"World Order" by Henry Kissinger. Kissinger: In the new "world order" of the United States, Russia does not exist

Dedicated to Nancy

Copyright © 2014 Henry A. Kissinger

© Translation. V. Zhelninov, 2015

© Translation. A. Milyukov, 2015

© Russian edition AST Publishers, 2015

Introduction
What is "world order"?

In 1961, as a young scientist, I spoke at a conference in Kansas City and remembered President Harry S. Truman. Asked what achievements of his presidency he is most proud of, Truman replied: “The fact that we completely and completely defeated our enemies, and then returned them back to the community of nations. I like to think that only America has managed something like this.” Realizing America's great power, Truman was proud, first of all, of American humanism and adherence to democratic values. He wanted to be remembered not so much as the president of a victorious country, but as the head of state who reconciled enemies.

All of Truman's successors, to one degree or another, followed his convictions as reflected in this story, and similarly took pride in the above-named elements of the American idea. I note that for many years the community of nations, which they supported in every possible way, existed within the framework of the "American consensus" - states cooperated, steadily expanding the ranks of this world order, observing common rules and norms, developing a liberal economy, refusing territorial conquest in favor of respect national sovereignties and adopting a representative democratic system of government. American presidents, regardless of their party affiliation, have strongly urged other governments, often with great fervor and eloquence, to ensure respect for human rights and the progressive development of civil society. In many cases, the support of these values by the United States and its allies led to significant transformations in the status of the population of a particular state.

However, today this "rule-based" system is having problems. Frequent exhortations addressed to other countries, calls to "make a feasible contribution", to play "by the rules of the twenty-first century" and to be "responsible participants in the process" within the framework of a common coordinate system clearly show that there is no common idea about this system, a common for all understanding of "feasible contribution" or "justice". Outside the Western world, those regions that have had minimal involvement in the development of the current rules are questioning the effectiveness of these rules in their current formulation and are clearly demonstrating a willingness to make every effort to change the said rules. Thus, the "international community", which is called upon perhaps more insistently today than in any other era, is unable to agree - or even agree - on an unambiguous and consistent set of goals, methods and limits.

We live in a historical period in which there is a persistent, at times almost desperate pursuit of a concept of world order that eludes common understanding.

Chaos threatens us, and at the same time, an unprecedented interdependence is emerging: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disintegration of former states, the consequences of predatory attitudes towards the environment, the persistence of the practice of genocide, unfortunately, and the rapid introduction of new technologies threaten to exacerbate familiar conflicts, exacerbate them to the point of beyond human capabilities and the limits of reason. New ways of processing and transmitting information are uniting regions like never before, projecting local events onto the global level - but in such a way that they prevent their full understanding, while at the same time demanding from state leaders an instant reaction, at least in the form of slogans. Are we entering a new period in which the future will be determined by forces that recognize neither limits nor any order at all?

Varieties of world order

Let's not dissemble: a truly global "world order" has never existed. What is now recognized as such was formed in Western Europe almost four centuries ago, its foundations were formulated in peace negotiations in the German region of Westphalia, and without the participation - or even attention - of most countries on other continents and most other civilizations. A century of religious strife and political upheaval in Central Europe culminated in the Thirty Years' War of 1618–1648; it was a "global" fire, in which political and religious contradictions were mixed; during the course of the war, the combatants resorted to "total war" 1
The Westphalian peace treaty was signed in the middle of the 17th century, and the concept of total war was developed by German military theorists at the beginning of the 20th century; this concept proceeded from the fact that modern war has ceased to be a battle of armies and has become a battle of nations - one state, mobilizing all available resources, defeats another, crushing its "spirit". ( Note. transl.)

Against key settlements, and as a result, Central Europe lost almost a quarter of its population - due to fighting, disease and hunger. The exhausted opponents met in Westphalia to agree on a set of measures designed to stop the bloodshed. Religious unity cracked due to the establishment and spread of Protestantism; political diversity was a logical consequence of the multiplicity of independent political units that participated in the war. As a result, it turned out that Europe was the first to perceive the familiar conditions of the modern world: a variety of political units, none of which is powerful enough to defeat all the others; adherence to conflicting principles, ideologies and internal practices, and all strive to find some kind of "neutral" rules that regulate behavior and mitigate conflicts.

