agreements with it, while recalling the USSR Ambassador to Germany J. Surits - a Jew and therefore disliked by the Nazis. Hitler made the following statement to the new ambassador, A. Mirekalov, on July 4: “I have read with satisfaction the declaration setting out the principles that will guide you in your efforts to establish normal relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.”
After Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union gave up its last illusions about the effectiveness of its collective security policy. In addition, France and Great Britain, whose governments Litvinov tried in vain to convince that the USSR was able to fulfill its obligations, expressed strong doubts about the combat effectiveness of the Red Army, devastated by the purges, and did not see how Soviet troops could participate in combat operations from -for the refusal of Poland and Romania to allow them through their territories. The Soviet Union, of course, would have taken part in the international conference, but it was not even invited to sign the Munich Agreements on September 30, 1938. The non-aggression treaty concluded by J. Bonnet and I. Ribbentrop on December 6, 193 8 in Paris between France and Germany was regarded in Moscow as a step that, to one degree or another, gave Hitler a free hand in the East.
By the end of 1938, the USSR's foreign policy position seemed more fragile than ever, and the feared threat of creating a united "imperialist front" was very real. In November 1936, this threat became more concrete after the signing of the “Anti-Comintern Pact” by Germany and Japan, which was then joined by Italy and Spain. In this situation, the Soviet leadership decided to make reconciliation with Chiang Kai-shek and convince the Chinese communists of the need to create a united front with the nationalists to fight against Japanese aggression. In August 1937, the USSR and China entered into a non-aggression pact. In the summer of 1938, hostilities began between Japan and the Soviet Union. Fierce battles took place in August 1938 in Eastern Siberia in the area of Lake Khasan, and then in Mongolia, where ground and air battles in the Khalkhin Gol region that lasted several months ended in victory for the Soviet troops, commanded by G. Stern and G. Zhukov.
On September 15, 1939, a truce was concluded. In the face of the threat of capitalist encirclement, the Soviet Union decided to further rapprochement with Germany, without abandoning negotiations with Western democracies.
V. THE ERA OF THE SOVIET-GERMAN PACT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1939-1941)
Soviet-German Pact
On the eve of the entry of German troops into Prague, Stalin sent his first “message” to Nazi Germany. On March 10, 1939, he told the delegates of the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) that if the West intends to instill in the Soviet Union the idea of Hitler’s intentions to seize Ukraine, in order to thereby provoke a conflict with Germany, then the USSR will not allow itself to be fooled and is not going to “arsonists” wars" (by which Western democracies were meant) "pulling chestnuts out of the fire." Only with great hesitation did the USSR agree a few days later to the idea of joining the declaration of “unconditional guarantees” provided by Great Britain and France to Poland. However, the head of the Polish Foreign Ministry, Beck, rejected the possibility of an agreement that would allow the presence of Soviet troops on Polish territory. On April 17, 1939, the USSR proposed that Great Britain and France conclude a tripartite agreement, the military guarantees of which would apply to the entire Eastern Europe from Romania to the Baltic states. On the same day, the Soviet ambassador in Berlin informed von Weizsäcker, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, about the desire of the Soviet government to establish the best possible relations with Germany, despite mutual ideological differences.
Two weeks later, M. Litvinov, who headed the NKID of the USSR and made a lot of efforts to ensure collective security, was removed, and his post was transferred to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov. This action was rightly regarded as a signal of a change in the course of Soviet foreign policy towards improving Soviet-German relations. In May, the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, was tasked with preparing negotiations with the Soviet Union in connection with Germany's decision to occupy Poland. Wanting to bargain, Soviet diplomacy simultaneously continued to negotiate with France and Great Britain. Each of the participants in the negotiations had their own hidden goals: the Western countries, trying first of all to prevent the Soviet-German rapprochement, delayed the negotiations and at the same time tried to clarify Germany’s intentions. For the USSR, the main thing was to achieve guarantees that the Baltic states would not end up, one way or another, in the hands of Germany, and to gain the opportunity, in the event of war with it, to transfer its troops through the territory of Poland and Romania (since the USSR and Germany did not have a common border). However, France and Great Britain continued to shy away from resolving this issue.
With growing alarm, the Soviet Union followed the Western democracies' preparations for a new Munich, now sacrificing Poland and at the same time opening Germany's path to the East. On June 29, Pravda published an article signed by Zhdanov and sharply criticizing the reluctance of the British and French governments to conclude an equal treaty with the USSR. Two days later, Western governments agreed to include the Baltic states within the scope of the "Eastern Guarantee" subject to, albeit illusory, a "Western Guarantee" regarding Switzerland, Holland and Luxembourg. The USSR refused such an agreement; neither in the West nor in the East did the states mentioned in it want such “guarantees.”
Seeing that the negotiations had reached a dead end, the British and French agreed to discuss the military aspects of the agreement with the USSR. However, representatives of England and France sent by sea on August 5 arrived in Moscow only on August 11. The Soviet side, represented by the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov and the Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov, was dissatisfied with the fact that their partners were low-ranking officials who had (especially the British) very vague powers that excluded negotiations on such important issues as the possibility of the passage of Soviet troops through the territory of Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries, or the obligations of the parties regarding specific quantities of military equipment and personnel to be mobilized in the event of German aggression.
On August 21, the Soviet delegation postponed negotiations to a later date. By this time, the Soviet leadership had already finally decided to conclude an agreement with Germany. Since the end of July, negotiations between German and Soviet representatives at different levels have resumed. Having learned about the sending of French and British missions to Moscow, the German side made it clear that an agreement with Germany on a number of issues of a territorial and economic nature would meet the interests of the Soviet leadership. On August 14, Ribbentrop announced his readiness to arrive in Moscow to conclude a full-fledged political agreement. The very next day, the Soviet government gave its consent in principle to this German initiative, at the same time demanding that some clarifications be made to the German proposals. .On August 19, the German government responded by signing a trade agreement that had been discussed since the end of 1938, very beneficial to the Soviet Union (it provided for a loan of 200 million marks at a very small interest rate), and also expressed its readiness to demand from Japan a cessation of hostilities against the USSR and to delimit "spheres of interest" of Germany and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. On the evening of the same day, the Soviet leadership confirmed its consent to Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact, the text of which, already prepared by the Soviet side, was immediately transmitted to Berlin. Ribbentrop's arrival, scheduled for August 26, was accelerated at Hitler's urgent request. Ribbentrop, endowed with emergency powers, arrived in Moscow in the afternoon of August 23, and the very next day the text of the non-aggression treaty signed that same night was published. The agreement, which was intended to last for 10 years, came into force immediately.
The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol, a photocopy of which was later discovered in Germany, but the existence of which was nevertheless denied in the USSR until the summer of 1989. The protocol delimited the spheres of influence of the parties in Eastern Europe: Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Bessarabia were in the Soviet sphere: in German - Lithuania. The fate of the Polish state was diplomatically passed over in silence, but in any case, the Belarusian and Ukrainian territories included in its composition under the Riga Peace Treaty of 1920, as well as part of the “historically and ethnically Polish” territory of the Warsaw and Lublin voivodeships should have been after Germany’s military invasion in Poland will go to the USSR.
The news of the signing of the Soviet-German Pact created a real sensation throughout the world, especially in those countries whose fate directly depended on these agreements. The general public of these countries, completely unprepared for such developments, regarded them as a real revolution in the European order.
Eight days after the treaty was signed, Nazi troops attacked Poland.
