The struggle of Soviet power against the troops of Poland. Poland vs Russia
#war #1920 #history #RSFSR
Causes of the conflict
The Polish state, formed in November 1918, from the very beginning began to pursue an aggressive policy towards its eastern neighbor - Russia. On November 16, the Head of the Polish state, Jozef Pilsudski, notified all countries, except for the RSFSR, of the creation of an independent Polish state. But, despite ignoring Soviet Russia, nevertheless, in December 1918, the Soviet government announced its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Poland. She turned down the offer. Moreover, on January 2, 1919, the Poles shot down the mission of the Russian Red Cross, which caused an aggravation of relations between the two states. Poland was proclaimed an independent state within the borders of the Commonwealth in 1772 (the year of the first partition of Poland - M.P.). This involved a radical revision of its borders, including with Russia. The border between Poland and Russia was the subject of discussion at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Poland's eastern border was defined in ethnic boundaries between Poles on the one hand, and Ukrainians and Belarusians on the other. It was established at the suggestion of the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon and was called the "Curzon Line". On January 28, 1920, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs once again turned to Poland with a peace proposal based on the recognition of its independence and sovereignty. At the same time, serious territorial concessions were made to Poland. The border was supposed to run from 50 to 80 km east of the Curzon Line, that is, Soviet Russia was ready to cede significant territories. Lenin noted on this occasion: “When in January (1920 - M.P.) we offered Poland peace, which was extremely beneficial for her, very unprofitable for us, the diplomats of all countries understood this in their own way:“ the Bolsheviks - so they are unreasonably weak ”(Lenin V.I. T. 41. S. 281). In mid-February 1920, Pilsudski announced that he was ready to start negotiations with Russia if she recognized the borders of Poland within the 1772 Commonwealth.
This approach was unacceptable for Russia. The Polish ruling elite put forward the national slogan of creating "Great Poland" "from sea to sea" - from the Baltic to the Black. This nationalist project could only be realized at the expense of Russia. Pilsudski raised the issue of revising the border between Poland and Soviet Russia, that is, it was about tearing away the historical territories of Russia and their annexation to Poland. On the Polish side, as preconditions for negotiations, they demanded that the Soviet side withdraw Soviet troops from all territories that were part of the Commonwealth before the first partition of Poland. They were supposed to be occupied by Polish troops. On March 6, the Soviet government offered peace to Poland for the third time since the beginning of 1920. On March 27, 1920, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Patek announced his readiness to start peace negotiations. The place of negotiations was the city of Borisov, which was located in the area of hostilities and was occupied by Polish troops. The Polish side offered to declare a truce only in the Borisov region, which allowed it to conduct military operations on the territory of Ukraine.
The Soviet side offered to declare a general truce for the period of negotiations and choose any place for negotiations far from the front line. Poland did not accept these proposals. The last time a Soviet offer of peace was sent to Poland was on February 2, 1920, and on April 7 it was refused to conduct any negotiations with the Soviets. All attempts by the Soviet government to establish peaceful relations and resolve disputed issues through negotiations ended in failure.
As noted by L.D. Trotsky, we "wanted with all our might to avoid this war." Thus, among the main reasons for the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, one should mention the desire of Poland to seize the territory of Russia, as well as the policy of the Entente, which encouraged the attack of Poland on Soviet Russia in order to overthrow the power of the Bolsheviks.
Beginning and course of the war
France, England, the United States helped Poland create a strong army.
In particular, the United States provided her with $50 million in 1920. Assistance with advisers and instructors was provided by France and England. Ferdinand Foch in January 1920 set the task of the French mission in Warsaw: "to prepare the strongest army possible in the shortest possible time." In France, under the command of General Haller, a Polish army was created, consisting of two corps. In 1919 she was transferred to Poland. These states provided Poland with enormous military and economic assistance. In the spring of 1920, they supplied her with 1494 guns, 2800 machine guns, 385.5 thousand rifles, 42 thousand revolvers, about 700 aircraft, 200 armored vehicles, 800 trucks, 576 million cartridges, 10 million shells, 4.5 thousand wagons, 3 million pieces of equipment, 4 million pairs of shoes, communications and medicines.
With the help of the above countries, by the spring of 1920, Poland managed to create a strong and well-equipped army of about 740 thousand people. By April 1920, the Polish armed forces on the Eastern Front consisted of six armies, the combat strength of which was determined at 148.4 thousand soldiers and. They were armed with 4157 machine guns, 302 mortars, 894 artillery pieces, 49 armored vehicles and 51 aircraft. On the Soviet side, they were opposed by two fronts: the Western (commander V.M. Gittis, member of the Revolutionary Military Council I.S. Unshlikht), deployed on the territory of Belarus, and the South-Western (commander A.I. Egorov, member of the Revolutionary Military Council R.I. Berzin ), located on the territory of Ukraine. Both fronts had two armies. On the whole, on the Soviet-Polish front, Polish troops slightly outnumbered Soviet troops. However, in Ukraine, where the Polish command planned to strike the main blow, he managed to create superiority in fighters by 3.3 times, machine guns by 1.6 times, guns and mortars by 2.5 times. The plan of the Polish command, approved by the Entente, provided for the defeat of the 12th and 14th Soviet armies at the first stage of hostilities, they began to retreat. However, it was not possible to defeat them, as the Polish command intended.
The Polish army was supported by Polish nationalists. On April 21, 1920, a secret "political convention" was signed between Pilsudski and Petliura, one of the leaders of the Central Ukrainian Rada. Petliurists for the recognition of their "government" gave Poland 100 thousand square meters. km. Ukrainian territory with a population of 5 million people. In Ukraine, there was no strong resistance to Pilsudski. And this despite the fact that the Poles took out industrial equipment, robbed the population; punitive detachments burned villages, shot men and women. In the city of Rovno, the Poles shot more than 3 thousand civilians. The villages of Ivantsy, Kucha, Yablukovka, Sobachy, Kirillovka and others were completely burned down for the refusal of the population to give food to the occupiers. The inhabitants of these villages were machine-gunned. In the town of Tetievo, 4,000 people were slaughtered during a Jewish pogrom. Troops of the 12th Army left Kyiv on May 6, where Polish troops entered. A few days later, the Polish General E. Ryndz - Smigly received a parade of allied troops on Khreshchatyk. Polish troops also occupied a significant part of the territory of Belarus with the city of Minsk.
By mid-May 1920, almost all of Right-Bank Ukraine was under the control of Polish troops. By the same time, the front in Ukraine had stabilized. The Soviet 12th and 14th armies suffered heavy losses, but were not defeated. Strategic goals, that is, the defeat of the troops of the Southwestern Front, Pilsudski failed to realize. As he himself admitted on May 15, "we hit the air with our fist - we traveled a long distance, but we did not destroy the enemy's manpower." The start of a broad Polish offensive in Ukraine and the capture of Kyiv led to significant changes in the strategy of Soviet Russia. The Polish front became the main one for Moscow, and the war with Poland became the “central task”. On May 23, the theses of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) "The Polish Front and Our Tasks" were published, in which the country was called upon to fight pan-pan Poland. As early as April 30, that is, a week before this document, the appeal of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "To all workers, peasants and honest citizens of Russia" was published.