The Peace of Westphalia should be interpreted as a practical approximation to reality, it does not at all demonstrate any unique moral awareness. This peace rests on the coexistence of independent states that refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs and weigh their own and others' ambitions against the principle of a general balance of power. No individual claim to the possession of truth, no universal rule, has succeeded in establishing itself in Europe. Instead, each state acquired sovereign power over its territory. Each agreed to recognize the internal structures and religious beliefs of its neighbors as realities of life and refrained from challenging their status. Such a balance of power was now seen as natural and desirable, and therefore the ambitions of the rulers acted as a counterbalance to each other, at least in theory, limiting the scope of conflicts. Separation and diversity (largely accidental in the development of European history) became the hallmarks of a new system of international order - with its own worldview, its own philosophy. In this sense, the efforts of Europeans to extinguish their "world" fire contributed to the formation and served as a prototype of the modern approach, when absolute judgments are renounced in favor of practicality and ecumenism. 2
Ecumenism is unity in diversity, the principle of coexistence of various Christian churches. In this case, instead of the author's term, it would be more logical to use the definition of "multiculturalism". ( Note. translation.)

; it is an attempt to build order on diversity and containment.

The seventeenth-century negotiators who drafted the terms of the Peace of Westphalia did not, of course, assume that they were laying the foundations of a global system that would extend far beyond Europe. They did not even try to involve neighboring Russia in this process, which at that time was establishing its own new order after the hardships of the Time of Troubles, moreover, it was elevating into law principles that were radically different from the Westphalian balance of power: absolute monarchy, a single state religion - Orthodoxy and territorial expansion in all directions. However, other major centers of power did not perceive the Westphalian agreements (as far as they were generally aware of these agreements) as related to their territories and possessions.

The idea of a world order was realized in the geographical space known to the statesmen of that time; this approach is regularly implemented in many regions. This is largely due to the fact that the then dominant technologies did not in any way contribute to the creation of a single global system - the very idea of the latter seemed impermissible. Lacking the means to interact with each other on a permanent basis, lacking the ability to adequately assess the "temperature of power" of European regions, each sovereign unit interpreted its own order as unique, and regarded all others as "barbarians" - who are controlled in a manner unacceptable to the existing order and therefore regarded as a potential threat. Each sovereign unit considered its own order as an ideal template for the social organization of mankind as a whole, imagining that it ordered the world in its way of governing.

At the opposite end of the Eurasian continent, China has created its own, hierarchical and theoretically universal, concept of order - with itself at its center. The Chinese system developed over millennia, existed already when the Roman Empire ruled Europe as a whole, relying not on the equality of sovereign states, but on the supposed limitlessness of the claims of the emperor. In the Chinese conception, the concept of sovereignty in the European sense was absent, since the emperor ruled over "the entire Celestial Empire." It was the pinnacle of a political and cultural hierarchy, streamlined and universal, which spread from the center of the world, which was the Chinese capital, outward to the rest of humanity. The peoples surrounding China were classified according to the degree of barbarism, including on the basis of their dependence on Chinese writing and cultural achievements (this cosmography has successfully survived into the modern era). China, from the Chinese point of view, should rule the world, first of all, arousing the awe of other societies with its cultural splendor and economic abundance, and involve these other societies in relations that, if properly managed, can lead to the goal of achieving “celestial harmony”.

Islam has become the dominant religion in the Middle East, North Africa, many areas of Asia and parts of Europe. The Islamic version of the universal order provided for the spread of the true faith to the entire "territory of war" 4
"Territory of war" (Dar-al-harb) - in Islamic theology of the land where the majority of the population are infidels, non-Muslims and hostile to it. "Territory of war" is opposed to Dar al-Islam - "territory of Islam"; between them is Dar-as-sulh - the "territory of a truce", where they do not believe in Allah, but Muslims are not persecuted. Neither in the Koran, nor in the hadiths (sayings) of the Prophet about such a division of the world is not mentioned; it is believed that theologians of the 13th-14th centuries introduced this concept into circulation. ( Note. transl.)