It revealed the aggressive nature of the war, and again confirmed the independence and sovereignty of Poland. There was a mass mobilization in the country. By November 1920, 500 thousand people were mobilized. Komsomol and party mobilizations were also carried out: 25,000 communists and 12,000 Komsomol members were mobilized. By the end of 1920, the strength of the Red Army reached 5.5 million people. The Soviet-Polish war and the seizure of the historical territories of Russia during it led to a certain national unity in the country split by the civil war. Former officers and generals of the tsarist army, who had previously not sympathized with the Bolsheviks, now declared their support. Famous generals of the Russian army A.A. Brusilov, A.M. Zaionchkovsky and A.A. Polivanov May 30, 1920 appealed to "all former officers, wherever they are" with a call to side with the Red Army. Quite a few have come to the conclusion that the Red Army is now being transformed from a Bolshevik army into a national, state army, that the Bolsheviks are defending the interests of Russia. Following this appeal, on June 2, 1920, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the release from responsibility of all White Guards who will help in the war with Poland and Wrangel" was issued.
Counteroffensive of the Red Army
After the capture of Kyiv, according to Trotsky, "the country was shaken up." Thanks to mobilization measures, the preconditions for a counteroffensive of the Red Army were created. On April 28, 1920, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) discussed the plan of the counteroffensive. The main blow was planned in Belarus, north of Polesie. The troops of the Western Front received significant reinforcements. From March 10 to June 1, 1920, the front received more than 40 thousand replenishment people. The number of horses increased from 25 thousand to 35. On April 29, M.N. became the commander of the Western Front. Tukhachevsky, who replaced Gittis. At the same time (May 26), Stalin was appointed a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front, F.E. Dzerzhinsky. The offensive of the Western Front began on the morning of May 14 (15th Army - Commander A.I. Kork) in the Vitebsk region. Here it was possible to create a preponderance of forces over the Poles, both in manpower and in weapons. The defense of the first Polish division was broken. Already on the first day of the offensive, Soviet troops advanced 6-20 km. The 43rd regiment of the 5th rifle division under the command of V.I. Chuikov. The troops of the Western Front advanced westward up to 100-130 km.
However, the enemy, having pulled up reserves, managed to push our troops back 60-100 km. But this was done to a large extent by moving troops from Ukraine, where the Poles had weakened their positions. The May offensive of the Soviet troops in Belarus forced them to use up a significant part of their reserves. This made it easier for the troops of the southwestern front to go over to the offensive. In May 1920, the Southwestern Front received a reinforcement of 41 thousand people. The first Cavalry Army was transferred from the North Caucasus to the Southwestern Front. Its commander was S.M. Budyonny; members of the RVS - K.E. Voroshilov and E.A. Shchadenko. Cavalry made a 1000-kilometer campaign on horseback. During the campaign, she defeated many insurgent and anti-Soviet detachments operating in the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front. On May 25, the cavalry concentrated in the Uman region (18 thousand sabers). It significantly strengthened the offensive capabilities of the Southwestern Front. May 12-15 at the front headquarters in Kharkov with the participation of Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev developed a plan for the counteroffensive of the front. On the eve of the offensive, the balance of forces looked like this: the Polish troops consisted of 78 thousand bayonets and cavalry; The Southwestern Front had 46,000 infantry and cavalry. But he seriously outnumbered the enemy in cavalry. In early June, the first cavalry went on the offensive. On June 7, the 4th Cavalry Division captured Zhitomir, freeing 7,000 Red Army soldiers from captivity, who immediately entered service. Pilsudski's headquarters were nearly captured here. On June 8, they took the city of Berdichev. The Polish front in Ukraine was split into two parts. June 12 was liberated Kyiv, June 30 - Exactly.
During the liberation of these cities, the 25th Chapaev division and the cavalry brigade of Kotovsky especially distinguished themselves. The Soviet offensive in Belarus developed successfully. At dawn on July 4, the troops of the Western Front went on the offensive. Already on the first day of the offensive, the right wing of the front advanced 15-20 km. However, it was not possible to surround and completely destroy the 1st Polish army opposing him. The 16th army advanced on Minsk, and on July 11 it was liberated, on July 19 - Baranovichi was liberated. In order to save Poland from complete defeat, on July 11, 1920, British Foreign Secretary Curzon addressed the Soviet government with a Note, which proposed conditions for ending the war and concluding a truce. This note was called "Curzon's ultimatum" in our country. It contained the following proposals: the Polish army retreats to the line outlined in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference (the "Curzon Line"). Soviet troops stop 50 km away. east of this line; the final decision on the border between Poland and Russia was to take place at an international conference in London; if the offensive of the Soviet troops continues, the Entente will support Poland. In addition, it was proposed to conclude a truce with Wrangel. In those conditions, this meant the annexation of Crimea from Russia. Moscow was given 7 days to respond and it was reported that Poland agreed to these conditions. Curzon's note was discussed by the Soviet government on July 13-16. There was no unity on this issue. G.V. Chicherin, L.B. Kamenev, L.D. Trotsky believed that the terms of the truce were favorable for the Soviet side, so they could agree to negotiations and, taking into account our conditions, conclude a truce with Poland. Given the way events unfolded in the future, this approach was very promising for Russia. However, the point of view prevailed, according to which it was believed that Poland was weak and a strong blow would lead to its final defeat, and after it the collapse of the entire Versailles system, which did not take into account Soviet interests, could also occur. This position was based on an erroneous assessment of the successes of the Red Army and the perception that Poland was on the verge of defeat. IN
As a result, on July 16, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Curzon's note was rejected and a decision was made on a further offensive against Poland. Already after 2.5 months in September 1920, at the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP (b), Lenin was forced to admit the fallacy of such a decision. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of the victories of the Red Army in Ukraine and Belarus, there was a growing conviction that this war could turn into a revolutionary war. The leadership of Soviet Russia planned that the entry of the Red Army into the territory of Poland and the defeat of Pilsudski here could be the beginning of the transformation of pan-bourgeois Poland into a Soviet Republic, headed by Polish workers and peasants. On July 30, the Polish Revolutionary Committee (Polrevkom) was created in Bialystok, which included the Bolsheviks of Polish origin Julian Markhlevsky (Chairman), Felix Dzerzhinsky, Felix Kohn, Edvard Pruchniak and Jozef Unshlikht. 1 million rubles were allocated for its activities. The task of the Polrevkom was to prepare the revolution in Poland. In late July - early August 1920, the Red Army entered the territory of ethnic Poland.
Disaster of the Red Army on the Vistula
On August 10, 1920, the commander of the Western Front, M.N. Tukhachevsky signed a directive to cross the Vistula and capture Warsaw. It said: “Fighters of the workers' revolution. Set your eyes to the West. The problems of the world revolution are being solved in the West. Through the corpse of white Poland lies the path to the world conflagration. On bayonets we will bring happiness and peace to working mankind. To the west! To decisive battles, to resounding victories! The troops of the front numbered more than 100 thousand bayonets and sabers, somewhat inferior to the enemy in numbers. In the Warsaw and Novogeorgievsk directions, it was possible to create a preponderance of forces over the Poles, of which there were about 69 thousand bayonets and cavalry, and the Soviet troops (4, 15, 3 and 16 armies) - 95.1 thousand. However, in the Ivangorod direction, where Pilsudski was preparing a counterattack , the number of troops was: 38 thousand bayonets and sabers from the Poles and 6.1 thousand from the soldiers of the Red Army. The main forces of the Polish troops were withdrawn beyond the Vistula for regrouping. They've got a fresh addition. The Soviet units that came out to the Vistula, on the contrary, were extremely tired and small in number. During the fighting, they suffered heavy losses, the rear units fell behind by 200 - 400 km, in connection with which the supply of ammunition and food was disrupted. The troops did not receive reinforcements.
In some divisions, there were no more than 500 fighters. Many regiments turned into companies. In addition, between the two Soviet fronts, the Southwestern, whose main forces were fighting for the city of Lvov, and the Western, which was supposed to force the Vistula and take Warsaw, a gap of 200 - 250 km was formed, which did not allow them to quickly interact with each other . In addition, the 1st Cavalry Army transferred from the Southwestern Front to the Western Front, at the time of the decisive battles for Warsaw, was far from the main battlefield and did not provide the necessary assistance. The hopes of the Bolsheviks for support from the Polish workers and the poorest peasants did not come true. If the Bolsheviks said that the Red Army was going to Poland to liberate the workers and peasants from exploitation, then Pilsudski said that the Russians were going to enslave again, they were again trying to eliminate the Polish statehood. He managed to give the war, at the stage when the Red Army was on the territory of Poland, a national liberation character and unite the Poles. The Polish workers and peasants did not support the Red Army. At the IX All-Russian Conference of the RCP(b) (October 1920), a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 15th Army of the Western Front, D. Poluyan, said: “In the Polish army, the national idea solders both the bourgeois, and the peasant, and the worker, and this has to be observed everywhere.” The entry of the Red Army into Poland frightened the West, the Entente countries, as they believed that in the event of a socialist revolution and the beginning of Sovietization in this country, a chain reaction would begin and other European countries would be influenced by Soviet Russia, and this would lead to the destruction of the Versailles system.
Therefore, the West has seriously stepped up assistance to Poland. Under such conditions, on August 13, 1920, the battle on the Vistula began. On the same day, after stubborn fighting, they managed to capture the city of Radzimin, located 23 km from Warsaw, the next day - two forts of the Modlin fortress. But this was the last success of the Soviet troops. The situation for the Soviet troops was further aggravated by the fact that on August 12 the Armed Forces of the South of Russia launched an offensive under the command of Baron Wrangel, who pulled back part of the Red Army forces destined for the Polish front. On August 16, Polish troops launched a counteroffensive and launched a strong flank attack between the Western (Warsaw) and Southwestern (Lvov) fronts. The enemy quickly broke through the weak front of the Mozyr Group of Forces of the Western Front and created a threat of encirclement of the Warsaw grouping of Soviet armies.
Therefore, the front commander Tukhachevsky ordered the retreat of the troops to the east, although a large part was surrounded. On August 18, Pilsudski, as the Head of the Polish state, addressed the population with an ominous appeal not to let a single Red Army soldier who remained in the encirclement leave Polish soil. As a result of the defeat near Warsaw, the troops of the Western Front suffered heavy losses. According to some estimates, 25,000 Red Army soldiers died during the Warsaw battle, more than 60,000 were captured, and 45,000 were interned by the Germans. Several thousand people went missing. The front also lost a large amount of artillery, small arms and property. Polish losses are estimated at 4,500 killed, 10,000 missing and 22,000 wounded. On August 25, 1920, the retreating Soviet troops ended up in the area of the Russian-Polish border of the 18th century. However, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that at that time in the West few people believed that Piłsudski could win. The Entente countries did not have confidence in him. This is evidenced by the fact that at a meeting of Lloyd George and French Prime Minister Milner, Warsaw was actually recommended to remove Pilsudski from the post of Commander-in-Chief. The Polish government offered this post to the French General Weygand, who refused, believing that in the specific conditions of this war a local commander should be in command. The authority of Piłsudski as a military leader was also low among the Polish military. It is no coincidence, therefore, that many said that either Providence or a Miracle could save Poland. And Churchill would call the Polish victory at Warsaw "The Miracle on the Vistula, with only a few changes, it was a repeat of the Miracle on the Marne." But the victory was won, and in the future they began to associate her with Jozef Pilsudski. During the battle on the Vistula, on August 17, a peaceful Soviet-Polish conference opened in Minsk. The Soviet delegation consisted of representatives of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR. The interests of Belarus were represented by the Russian delegation. During the work of the conference hostilities between Poland and Russia did not stop. In order to undermine the negotiating positions of the Soviet delegation, the Polish troops stepped up their offensive, capturing new territories. On October 15-16, 1920, they occupied Minsk, and in the southwestern direction they were stopped by September 20 at the turn of the Ubort, Sluch, Litvin, Murafa rivers, that is, much east of the Curzon Line. Negotiations from Minsk were transferred to Riga. They started on October 5th. Poland did not stop hostilities this time either, capturing new territories and pushing the border more and more towards Russia. The armistice was signed on 12 October 1920 and came into effect at midnight on 18 October.
The final peace treaty between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, on the one hand, and the Polish Republic, on the other, was signed on March 18, 1921 in Riga. Under the treaty, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were ceded to Poland. The state border ran much to the east of the Curzon Line. The captured territory was 200 thousand square meters. km., more than 13 million people lived on it. The financial and economic conditions of the agreement were also difficult for Russia. Russia released Poland from liability for the debts of the Russian Empire; Russia and Ukraine pledged to pay Poland 30 million rubles in gold as the Polish part of the gold reserves of the former Russian Empire and as recognition of Poland's secession from Russia. Poland also received 555 steam locomotives, 695 passenger cars, 16,959 freight cars, railway property along with stations. All this was estimated at 18 million 245 thousand rubles in gold in 1913 prices. Diplomatic relations were established between the parties. The state of war between states ceased from the moment the treaty entered into force. Despite the fact that the bloodshed was over, but the signed agreement did not lay the foundation for future good neighborly relations between Russia and Poland, on the contrary, it became the cause of a serious conflict between the two neighbors. "On the live" were divided Belarusian and Ukrainian lands. Eastern Galicia, against the will of the Ukrainian population, was transferred to Poland.
The great drama of this war was the fate of the prisoners of war of the Red Army in Polish captivity. It should be noted that there is no reliable data on the total number of Red Army soldiers who were in captivity and the number of dead and dead. Polish and Russian historians give different data. Polish historians Z. Karpus, D. Lepinska-Nalench, T. Nalench note that at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Poland there were about 110 thousand prisoners of the Red Army, of which 65,797 prisoners of war were sent to Russia after the end of the war. According to Polish data, the total number of deaths in the camps for various reasons amounted to 16-17 thousand people. According to the Russian historian G.M. Matveev, 157 thousand Red Army soldiers were in Polish captivity, of which 75,699 returned to their homeland. The fate of the remaining more than 80 thousand prisoners developed in different ways. According to his calculations, from hunger, disease, etc. could die in captivity from 25 to 28 thousand people, that is, approximately 18 percent of the Red Army soldiers who were actually captured. I.V. Mikhutina cites data on 130,000 Red Army prisoners of war, of whom 60,000 died in captivity in less than two years. M.I. Meltyukhov calls the number of prisoners of war in 1919-1920. 146 thousand people, of which 60 thousand died in captivity, and 75,699 returned to their homeland. Thus, in Russian historiography there is no generally accepted data on the number of Soviet prisoners of war who were in Polish captivity, as well as on the number of those who died in captivity. The Polish captivity turned out to be a real nightmare for the Red Army. Inhuman conditions of detention put them on the brink of survival. The prisoners had extremely poor food, in fact, there was no medical care. The delegation of the American Christian Youth Union, which visited Poland in October 1920, testified in its report that Soviet prisoners were kept in premises unsuitable for habitation, with windows without glass and through cracks in the walls, without furniture and sleeping appliances, placed on the floor, without mattresses and blankets.