How Muslims called the lands inhabited by infidels; the world is destined to become united and find harmony, heeding the word of the prophet Muhammad. While Europe was building its multi-state order, the Ottoman Empire, with Turkey as its mother country, revived this claim to sole "divinely inspired" rule and extended its power to the Arab lands, the Mediterranean basin, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. She, of course, paid attention to the emerging interstate Europe, but did not at all consider that she was observing a model to follow: the Ottomans saw the European agreements as an incentive for further Ottoman expansion to the west. As Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror put it when admonishing the Italian city-states, this early example of multipolarity in the fifteenth century: “You are twenty cities ... You are always bickering among yourselves ... There must be one empire, one faith, one power in the whole world.”

Meanwhile, on the opposite coast of the Atlantic Ocean from Europe, in the New World, the foundations of a different idea of the world order were being laid. Seventeenth-century Europe was engulfed in political and religious conflicts, and Puritan migrants expressed their determined intention to "carry out God's plan" and implement it in the "remote wilderness" in order to free themselves from the observance of the established (and, in their opinion, "unsuitable") power structure. There they intended to build, to quote Governor John Winthrop, who preached in 1630 aboard a ship bound for the Massachusetts settlement, "a city upon a hill," inspiring the world by the justice of his principles and the strength of his example. In the American vision of world order, peace and balance of power are achieved naturally, ancient strife and enmity must be left in the past - as soon as other peoples learn the same principles of government as the Americans. The task of foreign policy, then, is not so much to defend purely American interests as to spread general principles. Over time, the United States has become the main defender of the order that Europe has formulated. However, while the United States lends its credibility to European efforts, there is a certain ambivalence in perception, as the American vision is based not on the adoption of a European system of balanced power, but on the achievement of peace through the spread of democratic principles.

Among all the above concepts, the principles of the Peace of Westphalia are considered - within the framework of this book - as the only generally accepted basis of what can be defined as the existing world order. The Westphalian system has spread throughout the world as a "framework" of the interstate and international order, covering various civilizations and regions, since the Europeans, expanding the boundaries of their possessions, everywhere imposed their own ideas about international relations. They often "forgot" about the concept of sovereignty in relation to the colonies and colonized peoples, but when these peoples began to demand independence, their demands were based precisely on the Westphalian concept. National independence, sovereign statehood, national interests and non-interference in the affairs of others - all these principles proved to be effective arguments in disputes with the colonialists, both in the course of the struggle for liberation and in the defense of the newly formed states.

The modern, now global Westphalian system - which today is commonly called the world community - seeks to "ennoble" the anarchic essence of the world with the help of an extensive network of international legal and organizational structures designed to promote open trade and the functioning of a stable international financial system, to establish common principles for settling international disputes and limit the scope of wars when they do occur. This interstate system now covers all cultures and regions. Its institutions provide a neutral framework for the interaction of different societies - largely independent of the values professed in particular societies.

At the same time, the Westphalian principles are challenged from all sides, sometimes, surprisingly, in the name of world order. Europe intends to move away from the system of interstate relations, which it designed itself, and henceforth adhere to the concept of united sovereignty 5
This refers to the transfer of a significant part of the powers of state power in a sovereign nation-state to a supranational structure, in this case, to the European Union. ( Note. transl.)

Ironically, Europe, which came up with the concept of the balance of power, now consciously and substantially limits the power of its new institutions. Having reduced its own military power, it has practically lost the ability to adequately respond to the violation of these universalist norms.

In the Middle East, jihadists of both Sunnis and Shiites continue to divide societies and dismantle nation-states in pursuit of a global revolution based on fundamentalist versions of the Muslim religion. The very concept of the state, along with the regional system of relations based on it, is now in danger, it is attacked by ideologies that reject the restrictions imposed by the state as illegal, and terrorist groups, which in a number of countries are stronger than the armed forces of the government.

Asia, some of the most astonishing successes among the regions that have adopted the concept of sovereign statehood, is still nostalgic for alternative principles and provides the world with numerous examples of regional rivalries and historical claims of the kind that undermined the European order a hundred years ago. Almost every country considers itself a "young dragon", provoking divisions to the point of open confrontation.

The United States alternates between defending the Westphalian system and criticizing its founding principles of the balance of power and non-intervention in internal affairs as immoral and outdated—sometimes doing both at the same time. The United States continues to consider its values, which should be the basis of the world order, universally demanded, and reserves the right to support them on a global scale. Yet after three wars over two generations—each war beginning with idealistic aspirations and widespread public approval and ending in national trauma—America today is trying to balance its (still apparent) power with nation-building principles.

All the major centers of power on the planet use elements of the Westphalian order to some extent, but none considers themselves a "born" champion of this system. All of these centers are undergoing significant internal changes. Are regions with such diverse cultures, histories, and traditional theories of world order capable of accepting some kind of global system as law?

Success in achieving such a goal requires an approach that respects both the diversity of human traditions and the inherent desire for freedom in human nature. It is in this sense that one can speak of a world order, but it cannot be imposed. This is especially true in an age of instant communication and revolutionary political change. Any world order, in order to be viable, must be perceived as just - not only by leaders, but also by ordinary citizens. It must reflect two truths: order without freedom, even approved at first, in a fit of exaltation, ultimately gives rise to its own opposite; however, freedom cannot be secured and secured without a "framework" of order designed to help keep the peace. Order and freedom, sometimes treated as opposite poles of the scale of human experience, should be seen as interdependent entities. Are today's leaders able to rise above the immediate concerns of the day to find such a balance?

Legitimacy and power

The answer to these questions must take into account the three levels of the concept of public order. The world order implies the state of a particular region or civilization within which a set of just agreements operates and there is a distribution of power that is considered applicable to the world as a whole. The international order is the practical application of this system of views to a large part of the globe, and the area of coverage must be large enough to affect the global balance of power. Finally, the regional order is based on the same principles applied in a particular geographical area.

Any of the above levels of order is based on two components - a set of generally accepted rules that define the limits of permissible actions, and on the balance of power necessary to deter in conditions of violation of the rules, which does not allow one political unit to subjugate all others. Consensus on the legitimacy of existing mechanisms – now as in the past – does not completely rule out rivalry or confrontation, but helps to ensure that competition only takes the form of a correction of the existing order, not a fundamental challenge to that order. The balance of power alone cannot ensure peace, but if it is carefully designed and strictly observed, this balance can limit the scale and frequency of fundamental confrontations and prevent them from turning into a global catastrophe.

No book is capable of containing all, without exception, the historical traditions of the international order, even within the framework of one country, which is now actively participating in the formation of the political landscape. In my work, I focus on those regions whose conceptions of order have had the greatest impact on contemporary thinking.

The balance between legitimacy and power is extremely complex and fragile; the smaller the geographic area in which it is applied, the more harmonious the cultural principles within it, the easier it is to achieve a viable agreement. But the modern world needs a global world order. The variety of entities, political units that are not related to each other historically or value-wise (with the exception of those located at arm's length), defining themselves mainly by the boundaries of their capabilities, most likely generates conflict rather than order.

During my first visit to Beijing, in 1971, to re-establish contact with China after two decades of hostility, I mentioned that China was "a land of mysteries and mysteries" for the American delegation. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai replied, “You will see for yourself that there is nothing mysterious about China. When you get to know us better, we will no longer seem so mysterious to you. There are 900 million people living in China, he added, and they see nothing unusual in their own country. In our time, the desire for a world order requires taking into account the opinions of societies whose views, until recently, have remained largely self-sufficient. The secret to be uncovered is the same for all peoples: how best to combine various historical experiences and traditions in a common world order.

Dedicated to Nancy

Copyright © 2014 Henry A. Kissinger

© Translation. V. Zhelninov, 2015

© Translation. A. Milyukov, 2015

© Russian edition AST Publishers, 2015

Introduction
What is "world order"?

We live in a historical period in which there is a persistent, at times almost desperate pursuit of a concept of world order that eludes common understanding. Chaos threatens us, and at the same time, an unprecedented interdependence is emerging: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disintegration of former states, the consequences of predatory attitudes towards the environment, the persistence of the practice of genocide, unfortunately, and the rapid introduction of new technologies threaten to exacerbate familiar conflicts, exacerbate them to the point of beyond human capabilities and the limits of reason. New ways of processing and transmitting information are uniting regions like never before, projecting local events onto the global level - but in such a way that they prevent their full understanding, while at the same time demanding from state leaders an instant reaction, at least in the form of slogans. Are we entering a new period in which the future will be determined by forces that recognize neither limits nor any order at all?