The report also emphasized that the prisoners were also taken away clothes and shoes, many were without clothes at all. As for the Polish prisoners of war in Soviet captivity, their situation was quite different. No one pursued a policy of destruction towards them. Moreover, they were considered victims of the Polish lords and capitalists, and in Soviet captivity they were looked upon as "class brothers". In 1919-1920. 41-42 thousand people were taken prisoner, of which 34,839 people were released to Poland. Approximately 3 thousand people expressed a desire to stay in Soviet Russia. Thus, the total loss was approximately 3-4 thousand, of which about 2 thousand were documented as having died in captivity.
Polynov M.F. USSR/Russia in local wars and
armed conflicts of the XX-XXI centuries. Tutorial. - St. Petersburg,
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Made my own adjustments. As a result of the Versailles, the country returned sovereignty over most of the original Polish lands, but was not going to stop there. The plans of the government included the complete restoration of the territory.
Nicholas II looked at the future of the Polish people in his own way. In August 1914, the Russian government announced its desire to unite the Poles and recreate Polish statehood within the borders of the independent kingdom of Poland under the auspices of the Russian emperor.
In 1916, the existence of the Kingdom of Poland was proclaimed, but without specifying the territorial boundaries. A little later, the Polish Provisional State Council was created. Russia, in turn, announced the creation of an independent Poland, including territories that were part of the Russian Empire before the war.
In early 1917, Emperor Nicholas II abdicates the throne. Thus, dual power is established in the country in the person of the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet. It was the latter, in March of the same year, adopted a declaration on the right of the people to self-determination. confirmed the need for an independent Polish state.
In November 1918, Pilsudski informed all countries, with the exception of the RSFSR, of his formation. The Soviet government, in turn, expressed its readiness to establish diplomatic relations. In December of the same year, Russia made three more proposals for diplomatic ties, but Poland did not agree to any of them.
The beginning of 1919, marked by the execution of the mission of the Russian Red Cross, led to accusations from Russia. But the Polish side was only interested in its own borders, and Pilsudski's main desire was to remove Russia from the position of the main power of Eastern Europe. In his opinion, Poland should have taken its place.
The Soviet-Polish War of 1920 began on April 25, when the Poles attacked Soviet troops without warning in the territory covering the land from the city of Pripyat to the Dniester River. A little later, the Polish side captured part of the left bank of the Dnieper. The occupied part of Ukraine experienced a terrible time that year. The Poles plundered its territory, burned houses, killed civilians.
The Soviet-Polish war on July 2, 1920 was marked by a head-on battle, the end of which was the victory of the Soviet troops.
Therefore, July 1 in Warsaw is the date of the creation of the Defense Council headed by Pilsudski. A few days later, the Council turned to the Entente for help, asking for assistance in peace negotiations with Russia. So, the last note was handed over with a demand to stop the offensive from the city of Grodno to the Carpathians. As a result of long negotiations and deliberations, the Russian side decided to refuse, counting on the weakness of the enemy, which, in their opinion, should have led to its collapse. But Russia expressed its readiness to hold peace talks with the Polish side, but without intermediaries. England, in turn, announced the termination of relations with the RSFSR in the event of the continuation of the offensive of the latter. The Soviet-Polish war continued with hostilities.
The Polish side was well armed and prepared for the battle on the Vistula, as well as for the defense of the city of Lvov. The leadership of Poland has tightened measures to maintain army discipline. Starting in August 1920, they were introduced to stop the retreating units. This fact could not go unnoticed.
The Russian command of the western front was considering a plan of attack on Warsaw. It should be noted that his troops were somewhat inferior in number to the Poles. The Soviet units near the Vistula were also small and exhausted. The battle began on August 13, 1920. On the same day, Soviet divisions captured the city of Radzymin, located near Warsaw. On August 14, the offensive broke into the headquarters of the fourth. The rapid retreat led to the loss of communication with the rest of the troops and the headquarters of the front. As a result, the right flank was left without control.
The Soviet-Polish war, the turning point of which occurred on September 21, 1920, when Poland and Russia began negotiations, ended with the signing of the Armistice Agreement. It entered into force on October 18, 1920. The negotiations led to the signing of the Riga Peace Treaty of March 18, 1921.
The Soviet-Polish war of 1920 brought the territory of western Belarus, as well as western Ukraine, to the Polish side.
Soviet-Polish war against the backdrop of fratricidal strife in Russia
The Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1920 was part of a large Civil War on the territory of the former Russian Empire. But on the other hand, this war was perceived by the Russian people - both those who fought for the Reds and those who fought on the side of the Whites - precisely as a war with an external enemy.
New Poland "from sea to sea"
This duality has been created by history itself. Before the First World War, most of Poland was Russian territory, other parts of it belonged to Germany and Austria - an independent Polish state did not exist for almost a century and a half. It is noteworthy that with the outbreak of World War II, both the tsarist government and the Germans and Austrians officially promised the Poles after the victory to recreate an independent Polish monarchy. As a result, thousands of Poles in 1914-1918 fought on both sides of the front.
The political fate of Poland was predetermined by the fact that in 1915 the Russian army, under pressure from the enemy, was forced to retreat from the Vistula to the east. The entire Polish territory was under the control of the Germans, and in November 1918, after the surrender of Germany, power over Poland automatically passed to Jozef Pilsudski.
This Polish nationalist was engaged in anti-Russian struggle for a quarter of a century, with the outbreak of World War I he formed the “Polish Legions” - volunteer detachments as part of the Austro-Hungarian troops. After the surrender of Germany and Austria, the "legionnaires" became the basis of the new Polish government, and Pilsudski officially received the title of "Head of State", that is, dictator. At the same time, the new Poland, headed by a military dictator, was supported by the winners in the First World War, primarily France and the United States.
Paris hoped to make from Poland a counterbalance to both the defeated but not reconciled Germany, and Russia, in which the power of the Bolsheviks, incomprehensible and dangerous for the Western European elites, appeared. The United States, for the first time realizing its increased power, saw in the new Poland a convenient opportunity to extend its influence to the very center of Europe.
Taking advantage of this support and the general turmoil that gripped the central countries of Europe after the end of the First World War, the revived Poland immediately came into conflict with all its neighbors over borders and territories. In the west, the Poles began armed conflicts with the Germans and Czechs, the so-called "Silesian uprising", and in the east - with the Lithuanians, the Ukrainian population of Galicia (Western Ukraine) and Soviet Belarus.
For the new, extremely nationalist authorities of Warsaw, the troubled times of 1918-1919, when there were no stable authorities and states in the center of Europe, seemed very convenient to restore the borders of the ancient Commonwealth, the Polish empire of the 16th-17th centuries, stretching od morza do morza - from sea and to the sea, that is, from the Baltic to the Black Sea coast.
The beginning of the Soviet-Polish war
No one declared a war between nationalist Poland and the Bolsheviks - in the context of widespread uprisings and political chaos, the Soviet-Polish conflict began without prior notice. Germany, which occupied the Polish and Belarusian lands, capitulated in November 1918. And a month later, Soviet troops moved into the territory of Belarus from the east, and Polish troops from the west.
In February 1919, in Minsk, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the creation of the "Lithuanian-Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic", and on the same days the first battles of Soviet and Polish troops began on these lands. Both sides tried to quickly correct the chaotically folding borders in their favor.
The Poles were more fortunate then - by the summer of 1919, all the forces of the Soviet government were diverted to the war with the White armies of Denikin, who launched a decisive offensive on the Don and in the Donbass. By that time, the Poles had captured Vilnius, the western half of Belarus and all of Galicia (that is, western Ukraine, where Polish nationalists fiercely suppressed the uprising of Ukrainian nationalists for six months).
The Soviet government then several times offered Warsaw to officially conclude a peace treaty on the terms of the actually formed border. It was extremely important for the Bolsheviks to free up all their forces to fight Denikin, who had already issued a “Moscow directive” - an order for a general attack by the Whites on the old Russian capital.
Soviet poster. Photo: cersipamantromanesc.wordpress.com
The Poles of Pilsudski did not respond to these peace proposals at that time - 70 thousand Polish soldiers, equipped with the most modern equipment, had just arrived in Warsaw from France. The French formed this army back in 1917 from Polish emigrants and prisoners to fight the Germans. Now this army, very significant by the standards of the Russian Civil War, came in handy for Warsaw to expand its borders to the east.
In August 1919, the advancing White armies occupied the ancient Russian capital of Kyiv, while the advancing Poles captured Minsk. Soviet Moscow found itself between two fires, and in those days it seemed to many that the days of Bolshevik power were numbered. Indeed, in the event of joint action by the Whites and the Poles, the defeat of the Soviet armies would have been inevitable.
In September 1919, the Polish embassy arrived in Taganrog at the headquarters of General Denikin, met with great solemnity. The mission from Warsaw was led by General Alexander Karnitsky, Knight of St. George and former Major General of the Imperial Russian Army.
Despite the solemn meeting and the mass of compliments that the white leaders and representatives of Warsaw expressed to each other, the negotiations dragged on for many months. Denikin asked the Poles to continue their offensive to the east against the Bolsheviks, General Karnitsky suggested first to decide on the future border between Poland and the "United Indivisible Russia", which would be formed after the victory over the Bolsheviks.
Poles between reds and whites
While negotiations were underway with the Whites, the Polish troops stopped the offensive against the Reds. After all, the victory of the Whites threatened the appetites of the Polish nationalists in relation to the Russian lands. Pilsudski and Denikin were supported and supplied with weapons by the Entente (an alliance of France, England and the USA), and if the Whites succeeded, it would be the Entente that would become the arbiter on border issues between Poland and “white” Russia. And Pilsudski would have had to make concessions - Paris, London and Washington, the winners in the First World War, having become the arbiters of the fate of Europe at that time, had already determined the so-called Curzon Line, the future border between the restored Poland and Russian territories. Lord Curzon, head of the British Foreign Office, drew this line along the ethnic border between Catholic Poles, Uniate Galicians and Orthodox Belarusians.
Pilsudski understood that in the event of the capture of Moscow by the Whites and negotiations under the patronage of the Entente, he would have to cede to Denikin part of the occupied lands in Belarus and Ukraine. The Bolsheviks were outcasts for the Entente. The Polish nationalist Pilsudski decided to wait until the Red Russians pushed the White Russians back to the outskirts (so that the White Guards would lose influence and no longer compete with the Poles in the eyes of the Entente), and then start a war against the Bolsheviks with the full support of the leading Western states. It was this option that promised the Polish nationalists the maximum bonuses in case of victory - the capture of vast Russian territories, up to the restoration of the Commonwealth from the Baltic to the Black Sea!
While the former tsarist generals Denikin and Karnitsky were wasting time on polite and fruitless negotiations in Taganrog, on November 3, 1919, a secret meeting took place between representatives of Pilsudski and Soviet Moscow. The Bolsheviks managed to find the right person for these negotiations - the Polish revolutionary Julian Markhlevsky, who had known Pilsudski since the time of the anti-tsarist uprisings of 1905.
At the insistence of the Polish side, no written agreements were concluded with the Bolsheviks, but Piłsudski agreed to stop the advance of his armies to the east. Secrecy became the main condition of this oral agreement between the two states - the fact of Warsaw's agreement with the Bolsheviks was carefully hidden from Denikin, and mainly from England, France and the United States, which provided political and military support to Poland.
Polish troops continued local battles and skirmishes with the Bolsheviks, but Piłsudski's main forces remained motionless. The Soviet-Polish war froze for several months. The Bolsheviks, knowing that in the near future there was no need to fear a Polish attack on Smolensk, almost all their forces and reserves were transferred against Denikin. By December 1919, the White armies were defeated by the Reds, and the Polish embassy of General Karnitsky left the headquarters of General Denikin. On the territory of Ukraine, the Poles took advantage of the retreat of the White troops and occupied a number of cities.
Polish trenches in Belarus during the battle on the Neman. Photo: istoria.md
It was the position of Poland that predetermined the strategic defeat of the Whites in the Russian Civil War. This was directly recognized by one of the best red commanders of those years, Tukhachevsky: “Denikin’s offensive against Moscow, supported by the Polish offensive from the west, could have ended much worse for us, and it’s hard to even predict the final results ...”.
Piłsudski's offensive
Both the Bolsheviks and the Poles understood that the informal truce in the autumn of 1919 was a temporary phenomenon. After the defeat of Denikin's troops, it was Pilsudski who became for the Entente the main and only force capable of resisting "Red Moscow" in Eastern Europe. The Polish dictator skillfully took advantage of this circumstance by bargaining large military aid from the West.
In the spring of 1920, France alone supplied Poland with 1,494 guns, 2,800 machine guns, 385,000 rifles, about 700 aircraft, 200 armored vehicles, 576 million rounds of ammunition and 10 million shells. At the same time, many thousands of machine guns, over 200 armored vehicles and tanks, more than 300 aircraft, 3 million sets of uniforms, 4 million pairs of soldiers' shoes, a large amount of medicines, field communications and other military equipment were delivered to Poland by American ships from the USA.
By April 1920, the Polish troops on the borders with Soviet Russia consisted of six separate armies, fully manned and well-armed. The Poles had a particularly serious advantage in the number of machine guns and artillery pieces, and Pilsudski's army absolutely outnumbered the Reds in aviation and armored vehicles.
Having waited for the final defeat of Denikin and thus becoming the main ally of the Entente in Eastern Europe, Pilsudski decided to continue the Soviet-Polish war. Relying on weapons generously supplied by the West, he hoped to quickly defeat the main forces of the Red Army, weakened by long battles with the Whites, and force Moscow to cede all the lands of Ukraine and Belarus to Poland. Since the defeated Whites were no longer a serious political force, Pilsudski had no doubt that the Entente would prefer to give these vast Russian territories under the control of the allied Warsaw, rather than see them under the rule of the Bolsheviks.
On April 17, 1920, the Polish "Head of State" approved the plan to capture Kyiv. And on April 25, Pilsudski's troops launched a general offensive on Soviet territory.