Varieties of world order

Let's not dissemble: a truly global "world order" has never existed. What is now recognized as such was formed in Western Europe almost four centuries ago, its foundations were formulated in peace negotiations in the German region of Westphalia, and without the participation - or even attention - of most countries on other continents and most other civilizations. A century of religious strife and political upheaval in Central Europe culminated in the Thirty Years' War of 1618–1648; it was a "global" fire, in which political and religious contradictions were mixed; during the course of the war, the combatants resorted to "total war" against key population centers, and as a result, Central Europe lost almost a quarter of its population - due to fighting, disease and hunger. The exhausted opponents met in Westphalia to agree on a set of measures designed to stop the bloodshed. Religious unity cracked due to the establishment and spread of Protestantism; political diversity was a logical consequence of the multiplicity of independent political units that participated in the war. As a result, it turned out that Europe was the first to perceive the familiar conditions of the modern world: a variety of political units, none of which is powerful enough to defeat all the others; adherence to conflicting principles, ideologies and internal practices, and all strive to find some kind of "neutral" rules that regulate behavior and mitigate conflicts.

The Peace of Westphalia should be interpreted as a practical approximation to reality, it does not at all demonstrate any unique moral awareness. This peace rests on the coexistence of independent states that refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs and weigh their own and others' ambitions against the principle of a general balance of power. No individual claim to the possession of truth, no universal rule, has succeeded in establishing itself in Europe. Instead, each state acquired sovereign power over its territory. Each agreed to recognize the internal structures and religious beliefs of its neighbors as realities of life and refrained from challenging their status. Such a balance of power was now seen as natural and desirable, and therefore the ambitions of the rulers acted as a counterbalance to each other, at least in theory, limiting the scope of conflicts. Separation and diversity (largely accidental in the development of European history) became the hallmarks of a new system of international order - with its own worldview, its own philosophy. In this sense, the efforts of Europeans to put out their "world" fire contributed to the formation and served as a prototype of the modern approach, when absolute judgments are abandoned in favor of practicality and ecumenism; it is an attempt to build order on diversity and containment.

If we consider the space between Europe and China, it is necessary to note the primacy in this territory of the universal concept of world order, which was proposed by Islam - with the dream of a sole, God-sanctioned rule that unites and reconciles the world. In the seventh century, Islam established itself on three continents through an unprecedented "wave" of religious exaltation and imperial expansion. After the unification of the Arab world, the capture of the remnants of the Roman Empire and the subjugation of the Persian Empire, Islam became the dominant religion in the Middle East, North Africa, many areas of Asia and parts of Europe. The Islamic version of the universal order provided for the extension of the true faith to the entire "territory of war", as the Muslims called the lands inhabited by infidels; the world is destined to become united and find harmony, heeding the word of the prophet Muhammad. While Europe was building its multi-state order, the Ottoman Empire, with Turkey as its mother country, revived this claim to sole "divinely inspired" rule and extended its power to the Arab lands, the Mediterranean basin, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. She, of course, paid attention to the emerging interstate Europe, but did not at all consider that she was observing a model to follow: the Ottomans saw the European agreements as an incentive for further Ottoman expansion to the west. As Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror put it when admonishing the Italian city-states, this early example of multipolarity in the fifteenth century: “You are twenty cities ... You are always bickering among yourselves ... There must be one empire, one faith, one power in the whole world.”

At the same time, the Westphalian principles are challenged from all sides, sometimes, surprisingly, in the name of world order. Europe intends to move away from the system of interstate relations, which it has designed itself, and henceforth adhere to the concept of united sovereignty. Ironically, Europe, which came up with the concept of the balance of power, now consciously and substantially limits the power of its new institutions. Having reduced its own military power, it has practically lost the ability to adequately respond to the violation of these universalist norms.

Legitimacy and power

The Westphalian peace treaty was signed in the middle of the 17th century, and the concept of total war was developed by German military theorists at the beginning of the 20th century; this concept proceeded from the fact that modern war has ceased to be a battle of armies and has become a battle of nations - one state, mobilizing all available resources, defeats another, crushing its "spirit". (Approx. transl.)

Ecumenism is unity in diversity, the principle of coexistence of various Christian churches. In this case, instead of the author's term, it would be more logical to use the definition of "multiculturalism". (Approx. transl.)