This time, the Poles did not drag out the negotiations and quickly concluded a military-political alliance against the Bolsheviks, both with the whites who remained in the Crimea, and with the Ukrainian nationalists of Petliura. Indeed, in the new conditions of 1920, it was Warsaw that was the main force in such alliances.
The head of the Whites in the Crimea, General Wrangel, bluntly stated that Poland now has the most powerful army in Eastern Europe (at that time 740,000 soldiers) and it is necessary to create a "Slavic front" against the Bolsheviks. An official representative office of the White Crimea was opened in Warsaw, and the so-called 3rd Russian Army began to form on the territory of Poland itself (the first two armies were in Crimea), which was created by the former revolutionary terrorist Boris Savinkov, who knew Pilsudski from the pre-revolutionary underground.
The fighting was carried out on a huge front from the Baltic to Romania. The main forces of the Red Army were still in the North Caucasus and Siberia, where they finished off the remnants of the White armies. The rear of the Soviet troops was also weakened by peasant uprisings against the policy of "war communism".
On May 7, 1920, the Poles occupied Kyiv - this was already the 17th change of power in the city in the last three years. The first blow of the Poles was successful, they captured tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers and created an extensive bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper for further offensive.
Tukhachevsky's counteroffensive
But the Soviet government was able to quickly transfer reserves to the Polish front. At the same time, the Bolsheviks skillfully used patriotic sentiments in Russian society. If the defeated Whites agreed to a forced alliance with Pilsudski, then the broad sections of the Russian population perceived the invasion of the Poles and the capture of Kyiv as external aggression.
Sending mobilized communists to the front against the White Poles. Petrograd, 1920. Reproduction. Photo: RIA
These national sentiments were reflected in the famous appeal of the hero of the First World War, General Brusilov, "To all former officers, wherever they may be," which appeared on May 30, 1920. By no means sympathetic to the Bolsheviks, Brusilov declared to the whole of Russia: "As long as the Red Army does not let the Poles into Russia, the Bolsheviks and I are on the way."
On June 2, 1920, the Soviet government issued a decree "On the release from liability of all White Guard officers who will help in the war with Poland." As a result, thousands of Russian people volunteered to join the Red Army and went to fight on the Polish front.
The Soviet government was able to quickly transfer reserves to the Ukraine and Belarus. In the Kiev direction, the cavalry army of Budyonny became the main striking force of the counteroffensive, and in Belarus divisions liberated after the defeat of the white troops of Kolchak and Yudenich went into battle against the Poles.
Piłsudski's headquarters did not expect that the Bolsheviks would be able to concentrate their troops so quickly. Therefore, despite the superiority of the enemy in technology, the Red Army again occupied Kyiv in June 1920, and Minsk and Vilnius in July. The uprisings of Belarusians in the Polish rear contributed to the Soviet offensive.
Piłsudski's troops were on the verge of defeat, which worried the Western patrons of Warsaw. First, a note from the British Foreign Office came out with a proposal for a truce, then the Polish ministers themselves turned to Moscow with a request for peace.
But here the sense of proportion betrayed the Bolshevik leaders. The success of the counter-offensive against Polish aggression gave rise among them to hope for proletarian uprisings in Europe and the victory of the world revolution. Leon Trotsky then bluntly offered to "probe the revolutionary situation in Europe with the Red Army bayonet."
The Soviet troops, despite losses and devastation in the rear, continued their decisive offensive with the last of their strength, trying to take Lvov and Warsaw in August 1920. The situation in Western Europe was then extremely difficult; after a devastating world war, all states, without exception, were shaken by revolutionary uprisings. In Germany and Hungary, local communists then quite realistically claimed power, and the appearance in the center of Europe of the victorious Red Army of Lenin and Trotsky could really change the entire geopolitical alignment.
As Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who commanded the Soviet offensive against Warsaw, later wrote: “There is no doubt that if we had won a victory on the Vistula, the revolution would have engulfed the entire European continent in flames.”
"Miracle on the Vistula"
In anticipation of victory, the Bolsheviks had already created their own Polish government - the "Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland", which was headed by communist Poles Felix Dzerzhinsky and Julian Marchlewski (the one who negotiated an armistice with Pilsudski at the end of 1919). The famous cartoonist Boris Efimov has already prepared for the Soviet newspapers a poster "Warsaw taken by the Red Heroes."
Meanwhile, the West stepped up its military support for Poland. The actual commander of the Polish army was the French General Weygand, head of the Anglo-French military mission in Warsaw. Several hundred French officers with extensive experience in World War II became advisers in the Polish army, creating, in particular, a radio intelligence service, which by August 1920 had established the interception and decoding of Soviet radio communications.
On the side of the Poles, an American aviation squadron, financed and manned by pilots from the United States, actively fought. In the summer of 1920, the Americans successfully bombed Budyonny's advancing cavalry.
The Soviet troops that made their way to Warsaw and Lvov, despite the successful offensive, found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. They were hundreds of kilometers away from the supply bases, due to the devastation in the rear, they were not able to deliver replenishment and supplies on time. On the eve of the decisive battles for the Polish capital, many red regiments were reduced to 150-200 fighters, artillery lacked ammunition, and the few serviceable aircraft could not provide reliable reconnaissance and detect the concentration of Polish reserves.
But the Soviet command underestimated not only the purely military problems of the "campaign to the Vistula", but also the national moods of the Poles. Just as in Russia during the Polish invasion there was a reciprocal surge of Russian patriotism, so in Poland, when the Red troops reached Warsaw, a national upsurge began. This was facilitated by active Russophobic propaganda, which represented the advancing Red troops in the form of Asian barbarians (although the Poles themselves in that war were extremely far from humanism).
Polish volunteers in Lvov. Photo: althistory.wikia.com
The result of all these reasons was the successful counteroffensive of the Poles, launched in the second half of August 1920. In Polish history, these events are called unusually pathetic - "The Miracle on the Vistula." Indeed, this is the only major victory for Polish weapons in the last 300 years.
Peaceful Riga Peace
The actions of the White troops of Wrangel also contributed to the weakening of the Soviet troops near Warsaw. In the summer of 1920, the Whites just launched their last offensive from the territory of the Crimea, capturing a vast territory between the Dnieper and the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov and diverting the Red reserves. Then the Bolsheviks, in order to free part of the forces and secure the rear from peasant uprisings, even had to make an alliance with the anarchists of Nestor Makhno.
If in the autumn of 1919 Pilsudski's policy predetermined the defeat of the Whites in the attack on Moscow, then in the summer of 1920 it was Wrangel's strike that predetermined the defeat of the Reds in the attack on the Polish capital. As the former tsarist general and military theorist Svechin wrote: “In the end, it was not Pilsudski who won the Warsaw operation, but Wrangel.”
The Soviet troops defeated near Warsaw were partially captured, and partially retreated to the German territory of East Prussia. Near Warsaw alone, 60,000 Russians were captured, and in total, more than 100,000 people ended up in Polish prison camps. Of these, at least 70 thousand died in less than a year - this clearly characterizes the monstrous regime that the Polish authorities established for the prisoners, anticipating the Nazi concentration camps.
The fighting continued until October 1920. If during the summer the Red troops fought more than 600 km to the west, then in August-September the front again rolled back more than 300 km to the east. The Bolsheviks could still gather new forces against the Poles, but they chose not to risk it - they were increasingly distracted by the peasant uprisings that flared up throughout the country.
Pilsudski, after a costly success near Warsaw, also did not have sufficient forces for a new offensive against Minsk and Kyiv. Therefore, peace negotiations began in Riga, which stopped the Soviet-Polish war. The final peace treaty was signed only on March 19, 1921. Initially, the Poles demanded monetary compensation of 300 million royal gold rubles from Soviet Russia, but during the negotiations they had to cut their appetites exactly 10 times.
As a result of the war, the plans of neither Moscow nor Warsaw were realized. The Bolsheviks failed to create Soviet Poland, and Pilsudski's nationalists failed to recreate the ancient borders of the Commonwealth, which included all Belarusian and Ukrainian lands (Pilsudski's most zealous supporters even insisted on the "return" of Smolensk). However, the Poles returned the western lands of Ukraine and Belarus under their rule for a long time. Until 1939, the Soviet-Polish border was only 30 km west of Minsk and was never peaceful.
In fact, the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 largely laid the foundation for the problems that "shot" in September 1939, contributing to the outbreak of World War II.
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Relations between Russia and Poland have always been difficult: this is confirmed by the Poles' campaign against Moscow in 1612, the three divisions of the Commonwealth in the 18th century, and numerous Polish uprisings against Russia. At the beginning of the 20th century, another aggravation of relations between the two peoples happened, this conflict became fatal for the whole of Europe.
The war between Poland and Soviet Russia lasted from 1919 to 1921 and can be called part of the civil war that was raging in Russia at that time. The fighting took place on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus and Poland. Poland, under the leadership of Pilsudski, sought to regain the lands of Ukraine and Belarus, which were part of the Commonwealth until the beginning of all partitions of the country in the 18th century, and the Bolsheviks wanted to spread communist ideology to other countries.
Start of hostilities
On November 11, 1918, the Compiègne armistice was signed, German troops began to leave the occupied territories in eastern Europe. They were replaced by local governments or political forces backed by communist Moscow.
Following the outgoing troops of Germany, the Red Army moved, on December 10 Minsk was occupied. Belarusian and Lithuanian Poles organized the "Committee for the Defense of the Eastern Outskirts" (KZVO). The Bolsheviks proclaimed the Byelorussian Soviet Republic, and the units of the KZVO occupied Vilnius, but were soon driven out of there. At this stage, the Polish army could not help the KZVO in any way: German troops were still in the western regions and a conflict with the Czechs began. But soon the situation changed and the Polish army moved east. On February 4, Kovel was occupied, followed by Brest. At the same moment, Poland invaded the territory of Western Ukraine.
At the end of February, the offensive of the Polish army began in Belarus. By the beginning of April, the Poles had taken Lida, Vilna, and Baranovichi. In August, Minsk and Bobruisk were occupied. At this very time, part of Galicia was occupied by the Poles and the ZUNR was liquidated.
The Bolsheviks were not able to send enough reserves to the Polish front, because at that time Denikin's army launched a powerful offensive against Moscow.
diplomatic front
The Entente countries provided assistance to the Poles, however, its excessive strengthening was not part of their plans. At the end of 1919, the Declaration on the Eastern Border of Poland (Curzon Line) was issued. According to this Declaration, the lands where the Poles lived were to go to Poland. But at that time the Polish army was much east of this line, and was not going to retreat.
At this very time, negotiations were taking place with Denikin, which ended in nothing. At the negotiations with the Bolsheviks, an exchange of prisoners was discussed, the Soviet side demanded a referendum in Belarus on the future of the country, and the Poles wanted an end to hostilities between Russia and the UNR.
Thanks to the cessation of hostilities in Belarus, the Soviet side was able to send part of its forces against Denikin. Piłsudski had an extremely low estimate of the strength of both the Red Army and the Volunteer Army, and in conversations with diplomats he claimed that Polish troops would soon enter Moscow.
At the beginning of 1920, a new Polish offensive began. Dvinsk, Mozyr and Kalinkovichi were occupied. But the most successful was the offensive of the Polish forces in Ukraine, where they had a significant advantage over the Red Army. In May, Polish troops entered Kyiv and crossed the Dnieper.
counteroffensive
In Belarus, the offensive of the Soviet troops under the leadership of Tukhachevsky began, but it did not bring any special results and quickly bogged down. The Red Army suffered heavy losses. The situation on the Southwestern Front was different. The Bolsheviks transferred fresh forces here (the 1st Cavalry Army of Budyonny) and managed to break through the Polish front. To avoid encirclement, the Polish troops withdrew to Rovno. At the same moment, the big offensive of the Red Army in Belarus began. He was successful: Minsk, Bobruisk, Bialystok were captured. The Red Army entered the original Polish lands. The Soviet government of Poland was formed.
Battle of Warsaw
The Red Army reached the border and stopped for a while. Many consider this a big mistake, because at that time the Polish army practically did not exist. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Western countries almost stopped sending aid to the Poles.
The Bolsheviks hoped for an uprising of workers and peasants in Poland, but it did not happen. On August 12, units of the Red Army under the command of Tukhachevsky went on the offensive against the Polish capital. The forces of both sides were approximately equal. The Red Army managed to occupy the first line of defense and capture several cities near the Polish capital. At this time, a plan was being prepared for the Polish counteroffensive.
A sudden blow to the Soviet troops was dealt from the southeast. At the same time, Polish troops delivered two more blows. Tukhachevsky's troops were greatly stretched, their flanks were bare. A real threat of encirclement hung in front of the strike force of the Red Army. The Soviet command sent Budyonny's cavalry army to help Tukhachevsky, but it was too late. Budyonny moved to help the troops of the western front, but he could not break through to them. In the battle for Warsaw, the Bolsheviks suffered serious losses: 25 thousand people were killed, 60 thousand soldiers were captured, thousands were missing.
Final stage of the war
After the Warsaw battle, hostilities began again in Belarus. Polish troops were successful. Molodechno, Lida, Minsk, Grodno were occupied. The Bolsheviks suffered significant losses. In August 1920, peace negotiations began. Russia agreed to establish the eastern borders of Poland along the Curzon line, but demanded a significant reduction in the Polish army. A truce was concluded in Riga on 12 October.
The peace agreement between Poland and Soviet Russia was signed on March 18, 1921, in Riga. This was the end of the war. The Polish border was drawn much east of the Curzon line, the question of reducing the composition of the Polish army was removed.
In this war, the Poles practically defended Europe from the Bolshevik invasion. If the Red Army had reached Germany, the history of the continent would have been completely different.
August 15, 1920 entered the history of Poland as an event that brought independence to the country. It was on this day that the “Miracle on the Vistula” took place, which put an end to the Soviet-Polish bloodshed.
On this day, Poland annually celebrates the holiday of the Polish Army, who performed a true feat and defended their native land, trampled down by the Bolshevik boot.
The deputy editor-in-chief of the Tsargrad TV channel, historian Mikhail Smolin.
It's defeat in igniting world revolution
- Why is not so much in the Soviet and post-Soviet historiography and history devoted to this event?
Of course, Soviet historiography had nothing to be proud of, since the events of the Soviet-Polish war are the defeat of the Soviet Red Army and, in fact, are not only a defeat in the war with Poland, but a defeat in fomenting a world revolution.