This refers to the state of the Sassanids on the territory of modern Iraq and Iran (in its heyday it occupied the territory from Alexandria in Egypt to Peshawar in Pakistan), which existed until the middle of the 7th century and was destroyed by the Arab Caliphate. (Approx. transl.)

. "Territory of war" (Dar-al-harb) - in Islamic theology of the land where the majority of the population are infidels, non-Muslims and hostile to it. "Territory of war" is opposed to Dar al-Islam - "territory of Islam"; between them is Dar-as-sulh - the "territory of a truce", where they do not believe in Allah, but Muslims are not persecuted. Neither in the Koran, nor in the hadiths (sayings) of the Prophet about such a division of the world is not mentioned; it is believed that theologians of the 13th-14th centuries introduced this concept into circulation. (Approx. transl.)

This refers to the transfer of a significant part of the powers of state power in a sovereign nation-state to a supranational structure, in this case, to the European Union. (Approx. transl.)

The name of the 91-year-old diplomat, almost forgotten in our country, was widely heard several years ago: he was preparing a document on strategic cooperation between the United States and Russia. And this year, he appeared in The Washington Post, warning the United States against ill-conceived actions in Ukraine.

Kissinger thaw

In Russian literature, she is better known as Brezhnevskaya, and in political science as the détente of international tension. As National Security Adviser to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger devised a strategy for strategic arms limitation negotiations that culminated in the signing of SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). These negotiations were being prepared even under Johnson - the entry of Soviet troops into Prague prevented. After that, all discussions went through a "confidential channel" with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin. The Nixon-Brezhnev summit was scheduled for the spring of 1972, which ended with the signing of the SALT-1 treaty. The following year, already in Washington, the “Treaty on the Prevention of Nuclear War” was signed, and a year later, the “Preliminary Treaty on the Ban on Nuclear Weapons Tests” was signed. Another important document of the Kissinger era is the Helsinki Accords on cooperation between the two camps in Europe. The policy of detente came to naught in 1980 after the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

Relations with China

The current colossal US-Chinese trade is largely the merit of Henry Kissinger. He did the unlikely at the time: held talks with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and prepared the Nixon-Mao Zedong summit. Kissinger's first visit to China was completely secret - organized through diplomats and the President of Pakistan. In 1972, the summit marked the beginning of cooperation between the United States and China, which de facto also constituted a silent alliance against the USSR. Because of Watergate, it only fully began to work in 1979, when the United States recognized China's rights to Taiwan and withdrew its support - this was the main condition for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Chinese side. “The Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of China. In this context, the American people will maintain cultural, commercial, and other informal ties with the Taiwanese people."

Nobel Peace Prize

Kissinger received it for settling in Vietnam. Let's remember what this settlement was like. After US President Nixon promised to withdraw troops from Vietnam, the policy of Vietnamization began - the strengthening and expansion of the Army of South Vietnam so that it could itself suppress the pro-communist National Liberation Frond of South Vietnam and the People's Army of Vietnam. But it was not so easy to ensure the military advantage of the southerners, so Kissinger took part in the development of Operation Menu. These were secret massive bombardments of Cambodia, from where the People's Army carried out raids against the Southern Army, replenished supplies. As a result, 40,000 people died, almost 30,000 civilians. This was followed by carpet bombing of North Vietnam - Freedom Rain, Linebacker I and Linebacker II - several tens of thousands more dead. At this point, the Watergate occurred, which hastened the withdrawal of troops from North Vietnam. So, for this story, Kissinger, along with a member of the Vietnamese Politburo Le Duc Tho, was awarded the Peace Prize. The Vietnamese refused it, but Kissinger took it, but did not go to the ceremony.

Soviet Jewry

Kissinger, despite the opposition of President Nixon, pursued his own line in relation to the state of Israel, in particular, in relation to Soviet Jews. Not so long ago, dialogues concerning this subject were published.
« Kissinger: The State Department issued a scathing statement about how Jews were treated in the Soviet Union.
Nixon: Oh no. What the hell!.. I thought we were done with this already...
Kissinger: Yes, but I confirmed already... I ask you to sign this document.
Nixon: All right, I'll sign it... But I ask you, Henry, to coordinate all public statements concerning the Soviet Union with me in advance. In that conversation, the Jew Kissinger uttered a phrase that he is still periodically reminded of: “The emigration of Soviet Jews is not on the list of priorities for American foreign policy. And even if they are sent to the gas chambers, this will not become an American problem, except perhaps a humanitarian one.”
Nevertheless, thanks to Kissinger's policies, 100,000 Jews emigrated from the USSR to Israel under Nixon.

Kissinger vs. Brzezinski

Kissinger and Brzezinski have always been doctrinal at odds. Zbig vs Kiss. The Washington Post recently published Kissinger's words about Brzezinski: “He is a real political prostitute. Ready to support any argument from any side. For example, in 1965 he wrote the book Peaceful Encounter, and now that we are doing just what he wrote about, he accuses us of being weak.” Newspapermen called Brzezinski and received this comment: “Henry is my friend, he probably meant “boring” (the words “whore” and “bore” are consonant in English).
And one more example of "friendship" of two patriarchs. At Brzezinski's 80th birthday, there was a kind of political colloquium where politicians argued about US-Russian relations. Brzezinski said: “If Ukraine is part of the West, part of the EU, the likelihood that Russia will accelerate its rapprochement with the West will increase. If Ukraine is excluded from the process of European integration, imperial sentiments will intensify in Russia. The idea that Ukraine, Georgia, Central Asia should be a Russian zone of influence will prevail again.”
Then Henry Kissinger stood up and defiantly walked towards the exit.
"Wait, Henry, you're not leaving because of what I say?" “I have been waiting for this moment for 30 years.”

In 1970, the socialist Salvador Allende was elected in Chile, who supported Cuba and was, of course, against the United States. Kissinger planned an operation: through the CIA, to stage a coup d'état and prevent the inauguration of a new president. The plan failed. Allende nationalized American-owned copper mines and other businesses. The Americans imposed sanctions. The CIA held two massive anti-government demonstrations, and on September 11, 1973, Allende was killed in a military coup led by Augusto Pinochet. In 1976, Chilean opposition leader Orlando Letelier, whom Kissinger helped get out of prison, was killed in Washington by a car bomb. There is evidence that Kissinger intended to write a letter to Pinochet urging him to abandon political assassinations, but he was dissuaded so as not to spoil relations with the dictator, who, of course, would not admit these accusations.

Henry - kiss

Henry Kissinger was a full blown public politician. He liked to show off in front of the cameras with actresses and models in such a way that even Mao Zedong in trade negotiations hinted at it. “We don't have much wealth. What we have a lot of is women, if you want, we can give you ten thousand.” In 1972, the Playboy Bunnies chose Kissinger as the man they would most like to date. Among Kissinger's girlfriends were the brilliant beauties Diane Sawyer, Candice Bergen, Gil St. John, Shirley MacLaine and Liv Ullman, who called him the most interesting man in her life. But in 1974, to the surprise of many, he married Nancy Muggins (this is the second marriage, the first broke up in 1964, giving Kissinger two children).

Henry Kissinger

World order

Dedicated to Nancy

Introduction

What is "world order"?

Varieties of world order

Let's not dissemble: a truly global "world order" has never existed. What is now recognized as such was formed in Western Europe almost four centuries ago, its foundations were formulated in peace negotiations in the German region of Westphalia, and without the participation - or even attention - of most countries on other continents and most other civilizations. A century of religious strife and political upheaval in Central Europe culminated in the Thirty Years' War of 1618–1648; it was a "global" fire, in which political and religious contradictions were mixed; during the course of the war, the combatants resorted to "total war" against key population centers, and as a result, Central Europe lost almost a quarter of its population - due to fighting, disease and hunger. The exhausted opponents met in Westphalia to agree on a set of measures designed to stop the bloodshed. Religious unity cracked due to the establishment and spread of Protestantism; political diversity was a logical consequence of the multiplicity of independent political units that participated in the war. As a result, it turned out that Europe was the first to perceive the familiar conditions of the modern world: a variety of political units, none of which is powerful enough to defeat all the others; adherence to conflicting principles, ideologies and internal practices, and all strive to find some kind of "neutral" rules that regulate behavior and mitigate conflicts.