The campaign was carried out to Berlin, and Warsaw was an intermediate stage in the movement of the Red Army - in fact, the very direction of Tukhachevsky's strikes in 1920 suggests that Warsaw was not the main prize in these operations. And this double desire to defeat the Poles and head for Berlin partly played such a deplorable role. The blows were dispersed, there was no powerful blow to Warsaw, and it seems to me that in reality there were absolutely not enough forces to defeat the Polish army.
- Who was the main ideologist of this event?
You know, according to the memoirs, one gets the impression that the ideologist of this operation (namely, the campaign in Europe) was, after all, Lenin. Trotsky frankly writes about this: Lenin formed a clear position that it was necessary to transfer the revolutionary wars towards Germany. There was a great hope that it was Germany, the most advanced working-class country, and that the proletariat would support the Russian revolution there, it should be helped by such a military campaign against Berlin.
But since by that time a certain Polish statehood had already been created, then, naturally, Warsaw-Pilsudski with his troops became an obstacle to the world revolution. And the Soviet-Polish war, in general, happened quite by accident - if the Entente had not been able to help Pilsudski in organizing the Polish state, such a war would not have happened. The Red Army would have marched to Berlin more victoriously and faster, without stopping at some kind of confrontation with the Polish troops (it must be said, rather hastily assembled by French instructors).
- And what can be said about the Soviet army?
If we talk about the commanding staff, then in fact all the commanders of the fronts and armies are the Russian imperial army, which went over to serve in the Red Army. Maybe the only non-commissioned officer there was Budyonny, who commanded the First Cavalry Army.
Perhaps for him this is also the saddest page in his biography. Because, firstly, the First Cavalry Army in 1920 did not play the decisive role that everyone was counting on, and on the other hand, it actually suffered a defeat, being surrounded after the fall of the Soviet front as a result of the Polish offensive. The first cavalry army had to be assembled, even some units had to be repressed due to the fact that they turned into the Makhnovshchina in the stage of retreat.
- How did it happen that armies disproportionate in size clashed, and the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, in fact, rolled back?
You know, firstly, after all, the task was not to deal with the destruction of Polish units, the general goal was to move on. On the other hand, Tukhachevsky tried to repeat the situation that was characteristic of the Polish uprising of 1830-1831. He wanted to repeat Paskevich's maneuver, to enter Warsaw from the west, and thereby force Warsaw itself to surrender. But since Tukhachevsky was not Field Marshal Paskevich, such a complex maneuver in that situation, and even with the Red Army, failed, and he could not achieve results. Moreover, the Poles opened the military cipher and listened to all the negotiations, knew about all the movements of the Red Army.
At the same time, the situation when, on the southwestern front, Stalin, together with the commander of this front, did not put the First Cavalry Army at the disposal of Tukhachevsky, also played a big role.
The negotiations were also unique, Tukhachevsky demanded that the commander-in-chief Kamenev hand over the First Cavalry to him. Kamenev spoke with Yegorov, the commander of the southwestern front, Stalin put pressure on Yegorov, preventing the implementation of this plan, everyone began to talk in turn with Lenin. Lenin said: "Guys, let's figure it out for yourself, just don't swear among yourselves." And it is clear that in the situation of such negotiations, no successful military actions were simply impossible.
The Red Army in 1920 is not the same as in 1945
- In the mass consciousness, after all, the Red Army is the army of the winner in a much more serious confrontation in the Great Patriotic War. And then such an unfortunate defeat. What is the difference - war is not just a mechanical and physical process. Is this something like metaphysics?
Certainly. I think that the Red Army as of 1920 was not the army that entered Berlin in 1945. These were less disciplined units, subjected to three years of revolutionary influence. The attitude towards his commanders was very peculiar - there were disputes all the time, I wanted to make a world revolution myself, and Tukhachevsky waged war in the style of Bonaparte, when he did not conform to any other opinions, and demanded reinforcements only for himself, believing that only he could carry out some military victories on this front.
This defeat against Poland was not the only one in those years. Lenin then already twice tried to fight with Finland, where the White Finns won, twice he lost to Finland, and the corresponding peace treaty with Finland strengthened this position. Two (also rather shameful) peace treaties were concluded with Latvia and Estonia. All the territorial disputes with Estonia that we have today are from that era.
- We must also thank Lenin ...
Yes, you can thank Vladimir Ilyich. Because at first he let everyone go, and literally a few months later he decided to try to take everything back by force. When he saw that the Bolshevik forces do not come to power, and the Soviet power is not established by itself only by the fact that it is correct. It turned out that neither the Estonian, nor the Latvian, nor the Finnish peoples are striving to repeat such a Soviet experiment of red Russia.
Therefore, the Soviet-Polish war is no exception, and the defeat in it during these years was backed up by several other negative aspects, including, of course, the Brest Peace should be remembered.
- It means a lot from the personality of a military leader, a person who is directly at the front with his soldiers. Tukhachevsky - what kind of person was he?
It seems to me that this was partly a military adventurer who was interested in a quick military career. Of course, he had a military streak, of course, he was an untalented military specialist. But one must understand that in those years the Red Army was the presence of a huge number of political leaders who all the time did not give the military experts full initiative to act. The situation with the southwestern front, when Stalin did not allow Yegorov, who was advancing from the southwest to Lvov and from the south to Warsaw, to deploy his forces and at the same time did not allow him to transfer the First Cavalry to the Tukhachevsky front. Here, the political attitudes of the Soviet leaders played a significant role: they strongly interfered in the course of hostilities, interfered with military specialists, who, in principle, were good specialists.
- There are a huge number of myths about Tukhachevsky, on the one hand, he is almost a pagan, esoteric and a member of secret societies, on the other hand, he is an extremely cruel person, it is worth remembering how he poisoned his own people with gas ...
Yes, I think that there is no need to whitewash these people in terms of human qualities. Of course, people who went to serve the communist government and went a long way in the hierarchy of the Soviet country, of course, were heavily smeared in various Soviet events, in suppressing uprisings. Including the Tambov uprising, when chemical weapons were used (by the way, even Hitler did not dare to use them during World War II).
Therefore, the personal qualities of Soviet military leaders are very peculiar. Here I recall the situation when the same Yegorov I mentioned was later drowned by Zhukov, who recalled that he heard back in 1917 how Yegorov spoke badly about Lenin at some rally. And this, imagine, 20 years after the revolution, Zhukov recalls in his memorandum against Yegorov, who was later shot.
I must say that all the more or less noticeable participants in the Soviet-Polish war from the Soviet side were subsequently repressed. The only one left is Budyonny, of course.
- Like a symbol.
- 25 years have passed, the Red Army enters Berlin, remains with the largest number of tanks and the most powerful army in the world - what has happened in these 25 years?
If we understand the question in terms of why we succeeded in 1945, then we first need to remember 1941, when a huge number of people finally realized that for them this war was a choice between life and death. Not when the Germans crossed the border, but when we realized that the Germans were already in the interior of Russia, when they were already on the Volga, near Moscow and near Leningrad. Then a huge people - Russians - turned on historical psychological moments when the nation feels a mortal danger for itself, and when everyone is included in the common defense. The year 1945 is the result of this sense of extreme danger to the national existence.
Actually, the losses that we suffered during this war indicate that the population was ready to pay such a sacrifice in order to get rid of this danger. And the danger itself was of such dimensions, and its feeling was so vivid that they were ready to carry out these strange measures of the Soviet government, which led to huge losses, including at the front.