The Peace of Westphalia should be interpreted as a practical approximation to reality, it does not at all demonstrate any unique moral awareness. This peace rests on the coexistence of independent states that refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs and weigh their own and others' ambitions against the principle of a general balance of power. No individual claim to the possession of truth, no universal rule, has succeeded in establishing itself in Europe. Instead, each state acquired sovereign power over its territory. Each agreed to recognize the internal structures and religious beliefs of its neighbors as realities of life and refrained from challenging their status. Such a balance of power was now seen as natural and desirable, and therefore the ambitions of the rulers acted as a counterbalance to each other, at least in theory, limiting the scope of conflicts. Separation and diversity (largely accidental in the development of European history) became the hallmarks of a new system of international order - with its own worldview, its own philosophy. In this sense, the efforts of Europeans to extinguish their "world" fire contributed to the formation and served as a prototype of the modern approach, when absolute judgments are abandoned in favor of practicality and ecumenism; it is an attempt to build order on diversity and containment.

If we consider the space between Europe and China, it is necessary to note the primacy in this territory of the universal concept of world order, which was proposed by Islam - with the dream of a sole, God-sanctioned rule that unites and reconciles the world. In the seventh century, Islam established itself on three continents through an unprecedented "wave" of religious exaltation and imperial expansion. After the unification of the Arab world, the capture of the remnants of the Roman Empire and the subjugation of the Persian Empire, Islam became the dominant religion in the Middle East, North Africa, many areas of Asia and parts of Europe. The Islamic version of the universal order provided for the extension of the true faith to the entire "war zone", as the Muslims called the lands inhabited by infidels; the world is destined to become united and find harmony, heeding the word of the prophet Muhammad. While Europe was building its multi-state order, the Ottoman Empire, with Turkey as its mother country, revived this claim to sole "divinely inspired" rule and extended its power to the Arab lands, the Mediterranean basin, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. She, of course, paid attention to the emerging interstate Europe, but did not at all consider that she was observing a model to follow: the Ottomans saw the European agreements as an incentive for further Ottoman expansion to the west. As Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror put it when admonishing the Italian city-states, this early example of multipolarity in the fifteenth century: “You are twenty cities ... You are always bickering among yourselves ... There must be one empire, one faith, one power in the whole world.”

Henry Kissinger

World order

Dedicated to Nancy

Introduction

What is "world order"?

Varieties of world order

Let's not dissemble: a truly global "world order" has never existed. What is now recognized as such was formed in Western Europe almost four centuries ago, its foundations were formulated in peace negotiations in the German region of Westphalia, and without the participation - or even attention - of most countries on other continents and most other civilizations. A century of religious strife and political upheaval in Central Europe culminated in the Thirty Years' War of 1618–1648; it was a "global" fire, in which political and religious contradictions were mixed; during the course of the war, the combatants resorted to "total war" against key population centers, and as a result, Central Europe lost almost a quarter of its population - due to fighting, disease and hunger. The exhausted opponents met in Westphalia to agree on a set of measures designed to stop the bloodshed. Religious unity cracked due to the establishment and spread of Protestantism; political diversity was a logical consequence of the multiplicity of independent political units that participated in the war. As a result, it turned out that Europe was the first to perceive the familiar conditions of the modern world: a variety of political units, none of which is powerful enough to defeat all the others; adherence to conflicting principles, ideologies and internal practices, and all strive to find some kind of "neutral" rules that regulate behavior and mitigate conflicts.

The Peace of Westphalia should be interpreted as a practical approximation to reality, it does not at all demonstrate any unique moral awareness. This peace rests on the coexistence of independent states that refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs and weigh their own and others' ambitions against the principle of a general balance of power. No individual claim to the possession of truth, no universal rule, has succeeded in establishing itself in Europe. Instead, each state acquired sovereign power over its territory. Each agreed to recognize the internal structures and religious beliefs of its neighbors as realities of life and refrained from challenging their status. Such a balance of power was now seen as natural and desirable, and therefore the ambitions of the rulers acted as a counterbalance to each other, at least in theory, limiting the scope of conflicts. Separation and diversity (largely accidental in the development of European history) became the hallmarks of a new system of international order - with its own worldview, its own philosophy. In this sense, the efforts of Europeans to extinguish their "world" fire contributed to the formation and served as a prototype of the modern approach, when absolute judgments are abandoned in favor of practicality and ecumenism; it is an attempt to build order on diversity and containment.